

**THE RADICAL JIHADIST GROUPS
AND THE DRIVING FACTORS OF
VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN INDONESIA
(2000-2020)**

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UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA

2025

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by

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Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

August 2025

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The completion of this dissertation was the result of a lengthy process of research and discussion. First of all, I would like to thank and praise God Almighty for all His mercy and grace. I am always grateful to Dr. Siti Zuliha Razali, my supervisor, for her suggestions, patience, and support throughout the research process which ran smoothly until it reached the final stage. I am also thankful to Associate Professor Dr. Mohamad Zaini Abu Bakar, my co-supervisor and previously my main supervisor, who is always open for discussion and debate so that the academic ecosystem at USM has become very productive and enjoyable.

During my PhD program at USM, colleagues and other faculty members also provided helpful feedback. I am very grateful for the comments from Professor Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Associate Professor Dr. Azmil Mohd Tayeb, Professor Mohd. Afandi Salleh, as the thesis examiners, who provided very valuable criticism and comments. On several occasions, Prof. Fauzi provided much enlightenment to the author regarding current issues in Islamism and Islamic politics. To all my fellow comrades during my studies at USM, especially Pak Taripar Samosir, mbak Atik Rachmawati, Pak Pranoto, Bung Fadli, and Pak Aris, I express my gratitude for all their friendship and kindness.

I am indebted to the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia through the Directorate of Islamic Higher Education at the Directorate General of Islamic Education, which has provided financial assistance through the 5000 Doctoral Mora Scholarship scheme. For that, I am deeply grateful for the financial support.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AQI	Al-Qaeda in Iraq
BNPT	Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme
Densus	Detasemen Khusus or Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terror
DDI	Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah
DI	Darul Islam or Islamic State
FKAAl	Forum Komunikasi Alumni Afghanistan di Indonesia
FPI	Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defender Front
GIA	Armed Islamic Group (Algeria)
HTI	Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
ICG	International Crisis Group
IM	Ikhwanul Muslimin or Moslem Brotherhood (Egypt)
ISIS	Islamic State of Syria and Iraq
JAD	Jamaah Ansharul Daulah
JAS	Jamaah Ansharus Shariah
JAT	Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid
Jl	Jemaah Islamiyah
Komji	Komando Jihad Group

MMI	Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
NII	Negara Islam Indonesia or Islamic State of Indonesia
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
Polri	Polisi Republic Indonesia or Indonesia Police
PUPJI	Pedoman Umum Perjuangan JI
TII	Tentara Islam Indonesia

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**KUMPULAN JIHAD RADIKAL DAN
FAKTOR-FAKTOR PEMACU KEGANASAN EKSTRIM
DI INDONESIA (2000-2020)**

ABSTRAK

Tesis ini mengkaji tindakan keganasan kumpulan Islamis radikal di Indonesia dari tahun 2000 hingga 2020. Tujuan kajian ini adalah untuk menganalisis faktor pendorong kemunculan keganasan Islamis, kaedah serangan dan sasarannya. Persoalan utama dalam tesis ini ialah, mengapa kumpulan radikal memilih cara ganas daripada penyertaan secara aman untuk mencapai matlamat mereka? Isu keganasan Islamis diteliti melalui perbandingan dua gelombang keganasan pasca Orde Baru: fasa pertama (2000-2009), yang melibatkan JI yang menyokong al-Qaeda, dan fasa kedua (2010-2020) yang melibatkan kumpulan jihad baru. Analisis dinamik keganasan menggunakan beberapa teori dalam gerakan sosial. Kajian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif. Data primer diperolehi melalui temu bual mendalam dengan jihadis dan bekas jihadis. Dua faktor utama mendorong keganasan jihadis Islamis: (1) faktor luaran, iaitu pengaruh ideologi jihad global pada fasa pertama keganasan; (2) faktor dalaman, iaitu penindasan oleh kerajaan semasa keganasan gelombang kedua. Didapati kegagalan mengasingkan tokoh-tokoh utama kumpulan jihad dan melemahkan pengaruh mereka telah membolehkan gerakan keganasan bertahan untuk jangka masa panjang. Penelitian ini mendapati doktrin, proses pemingkaian, pilihan taktika dan strategik, dan kapasiti organisasi merupakan faktor penting untuk menjelaskan variasi dalam keganasan Islamis radikal di Indonesia.

