

**THE CHALLENGES OF BOKO HARAM
INSURGENCY: IMPLICATIONS FOR NIGERIA'S
NATIONAL SECURITY, 2009-2017**

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NATIONAL SECURITY, 2009-2017**

by

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAIN	Action Against International Nigeria
ANSAs	Armed Non-State Actors
APC	All Progressives Congresses
APC	Arewa People's Congress
AQC	Al Qaeda Core
AQIM	Al Qaeda in Maghreb
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BH	Boko Haram
BHI	Boko Haram Insurgency
BHT	Boko Haram Terrorist
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJTF	Civilian Joint Task Force
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CT	Counterterrorism
CTC	Counter Terrorism Centre
CTS	Critical Terrorist Studies
DCCN	Da'wah Coordination Council of Nigeria
DSS	Department of State Security
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FLQ	Quebec Liberation Front
GDP	Gross Domestic Products

GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GPMG	General-Purpose Machine Guns
GPS	Global Positioning System
GTI	Global Terrorist Index
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IDMC	Internally Displaced Monitoring Centre
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
IEP	Institute of Economic and Peace
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
IOM	International Organization on Migration
IPOB	Independent People of Biafra
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IS	Islamic State
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISWAP	Islamic State-West Africa Province
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JTF	Joint Task Force
KII	Key Informants Interview
KKK	Ku Klux Klan
LGA	Local Government Area
LRA	Lord Resistance Army
MASSOB	Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta

MLN-T	Tupamaros National Liberation Movement
MNJTF	Multi-National Joint Task Force
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
MUJAO	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
NACTEST	National Action on Terrorist
NBS	National Bureau Statistics
NDA	Niger Delta Avengers
NDVF	Niger Delta Volunteer Force
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NLC	Nigerian Labour Congress
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NYSC	National Youth Service Corps
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONFF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPC	Oodua People's Congress
PDP	People Democratic Party
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PMC	Private Military Contractors
RAF	Red Army Faction
RC	Red Cross
RCN	Revolutionary Council of Nigeria
RIFU	Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SALWs	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SEMA	State Emergency Management Agency
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army

SRS	Simple Random Sampling
SSS	State Security Service
SVBIED	Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
UNHCR	United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA	United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNODC	United Nation Office on Drug and Crimes
USSR	Union Soviet Socialist Republic
VBIEDs	Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
VNSA	Violent Non-State Actors
VSF	Victim Support Fund
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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**CABARAN PEMBERONTAKAN BOKO HARAM: IMPLIKASI KEPADA
KESELAMATAN NASIONAL NIGERIA, 2009 – 2017**

ABSTRAK

Penyelidikan ini mengkaji keganasan Boko Haram serta terhadap keselamatan negara Nigeria, merangkumi skop kajian dari tahun 2009 hingga 2017. Skop kajian ini dipilih bermula apabila kumpulan pengganas Boko Haram bertindak secara lebih ganas. Tempoh ini menyaksikan serangan yang berterusan dan secara kejam oleh kumpulan pengganas BH di Nigeria dan memberi kesan buruk terhadap landskap keselamatan negara Nigeria. Teori asas kajian ini memberi penekanan terhadap Teori Anomie oleh Emile Durkheim dan Robert K. Merton. Kaedah kualitatif dalam penyelidikan inkuiri digunakan untuk menjana data dan menggunakan kaedah analisis kandungan sebagai metodologinya. Data kajian ini diperolehi melalui temu bual informan utama (KII) dan perbincangan kumpulan fokus (FGD). Seramai 210 responden terlibat dalam kajian ini, 30 temu bual mendalam untuk KII, dan 18 perbincangan kumpulan daripada 10 peserta dalam setiap kelompok kedua-dua negeri Adamawa dan Borno. Responden kajian dipilih menggunakan teknik persampelan bertujuan dan kriteria daripada mereka yang memainkan peranan aktif dalam memerangi peperangan keganasan Boko Haram dan mereka yang terjejas secara langsung oleh keganasan. Data yang dikumpul menggunakan analisis kandungan dan pengekodan. Hasil penyelidikan mendedahkan bahawa punca kepada kemunculan kumpulan pengganas Boko Haram di timur laut Nigeria adalah kemiskinan yang berleluasa, perubahan iklim, kepimpinan yang tidak berkesan, sistem kehakiman yang korup, ketiadaan

toleransi agama, rasuah, budaya samseng politik, dan pengabaian oleh ibu bapa. Kelolosan sempadan Nigeria memudahkan pengambilan ahli baru dari negara jiran dengan memberi sedikit dorongan kewangan kepada mereka. Sehubungan itu, kajian ini mengesyorkan antara lain bahawa pemimpin kerajaan, agama dan masyarakat harus bekerjasama dan memulakan program pemekaan dan pencerahan untuk membongkar ideologi pengganas Boko Haram. Selain itu, kerajaan harus menggalakkan dakwah yang membawa mesej keamanan dan perpaduan yang betul. Para ulama dan pemimpin politik mempunyai peranan yang besar dalam mencapai kejayaan ini. Ideologi ini tidak boleh dibiarkan bergema di kalangan rakyat, malah ia perlu disangkal oleh ulama Islam. Konsep takfir sepatutnya menjadi keutamaan Majlis Ulama.

