The Effect Of Ceo Power On Earnings Management Of Listed Firms In China: The Moderating Role Of Audit Committee Independence

Zhang, Qingping (2025) The Effect Of Ceo Power On Earnings Management Of Listed Firms In China: The Moderating Role Of Audit Committee Independence. PhD thesis, Universiti Sains Malaysia.

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Abstract

Earnings management is widely regarded as harmful because it distorts financial transparency and misleads stakeholders. Under the framework of Type Ι agency theory, this study examines the role of audit committee independence in mitigating agency problems and its moderating effect on the relationship between CEO power and earnings management. Using a GMM model, this study conducts an empirical analysis on 11,861 observations from A-share listed firms over the period 2010–2021. The findings show that CEO power positively influences various aspects of earnings management; however, this effect is weakened under the oversight of an independent audit committee, indicating its moderating role in the relationship between CEO power and earnings management. Additional contributions of this thesis include re-evaluating the measurement method for CEO power in the unique context of China, analyzing its impact on earnings management. The results support the hypothesis of agency theory, revealing that the audit committee in China plays a moderating role in the relationship between CEO power and earnings management. Robustness tests using alternative measurements confirm the reliability of the results. This study is significant in extending agency theory in emerging markets and offering practical insights into internal governance.

Item Type: Thesis (PhD)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28-70 Management. Industrial Management
Divisions: Pusat Pengajian Pengurusan (School of Management) > Thesis
Depositing User: Mr Aizat Asmawi Abdul Rahim
Date Deposited: 03 Sep 2026 07:24
Last Modified: 03 Sep 2026 07:24
URI: http://eprints.usm.my/id/eprint/64880

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