**THE RADICAL JIHADIST GROUPS AND
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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the acts of radical Islamist violence in Indonesia from 2000 to 2020. It aims to analyze the driving factors behind the emergence of Islamist violence, the methods of attack and their targets. The main question in this thesis is, why do radical groups choose violent means instead of peaceful participation to achieve their goals? This issue of Islamist violence is examined through a comparison between the two waves of jihadist violence in the post-New Order era: the first phase (2000-2009), which involved factions within JI supporting al-Qaeda, and the second phase (2010-2020) which involved new jihadi groups. The analysis of the dynamics of jihadist violence uses several theories from social movements. This study uses a qualitative approach. Primary data were obtained primarily through in-depth interviews with jihadists and former jihadists. Two main factors drove the jihadist Islamist violence: (1) external factors, namely the influence of global jihad ideology during the first phase of violence; (2) internal factors, namely repression by the government during the second wave of violence. This study found doctrines, framing processes, tactical and strategic choices, and organizational capacity are essential factors in explaining variations in radical Islamist violence in Indonesia.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The main objective of this thesis is to examine the factors that drive some Islamist movements in Indonesia to engage in terrorism in their effort to establish an Islamic state and the reasons why they choose violent means. After the fall of Soeharto's regime in 1998, Indonesia encountered many significant challenges; economic crisis, political polarization, separatism, communal conflicts, and acts of terror. The series of violence by radical Islamist groups has become a long-term and very dangerous threat.

During the early 2000s, Indonesia was hit by several acts of terror and violence involving one of the most active radical groups in Southeast Asia: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). On December 24, 2000, many JI members bombed 16 churches, killing 17 people and injuring dozens as a result of the attacks on the churches. Two years later, on October 12, 2002, they carried out massive bombings at two nightclubs in Bali, killing more than 200 people, most of them foreigners.

The JI cell continued its terror with the bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in 2003, the Australian Embassy in 2004, the second bombing in Bali in 2006, and in the J.W. Marriott and the Ritz Carlton hotels in 2009. Several suicide bombings targeted essential

sites that were deemed to represent the interests of the US and its Western allies. Ironically, the series of violence occurred as Indonesia enjoyed a democratic transition.¹

In subsequent years, a series of violent acts continued to occur with varying scales and patterns. After 2009, radical Islamic cells targeted domestic security forces: the Indonesian polices. Churches remained a constant target. The number of police officers killed in terror attacks increased significantly. The May 2018 incident, in which several terrorist prisoners executed five police officers, marked the peak of their brutality.²

The phenomenon of Islamist violence that continues to recur has had detrimental consequences for Indonesia, causing many deaths and resulting in social and economic impacts. Since the 2002 Bali Bombing, Indonesia has become a red zone, which indicates an unsafe situation with the danger of terrorism. The impact of the escalation of terror since the early 2000s has raised many concerns about the increasingly uncertain prospects for a democratic transition in Indonesia. The strengthening of religious extremism is also a threat to stability in the Southeast Asian region. This concern about the spread of the threat of violence is understandable, considering that in some countries in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, Islamist jihadist networks are actively carrying out acts of terror. The dangerous activities of *Jemaah Islamiah* (JI)³ with its regional and global network, especially its closeness to al-Qaeda, have become the main focus of the war on terror agenda in this region.

¹ In the early years of democratic reform, Indonesia was also hit by a number of ethnic and religious violence, such as the Dayak and Madura ethnic conflict in Sampit (Central Kalimantan), the Muslim-Christian conflict in Maluku and Poso (Central Sulawesi), as well as separatist rebellions in Aceh and Papua.

² A few days later, still in May 2008, three families of ISIS-supporters attacked a police headquarters and three churches in Surabaya. The suicide bombing at the churches killed more than 20 people.

³ The Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) is also the name of a violent Islamist group in Egypt. In this paper, all terms of JI without 'Egypt' refer to Indonesian JI.

JI and its network were primarily responsible for the terror wave in the first decade of the democratic reform era. With these acts of terrors, JI's notoriety in the eyes of the international community soared, and it became known as "Indonesia's al-Qaeda." As part of the global jihad movement, several JI exponents were also involved in terror attacks in several countries in Southeast Asia. Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, a JI bomb-making expert, was a key architect of the Manila bombings in December 2000 that killed 22 people.

The repeated acts of terror in Indonesia have led to mounting pressures and criticisms directed at the government, especially concerning the need for a more effective approach and strategy in addressing religious extremism. In the last twenty years, from 2000 to 2020, several radical Islamist groups in Indonesia have been involved in waves of terror and violence, starting from Jemaah Islamiyah, Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) Banten, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Western Indonesian Mujahideen (Mujahidin Indonesia Barat, MIB), Eastern Indonesian Mujahideen (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT), supporters of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) within the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), and other smaller cells. Besides militants affiliated with jihadi organizations, terror attacks have also involved individuals and small groups that are relatively independent (*lone wolf*).

The spiral of violence over the past two decades has raised serious questions about what motivates this radical groups to commit violence and how such acts of violence have persisted for so long. It also raises questions about the Indonesian government's capacity to address these acts of violence effectively.