**THE CHALLENGES OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY: IMPLICATIONS
FOR NIGERIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY, 2009 – 2017**

ABSTRACT

This research examines challenges of Boko Haram insurgency and implications for Nigeria's national security, with the scope covering the period from 2009 until 2017. The scope is purposely chosen to start from when the *BH* terrorist group became more violent. This period witnessed consistent and ruthless attacks by the *BH* terror group in northeastern Nigeria, with devastating consequences on the national security architecture of Nigeria. The theoretical basis of this study lays emphasis on Emile Durkheim and Robert K. Merton's Anomie Theory. Qualitative methods of research inquiry were used to generate data and Content Analysis as methodology. The data were collected using the key informant interview (KII) and focus group discussion (FGD). A total of 210 respondents participated in this study, 30 in-depth interviews for the KII, and 18 group discussions of 10 participants in each cluster of both Adamawa and Borno states. The participants are selected using the purposive and criterion sampling techniques of those who played active roles in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency and those directly affected by Boko Haram terrorism. Data collected were analysed using content analysis and coding. The findings of the research among others reveal that the root causes of Boko Haram terrorist group in northeastern Nigeria includes prevalent poverty, climate change, ineffective leadership, a corrupt judicial system, religious intolerance, corruption, political thuggery, and parental negligence. The porosity of Nigeria's borders makes it easier for recruitment from the neighbouring countries with some financial inducement to the new recruits. The study therefore recommends among other things

that the government, religious, and community leaders should collaborate and embark on sensitization and enlightenment programmes to debunk Boko Haram terrorist's ideology. Also, the government should encourage the preaching of the right messages of peace and unity. The religious scholars and political leaders have a massive role to play in achieving this feat. The ideology should not be allowed to resonate with the people; it has to be debunked by the Islamic scholars. Resolving the problem of takfirism should be the priority of the Council of Ulama.

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Since the end of the Cold war there has been a paradigm shift in war from conventional to nonconventional or asymmetric warfare. This period also coincided with the increase and proliferation of Armed Non-State Actors (ANSA) who engaged in protracted asymmetric violence, particularly terrorism. Accordingly, the Armed Non-State Actors (ANSA) avoid conventional battle spaces where they are weakest and rather use complex terrain such as jungles, mountains and urban areas to mask their activities (Kaplan, 2013). Globally, the Armed Non-State Actors (ANSA) has continued to pose a threat to the legitimacy of the plagued countries and to the stability of the international system as well. These new wars take the form of intrastate asymmetric warfare in various parts of the globe. A good number of these VNSAs that operate across the globe are terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Syria (ISIS), the Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Lashkar-e-Toba in India, the Italian Red Brigade, Lebanon's Hezbollah, the Syrian Liberation Front in Syria, Hamas and Al Fatah in Palestine, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) against the British. The Provisional IRA exploit included the conduct of about 1,300 bomb attacks leading to IRA control of large urban areas in Belfast and Derry between 1971 and 1972 (Taylor, 2011). The areas were no-go areas even to the British Army's one-ton armoured vehicles. On 21 July 1972, in the space of 75 min, the Provisional IRA detonated over 22 bombs in Belfast leading to the death of 11 people (including two soldiers and a loyalist volunteer) with over 130 persons injured. This prompted the British to conduct Operation MOTORMAN. The

British were able to quell the terrorism with the use of an overwhelming military force of over 27,000 strength and a fleet of Armoured Royal Engineers demolition vehicles. It also inserted adequately manned security posts in recaptured areas (Galula, 2010). Thus, the capability of the British military to deter the asymmetric warfare led to the takeover of the earlier no-go-areas in Derry and Belfast areas.

In Indonesia, the Violent Non-State Actors (ANSA) in Aceh was waged by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) between December 1976 and August 2005 in a bid to make the province of Aceh independent from Indonesia. The separatist terrorism was designated as the “Aceh Disturbance”. One of the grievances of the Acehnese was the perceived marginalisation with respect to the distribution of revenues and benefits derived from the exploitation of Aceh’s oil resources. The government of Indonesia used its Armed Forces and other strategies to curb the terrorism; however, the menace lasted for 29 years. During this period, about 15,000 people lost their lives, about half a million persons were displaced, some critical infrastructures destroyed and it caused a downturn in crucial activities of the country; thereby impeding their economic growth.

