Chong, Christine Siew Pyng
(2017)
The Size And Costs Of Bribe Given And Solicited : Analyses Based On Convicted Offenders In Malaysia.
PhD thesis, Perpustakaan Hamzah Sendut.
Abstract
The main objectives of the study were to estimate the costs of bribe giving and soliciting, the factors affecting the size of bribes involved and to evaluate if penalties given out were correlated with bribe size. Annual data on convicted bribe givers and solicitors for a five year period (2010 to 2014) obtained from the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission were used. The findings suggested that bribe giving and soliciting would have cost the government a minimum revenue loss of RM23.9 million per year or the equivalent of 1.1 percent and 0.31 percent of the annual development funds allocated to health and education during this period, respectively. The minimum value of resources that might have been misallocated by bribe giving and soliciting amounted to RM166.6 million a year or about 7.6 percent and 2.2 percent of the annual development funds allocated to health and education, respectively. These are minimum estimates but not inconsequential sums. Testing of the bribe giving and soliciting functions confirmed the hypothesis that the size of bribe given and solicited varies positively and significantly with both the size of the fine and the length of imprisonment that is avoided through bribery. Contrary to the hypothesised relationship, the higher expected value of fine for bribe giving and soliciting had the opposite effect of increasing the size of the bribe offered or solicited possibly to cover the risk of being caught. And while an expectation to be jailed for offering a bribe decreases the size of bribe given, it increases the size of bribe solicited. Broadly similar results were found in the case of giving and soliciting large bribes. Finally, there was no clear and significant relationship between fines and the length of imprisonment with the size of bribe offered or solicited to suggest significant deterrent effects.
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