Even though counter-terrorism policies in Indonesia have been considered increasingly effective, especially after the formation of the Special Anti-Terror

Detachment or *Densus 88*, this has not necessarily weakened the spread of violent ideologies. Radical Islamist cells have continued to operate, actively recruiting new members, and using diverse tactics. They have managed to survive even under the oppressive environment of the security apparatus. Ideology remains a crucial factor. As stated by a key Indonesian deradicalization official, although the police have succeeded in capturing terrorists and dismantling their networks, it has proven very difficult to eradicate their ideology (Idris, 2018, p. 83).

Some experts argue that repressive policies are more effective in crushing Islamist rebels than persuasive approaches. However, as shown in the case of Islamist resistance in Algeria in the mid-1990s, repression triggered brutal retaliation by rebels. Repression may be effective in the short term, but when the rebels survive, they frame the retaliatory violence as justified. (Hafez, 2003; Hwang, 2018). Determining how to most effectively break the cycle of violence has become a key issue among counter-terrorism experts. Currently, many countries prioritize soft power approaches, winning the hearts and minds of people, as the most important strategy.

After the decline of JI, due to many of its leaders and members being arrested and killed by *Detachment 88*, acts of terror continued by other jihadist cells, such as JAT, JAD, and lone wolves. Initially, they mainly targeted the US and Western interests, but after 2009, they shifted to attacking security forces and state officials. Dozens of Indonesian police officers were killed by jihadists, either in shootings or bombings.


The declaration of the caliphate of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/ Syam) in 2014 gave new energy to the jihad movement in Indonesia. The euphoria of jihad surged, marked by public declarations supporting Abu Bakr al Baghdady's caliphate. More than a

thousand Indonesian jihadists traveled to Syria to join ISIS in fighting the Bashar al As'ad regime. Domestically, ISIS sympathizers and supporters, primarily from Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), launched acts of terror and violence in several cities in Indonesia. In 2016 and 2017, JAD carried out two deadly terror attacks in downtown Jakarta. In May 2018, ISIS supporters also attacked and killed five police officers inside a police headquarters on the outskirts of Jakarta. Earlier the same month, three families of ISIS supporters carried out deadly suicide bombings at three churches in Surabaya, East Java.

Since the period of democratic reform, Indonesia's four elected presidents have tried to break the vicious cycle of violent extremism. During the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), Megawati Sukarno (2001-2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono or SBY (2004-2014), to Joko Widodo (2014-2024), the threat of radical Islamist has become a persistent problem. Some small radical cells even planned the assassination of two Indonesian presidents, Megawati and SBY, whom they considered stooges of the United States.

Although acts of terror and violence after 2009 were less deadly than in those in the early 2000s, they became more frequent and varied in technique. The number of suspected terrorists arrested and killed also increased compared to the figures in the first decade of the reform era (2000-2010) and the second decade (2011-2020). According to official police data, from 2000 to 2010, the Indonesian security apparatus arrested 583 suspected terrorists and killed 55 of them. From 2011 to 2020, the total number of suspected terrorists arrested and killed reached around 1649, an almost threefold increase. Details of these numbers can be seen in the table below.

Table. 1.1. Number of suspected terrorists arrested 2011-2020



Source: Data drawn from media reports.

Data regarding the number of arrests of suspected terrorists in the last decade, from 2011 to 2020, provides strong evidence of the terror threat that remains worrying. There was a significant increase from 2018 to 2020 compared to previous years. From 2011 to 2017, the average number of suspected terrorists arrested did not exceed 200, but in 2018, it almost doubled to 398. The series of arrests, which increased in number in 2018, were mainly related to actions involving ISIS supporters in Indonesia. In 2019 and 2020, those arrested decreased to 275 and 228. However, a year later, in 2021, it rose to 371.

The large number of terrorist members and sympathizers arrested occasionally shows that the jihadist Islamist ideology of violence still has many supporters. Not to mention the number of those who have chosen to remain silent to avoid the intensive hunt by the Indonesian police. Even though many terrorists have been sentenced to prison or killed, many people are still interested in joining and being involved in acts of terror. If the terror movement in the early 2000s involved many core members and activists of

jihadist organizations, such as JI, the acts of violence after 2010 involved more fluid actors. The violence acts after 2010 not only involved members of jihadi groups, but also ordinary people who were not affiliated with such groups.

The increase in the number of terrorists from 2010 to 2020 is quite ironic, considering that at the same time, the government was actively campaigning for the success of the deradicalization program. For the government, one indicator of the success of deradicalization is evident in the increasing number of terrorist prisoners participating in the program. Previously, most terrorist prisoners had rejected and boycotted the deradicalization program, especially those from JI.

In its development, the policy of imprisoning and deradicalizing terrorists has drawn harsh criticism. Several reports stated the ineffectiveness of imprisoning terrorists. Several ex-prisoners have returned to committing acts of terror. Even in detention, these jihadist cells are also actively recruiting new members and spreading their ideology. From inside the prison, two prominent jihadist figures, Abu Bakar Baasyir, and Aman Abdurrahman, actively preached and distributed their thoughts to their followers.

Based on this background, this study aims to examine the underlying motivations that drive radical Islamist groups in Indonesia to use violent methods to achieve their goals, as well as the factors that have contributed to the sustained longevity of these acts of violence from 2000 to 2020.

1.2 Problem Statement

Compared to other Muslim countries, cases of Islamist violence in Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto's authoritarian regime in 1998 have given rise to many interesting

phenomena to be studied in depth. Indonesia, which has a Muslim majority population, is far from the hot spots of violence compared to countries in the Middle East region with a long history of bloody conflicts involving radical Islamist groups. Since the 1980s, bloody feuds and conflicts triggered by religious sentiments have occurred more frequently in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, as well as several countries in South Asia, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan (Martiner, 2000, Hafez; 2003, Hegghammer; 2010). Most countries with a long history of Islamist violence are generally ruled by repressive authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. Experts consider the regime's repression of Islamist groups as a triggering factor in the escalation of conflict and violence.

Table. 1.2. Islamist Violence, Type of Regime, and Level of Repression

Cases of Violence	Democratic/ Authoritarian	Level of the State Repression
Islamist violence in Egypt involving al Jihad, Takfir wal Hijra (1970s-1980s)	Authoritarian regime under the rule of Anwar Sadat and Husni Mubarak.	High and moderat repression
Islamist violence in Algeria involving GIA (1992-1997)	Authoritarian regime under the military rule (supreme security council)	High repression
Islamist violence in New Order Indonesia involving Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) and Its cells (1970s-1980s)	Authoritarian regime under the military rule of General Soeharto	High and moderate level of repression
Islamist violence in Post New Order Indonesia (since 1999) involving JI and other violent groups ⁴	Democratic regime under the civilian supremacy	No and very low level of repression

Source: Martinez (2000), Hafez (2003), Hegghammer (2010), Muqoddas (2011)

⁴ Among others: Komando Jihad terror, Warman terror, Jama'a Imron terror.

Meanwhile, the deadly circuit of jihadist violence in Indonesia from 2000 to 2020 occurred in a more liberal and democratic political environment. This condition is very different from the era of Soeharto's leadership during the New Order (1967-1998) which was known to be authoritarian. The following statements summarize several vital issues related to Islamist jihadist violence in Indonesia.

First, the success of the democratization process has made Indonesia one of the largest democratic Muslim countries in the world. After the fall of the New Order, the government's relationship with Islamic elites in the political and social spheres was no longer marked by conflict. In Indonesia's more democratic environment, many Islamic political parties have participated in elections and gained broad access to influence national strategic policies⁵. The state no longer isolates political Islam as it did during Soeharto's regime. Several Islamic political parties, such as Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), have shown a strategic role in social and political arenas. An interesting question arises: why, in a more inclusive and less repressive political environment, do some Islamist groups choose violence over peaceful means?

Second, with regard to the change in tactics and targets in jihadist Islamist attacks, it is important to have a further explanation of what factors caused the shift from targeting Christians and the US-Western interests in 2000 to 2009 to targeting security forces, mainly police officers, and state officials after 2009. To understand the reasons behind the change in tactics and targets of their violence, it is crucial to investigate the dynamics of political interaction between actors in jihadist Islamist groups and their relationship with

⁵ At least 14 of the 48 political parties contesting in the 1999 elections were Islamic Parties.

government regarding counter-terrorism policies, as well as significant changes in the dynamics of global jihadi movement.

Third, the strength of the radical Islamism ideology is a crucial factor in the resilience of these terror groups. Although the Indonesian government claimed significant success in countering violent extremism, the cycle of terror has been repeated. This indicates that elements of thought and ideology are important resources for their long-term survival.

Based on the description above, we can raise more concise problem statements: if the emergence of Islamist violence in several Muslim countries is generally caused by repressive policies against Islamic groups and the absence of political participation, why did the acts of violence by Indonesian Islamist jihadists take place in such opposite conditions: during a period of more inclusive and democratic government that was more friendly to Muslim aspirations? With the relative absence of repression by the security forces against Islamist groups in the early years after the collapse of the New Order, what prompted them to instigate terror and violence? This research will answer those problems

1.3 Research Objectives

There are three main objectives to be achieved through this study:

1. To analyse what factors influenced jihadist Islamist groups to choose acts of violence and extremism over participating in the democratic process.
2. To analyse ideological developments and thoughts that justify Islamist violence.
3. To analyse changes in their strategies and methods of violence

1.4 Research Problems

Based on the reasons above, this research focuses on three main problems, namely:

1. Why did the jihadist Islamist groups choose violence to realize their objectives instead of peaceful participation in a democratic political system?
2. How are the ideological debates and thoughts among jihadist Islamist groups?
3. What are the strategies and tactics of jihadist Islamist groups in their violent actions, and how do they select their targets?

From the three questions above, derivatives of other questions can be broken down in more detail, as seen in the table below.

1.5 Detail Questions

I

1. What was the process of the emergence and development of the Islamist-jihadist groups at the beginning of democratic reform?
2. How has the development of the global jihad movement influenced the formation of the ideology and terror acts of Indonesian jihadist Islamist groups?
3. How did domestic factors, especially government policies in combating terrorism, influence jihadist Islamist groups to commit acts of violence?

II

1. How and what was the discourse of Islamic thought among jihadist Islamist groups related to the use of violence? and how did they define who were their friends and who were their enemies?
2. How their thoughts and doctrines are the basis for JI and other jihadist groups to carry out violence?
3. What were their framing processes to justify the attacks on the far and the near enemies?

III

1. What are the strategies and tactics of Jemaah Islamiyah in its terror acts against the US and Western interest
2. How have the strategies and tactics changed in jihadist Islamist violence groups post-JI?
4. How effective are their strategies and tactics?

1.6 Operational Definition of the Study

This research uses several keywords: radical Islamism, jihadists Islamist, global jihad, social movements, religious violence.

1.6.1 Radical Islamism and Jihadist Islamist

In this study, Islamism is defined as a political ideology whose primary source is the interpretation of Islamic teachings. Islamism refers to a view that demands the establishment of a state and social order based on Islamic law or Sharia (Hamid, 2018). Radical Islamism refers to an uncompromising understanding of Islam that seeks to completely restore the current polluted society to a pure Islamic society, the secular regime to a sharia government under authority of God or *al hakimiyya lillah* (Calvert, 2010, pp. 288-289). Modern radical Islamism is heavily influenced by Sayyid Qurb's radical thought. Meanwhile, Islamists refer to individuals and organizations that adhere to this Islamic totalism, believing that Islamic teachings are holistic and perfect. For them, Islam is a religious belief (*ad-din*) and a concept of political authority (*ad-daulah*). In their imagined model of Islamic political power, Sharia must be the highest source of law and should play an important role in private and public life as well as government affairs. The term Islamism also describes the position of individuals and institutions that believe that the doctrines of Islam are the most important reference for them. They believe that Islamic teachings are perfect or *kaffah*, covering all aspects of human life, so the doctrines must be implemented in political, economic, cultural, and other political matters (Volpi, 2011, p. 9).

As an ideology, Islamism has many faces. On the moderate face, Islamism offers softer Islamic doctrines that are open to compromise with secular ideology, including democracy. Radical Islamism, meanwhile, demands more assertive expression of the supremacy of Islam, through the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of sharia. The adherents of Islamism, Islamists, also have many differences in

understanding and interpreting Islamic teachings. Esposito, Rahim, and Ghobadzadeh (2018, p. 2) noted that the moderate wing of Islamists tends to interpret Islam and Islamic sources flexibly and contextually. On the other hand, the conservative wing tends to interpret the scriptures rigidly and literally.

Islamist groups have adopted various strategies or methods to realize its goals. Moderate political Islamists mostly choose the democratic participation model to realize their goals. They form Islamic political parties and participate in elections to compete with secular parties. There are also moderate but apolitical Islamists; they recognize and adhere to the state's official political system but avoid getting directly involved in politics. Salafi groups that only focus on da'wa and education activities fall into this category.

In contrast to the moderates, radical Islamists choose anti-system activities in the sense of refusing to recognize and be involved in state regulations that they consider inconsistent with the vision of Islam. In terms of attitude and behavior, they can be distinguished into two types. The first is organizations such as Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir, which steadfastly refuse to acknowledge and participate in a system that it considers to have no Islamic legitimacy. For Hizbut Tahrir, the only legitimate authority in Islam is the caliphate system. However, in expressing its demand, Hizbut Tahrir avoids violent actions (perhaps due to temporary strategic and tactical considerations) but campaigns peacefully.

Secondly, there are Islamist groups that totally reject compromise with a system that they consider to be contrary to Islamic principles (whether a democratic or authoritarian-secular government). For them, there is only one way to deal with this anti-Islamic system: fighting to replace it with Islamic rule, even by violent means (Hilmy,

2010; Platzdach, 2009). Those who hold this view are called by several terms, including Islamist-extremists, Islamist terrorists, jihadists Islamist and Salafi jihadists.

This thesis uses the term radical Islamists interchangeably with jihadists Islamist. The term radical Islamists refers to a more general understanding, especially Islamic groups that committed violence prior to the development of the ideology of global jihad and also those who committed violence with religious motives but were not directly influenced by al-Qaeda's global jihad ideology. The definition radicalization in this study refers to processes by groups and individuals who adopt extreme belief systems, including the will to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to influence societal change (Allen in Vidino, 2011). The use of the term jihadist Islamist is also more relevant to refer Islamist groups that committed violence after the fall of New Order regime compared to Salafi Jihadists (Barton, 2009). However, not all violent groups claim to be Salafists. Here, the notion of radical Islamist and jihadist Islamists refers to the people who have an extreme understanding of Islamic doctrines, which then justifies violent means to form an Islamic political order.

1.6.2 Radical Islamism as a Social Movement

The term radical Islamism, for contemporary radical Islamic groups, such as al-Qaeda, ISIS, al-Shabab, Boko Haram, Jabhat Nusrah, and their networks, refers mainly to extreme Salafist groups. The term *Salafy* itself comes from '*al salaf al shalih*,' which refers to the early generations of the Muslim community, the life of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, who were considered to reflect pious behavior and a mirror of pure Islamic teachings (Ismail, 2021, p. 12). For the Salafists, the generation of *al-salaf al-*

saleh has provided a perfect example of the attitude and behavior of every Muslim. Salafists strictly believe that only the Koran and hadith are the source of the legitimacy of religious thought and action. Salafist is synonymous with a more literalist and puritanical approach to Islamic doctrine and practice than mainstream Islamic traditions. (Hegghammer in Meijer, 2009, p. 249).

The theological-religious views of the Salafists lean heavily on the teachings of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyya, and Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab. Even though they have the same reference, Salafist continues to develop in several variants. Wictorowicz divides Salafist groups into three types: First, Salafi purists, namely those who avoid getting involved in politics or are non-political; Second, politico-Salafy, also called Salafy *haraki*, which has a political or power orientation; and, Third, jihadist Salafy, who prioritize uncompromising attitude and confrontational actions (Wictorowicz, 2006). Some of the differences between the three are characterized by the fact that purists Salafis emphasize the method of da'wa, which is non-violence, the purification of Islam, and the development of education. Politico-Salafy applies the doctrines by involving themselves in the political arena. According to them, this involvement in politics is vital to ensuring the enactment of God's law. The *manhaj* of politico-Salafy was shown by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (IM), which was involved in the democratic process by participating in elections. Meanwhile, Salafy jihadists believe that revolutionary jihad with violence suits the current situation and conditions. They balked at compromising with elements they considered heretical, such as invitations to join political parties and be active in parliament.

Salafi-Wahabi doctrines and the thoughts of Sayyid Qutb heavily influence the ideological roots of contemporary jihadist Islamist groups. Their concepts of monotheism, ignorance, and emphasis on the centrality of God's authority, or al *hakimiyyah lillah*, borrowed a lot from Qutb's thought (Lav, 2011). Qutb's ideas on takfiri and jihad, which were later developed in a more radical formulation by Abdus Salam al-Faraj (1954-1982), a prominent figure in the Egyptian jihad movement, also made an essential contribution to the development of contemporary Salafi jihadist ideology. In al-Faraj's belief, the jihad movement must prioritize the overthrow unjust rulers and the taking of power (Maher, 2016, p. 42). In that way, an Islamic state can be realized.

Meanwhile, Abdullah Azzam has had a profound influence by transforming the concept of jihad from a local dimension to a global one. He is famous for his fatwa, which obliges all Muslims to participate in jihad when Islamic territory is attacked or occupied by infidel enemies. Ayman al Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden, and later sheik Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi are the most influential ideologues and advocates for this global jihad among jihadist activists within al-Qaeda and its networks.

Most Islamist activists in Indonesia who take the path of violence against what they call the enemies of Islam fall into this category of Salafi jihadists. They often form frames in "black and white" to define good Muslims and bad Muslims, for example, pure Islam versus polluted Islam (*bid'a*), faith in the oneness of Allah (*tawhid*) versus devotion to taghut, Allah's sovereignty versus human authority. Monotheism is also the foundation of their political theology about the necessity to only commit to and carry out God's laws and reject man-made legal rules as adhered to in a democratic system.

The doctrine of *al-wala wal bara* provides the basis for the Salafis to define who are friends and enemies in da'wa. All of them--the rulers and the people who support and obey those secular man-made rules and oppose the implementation of Islamic law--are groups that must be opposed (*al-bara*). The *takfiri* doctrine held by Salafis jihadist group has created a definite wall of separation so that there is no compromise for those who deviate and reject Islamic law as they believe (Brachman, 2009). Their *takfiri* attitude that they are often accuse their opponents of has created an awful image for adherents of Salafis jihadists. Their opponents have called them as the Neo-Khariji. The political theology of the Salafist-jihadists narrows down to the goal of establishing a caliphate, which is considered the only legitimate form of political authority from an Islamic perspective.

In Indonesia, the jihadist group involved in deadly bombings in the first years of the 2000s were influenced by al-Qaeda's global jihadist ideology. After the establishment of ISIS in 2014, some of the jihadists who previously stood with al-Qaeda have switched to supporting ISIS. At that time, there was a sharp polarization among the Islamist Jihadists in Indonesia between those still loyal to the al-Qaeda line and those who sided with ISIS (Hamid & Mubarak, 2018). Some of the widely known Jihadist Islamist groups in Indonesia include Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI), Negara Islam Indonesia or NII Ring Banten, the Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), The West Indonesia Mujahidin (Mujahidin Indonesia Barat, MIB), the East Indonesia Mujahidin (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT), Jamaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD), and Neo-Jemaah Islamiyah or Neo-JI.

In this study, several radical Islamism groups are categorized social movement driven by religious elements. These groups meet the criteria for social movements

characterized as rational, purposeful, and organized actions (Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 14). Their collective actions are to overthrow the existing authority of power and replace it with a new authority. As a rational and purposeful action, a social movement calculates costs and benefits, consider organizational resources and establish strategic networks for the survival of their struggle (Porta, 1995, p. 2-3).

As an established organization, Jemaah Islamiyah has a systematic organizational structure and has general guideline known as PUPJI. The guideline contains the principles of struggle, strategic steps for establishing the Islamic State, operational guidelines, principles and objectives of JI, and details of organizational structure. As a social movement, JI understands that to realize its Islamic ideals, it needs various infrastructures and robust resources as supporting elements. JI formed a reliable military force. This process has worked through his military training in Afghanistan since the late 1980s and continued later in its military training in the Southern Philippines. JI has an extensive network through its interactions with other jihadist movements, such as al-Qaeda, MILF, Abu Sayyaf, resistance groups in Southern Thailand, and also *Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia* (KMM). The JI's network has helped its survival as a cross-country jihadist movement.

1.6.3 Global Jihad

The concept of jihad in Islam is one of the themes that has always been debated within the Islamic community. The significance of jihad in the history of classical Islamic politics is mainly related to the expansion of Islam, which took place massively after the era of the Prophet Muhammad. The Islamic territory expanded in the hands of the caliphs,

stretching from Arabia, through Spain to India and Central Asia. Classical jihad is also closely related to defending Muslim territory from enemy attacks. The meaning of jihad and how it is implemented have continued to develop over time. In practice, the interpretation of jihad has been influenced by various agendas and subjective interests of the conflicting groups. According to Hillenbrand (2015, p. 122) the development of the interpretation of the doctrine of jihad in Islamic history are closely related to the response to various interests and challenges in a particular historical context.

The term jihad comes from the word "jahada", which can be interpreted as hard work or earnest effort (Khadduri, 2002, p. 46). In the context of da'wa and Islamic practice, the meaning of jihad includes all efforts to spread the faith and teachings of Islam throughout the world. Jihad also has a double dimension, emphasizing on the one hand a more personal aspect as an individual Muslim's attempt to control his passions but also being interpreted as a physical struggle: fighting against the enemies of Islam. In the modern era, from the 19th to the early 20th century, many Islamic scholars and leaders in several regions promoted jihad as a form of holy war or war for the sake of Allah in their efforts to fight colonialism (Bonner, 2006, p. 157). The call for jihad has become a religious justification for expelling the invaders who have occupied Muslim countries. In many Muslim countries, the call for *jihad fi sabilillah* has become an effective means of mobilization to fight colonialism compared to calls with nationalistic or tribalistic nuances.

As Piters (1979, p. 41), states, the rhetoric of jihad has consistently emerged in wars between Muslims and colonial powers since the 18th century. The call for jihad emerged when Muslims fought against the British colonial rule in India, in the Shaykh

Abdul Qadir's movement in Algeria against the French colonialists, in the al-Mahdi movement in Sudan, the resistance of the Sanusi congregation in Libya against Italy, and also in the declaration of jihad by the Ottoman caliphate in 1914 during the First World War. In Indonesia, Acehnese warriors called for a *jihad fi sabilillah* war against Dutch infidels in the early 20th century. In the battle in Java in 1945, the ulama also declared a Jihad Resolution which required every Muslim to participate in the nationalistic war against the British-led Allied Forces (Bruinessen, 1994, p. 59). Indeed, jihad refers to self-defense from enemy threats and also to offensive views to expand the territory of Islamic rule. In some Islamic thought literature, including those that grow among Salafi-jihadists, defensive jihad was considered more important (Maher, 2016, p. 35). The choice of which is more important, defensive jihad or offensive jihad, is generally very dependent on situational considerations and various other subjective considerations.

The call for jihad also emerged during the long conflict between Islamic groups and the military regime in Egypt in the 1960s to the early 1980s, involving radical Islamists, such as al-Jihad and Takfir wal Hijra, and also in the rebellion of the Juhayman al Utaibi group in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Their acts of violence were mainly due to their dissatisfaction with government policies, which they considered highly reprehensible from an Islamic point of view. The radicals consider themselves to have a sacred duty to overthrow rulers who have betrayed Islamic law and replace them with Islamic rule.

In the late 1980s to 1990s, calls for jihad by Islamist groups continued, not in the framework of colonial wars or against rulers but in the dimension of global jihad. The doctrine of global jihad emerged from the battlefield in Afghanistan. Unlike previous calls for jihad that were limited in scope, this type of global jihad is beyond the boundaries of

the nation-state. The global jihad ideology always emphasizes Muslims as a united ummah who have shared obligations and responsibilities. The pioneer of the global jihad is Abdullah Azzam, a scholar educated at al-Azhar and a Palestinian who fought with mujahideen groups in Afghanistan (Hegghammer, 2020). In the classical era, Ibn Taimiyyah once issued a fatwa regarding the obligation of jihad for every Muslim to defend Muslim lands controlled by the enemy (Kelsay, 2007, p. 117). With the same pretext, Azzam called on Muslims around the world to wage jihad in Afghanistan which was being controlled by the communist regime backed by Soviet Union.

The context of calling for global jihad was primarily meant to raise awareness among Muslims to share responsibility for defending their Muslim brothers in other regions, especially in Afghanistan and Palestine, which were at the time occupied by the enemy. In one of his famous works, *Ilhaq Bil Qafilah*, Abdullah Azzam stated that if the enemy enters the land of the Muslims, then jihad becomes a mandatory (*fard ain*). According to him, most Islamic scholars have agreed that jihad is currently *fard ain*; Muslims will forever be sinful until Islamic territory is liberated from colonization by infidels. The nature of the obligation to wage jihad is the same as the obligation for Muslims to practice prayer and fasting during Ramadan (Azzam, 2006, p. 73-75).

The main focus of Abdullah Azzam's call at that time was to liberate Palestine from the occupation of the Israeli Zionists and to expel the Communist Soviets from Afghanistan. The spirit to "defend Muslim brothers who are being oppressed" at that time encouraged many young Muslims from various countries to join the jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and several other areas from the mid-1980s to the 1990s. This global jihad ideology became increasingly popular and gained widespread support alongside

Osama bin Laden's calls. Gerges (2009, p.1) mentions the phenomenon of jihad that crosses national borders as the internationalization of jihad.

After the death of Abdullah Azzam in 1989, the idea of global jihad continued to inspire important jihadist Islamist figures in various countries, including several al-Qaeda elites. Through its two central figures, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden, the call for global jihad became increasingly prominent in many Muslim countries. Osama Bin Laden modified Abdullah Azzam's concept of jihad by giving it a more offensive dimension: the call for jihad was not only to liberate oppressed Muslim countries from foreign enemies but also to fight the enemies of Islam wherever they are (Bonner, 2006, p.163). This call for offensive global jihad has received much support from jihadist groups in various countries. They, who feel disappointed and angry with the current condition of the Islamic world, responded enthusiastically by attacking the many interests of the United States of America in Somalia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and several other Muslim countries.

1.6.4 Religious Violence

The relationship between religion and violence is a matter of debate among experts. There are many views among experts, including among social scientists, as to whether the religious violence that has occurred from the ancient times to the modern era was caused directly religious doctrines or by factors outside of doctrine, such as economic, socio-political, cultural and other conflicts. However, many experts agree that religion in practice has two different faces. Religion can be a driving factor for conflict and violence, but it can also play an important role in promoting peace and conflict resolution. (Appleby,

2000; Kippenberg, 2011; Juergensmeyer, 2022). Islam, both in its social and political roles, also cannot escape from the dynamics of the double face. The bad image of contemporary Islam as a cruel religion, especially after the emergence of al-Qaeda and the September 11, 2001 tragedy, is widely associated with acts of violence by radical Islamist groups.

Religious violence is a variety of acts of violence (torture, murder, and acts of terror) that are primarily motivated by religious belief and find their justification in literalistic interpretations of scriptures and other sources of religious teaching. Long before the emergence of years marked by violence fueled by the global ideology of jihad, religious violence involving Christian extremists had occurred in a number of Western countries. They attacked and bombed a number of abortion clinics in the US under the pretext of defending religious purity. The 1995 bombing by Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma that killed more than 160 people and the Brenton Tarrant massacre at a New Zealand Mosque on March 15, 2019, which killed dozens of people, were all examples of violent acts caused by religious bigotry. Likewise, the sarin gas attack by followers of the Aum Shinrikyo sect on the Tokyo Subway in 1995 had similar reasons. Asahara Shoko, the leader of this sect, believed their actions were noble deeds: to purify society of sins. (Lifton, 2000; Reader, 2013)

At least in the last two decades, most acts of terror and violence in many countries have involved more Islamic militant groups than any other. It is not surprising, then, that on the list of terrorist organizations issued by many countries in Europe and America, as well as international institutions (such as the EU and the UN), the majority are radical Islamist groups. Of the 68 foreign terrorist organizations on the list of the United States