It is inferred from the foregoing that efforts to curtail asymmetric warfare in a global context entails political, diplomatic, military, economic, social, and security measures intended to deny insurgents freedom of space, thereby preventing the recurrence of armed violence. According to Stanford (2015), asymmetric warfare demands capabilities different from those required in conventional insurgencies.

The African continent is not exempted from the activities of ANSAs that have repeatedly accounted for the broad insecurity and grave humanitarian catastrophe. The surge in internal crises and insecurity in many African countries

raises doubts over statehood status of several African states, particularly in the aftermath of the the cold war era because of the challenges and threats posed by internal revolt and civil unrest. This is a pointer that many African countries lack the least requirements that pronounce it as a state, which Max Weber (1985) conceptualised as a state that possess absolute control over the capacity to utilise viciousness. In some states, violent activities have created a situation where political sovereignty and national legitimacy are ambiguous and perpetually under threat. This has inherently complicated the internal crises in many African countries, reversing the development and recovery process in many states on the continent. Africa is one of the most violent-prone continents of the world. The continent has been witnessing a number of violent armed conflicts, ethno-linguistic disputes, political crises, boundary conflicts and religious fanaticism (Nyang, 1984; Ewalefoh, 2020). For the past few decades, many African countries have continued to experience violent armed conflicts in magnitude and intensity. These conflicts, as averred by Yusuf (2017), are accompanied by devastating and worrisome humanitarian consequences. Accordingly, there are lots of Armed Non-State Actors (ANSA) spread across the continent of Africa such as the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) of Uganda, Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), Al Shabaab of Somalia, the Janjaweed of Darfur in Sudan, the Al Qaeda in Maghreb (AQIM) of Algeria and Mali, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) of Algeria and Mali, Sierra Leonean Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the M23 Rebels of D.R. Congo and Nigeria's *BH* terrorist group, amongst others.

Nigeria has had her own fair share of the activities of Armed Non-State Actors (ANSA) in several parts of the country over the years. The current being the activities orchestrated by Armed Non-State Actors (ANSA) known as the “*Jama 'at Ahlsunah Lid-da-wa Wal-Jihad*” and the “*Jama 'atuAnsuralMusliminaFibiladis Sudan*” also known as Boko Haram (BH) terrorist group. The group’s purported aim is to establish Islamic State in Nigeria, including the implementation of Sharia Law across the nation. The BH unifying force is its ideology which is propagated with a narrative. The terrorist group’s ideology affirms their radical disposition that any individual from the group who battled and got killed in the cause of destroying the modern state formation and government institution would consequently access “*Aljanna*” (Paradise). In an interview that formed the main cover of the TELL Magazine (March 21, 2005), the founder of the *BH* terrorist group, late Mohammed Yusuf, stated the objective of the group:

The mission of the *BH* terrorist group was to establish an Islamic state where orthodox Islam is practiced. Orthodox Islam frowns at Western Education and working in the civil service because it is sinful. Hence, all government institutions, including security agencies like the police, military, and other para-military personnel, should be humiliated.

This mission pronouncement by late Yusuf has removed all doubts about whether the *BH* can be categorized as radical Islamists. In this respect, Adefuye (2012) aligned himself with the fact that BH is a radical Islamist group. This is because of the *BH* terrorist group’s targets, utterances, and activities which are starkly spelt out in sustained confrontations with Nigeria as a country (Animashaun, 2012).


Nigeria is presently confronted with one of the most troublesome and dangerous crises in its historical development since 1999 when the country returned to democratic rule after sixteen military interregnum years. The nation has been battling with corruption, bad governance, economic recession, inflation, increment in costs of oil by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), economic deregulation, privatisation policies, liberalisation, devaluation of the currency, trade barriers, civil conflicts which are accepted to be the main thrust of the development of ANSAs as ethnic or religious activists (Bukola, 2010). These scenarios have exacerbated the emergence of underdevelopment by increasing various violent clashes in the country that have impeded nation-building and national unity. Nigeria's Fourth Republic is faced with a myriad of violent clashes. Between 1999 and 2004, Nigeria witnessed more than 1000 instances of violent conflicts that resulted in the death of almost 50,000 individuals, with a lot more internally displaced, and billions of naira lost (Olaniyi, 2005:11). The intensity and rate of killings, kidnappings, theft, bombarding, an uprising, among others, are disturbing. Nigeria has faced a rapid growth in ethnoreligious militia groups across the federation. For instance, the Niger Delta militant group, the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), The Piracy are in the South-South region. While the other security threats include the Yan Daba in Kano, Aguleri-Umuleri crisis, Ife-Modakeke, Urhobo-Itsekiri-Ijaw, Andoni-Ndoni, Tiv-Jukun, Zango-Kataf crises, these pose serious threats to Nigeria unity and stability (Omoweh & Okanya, 2005).

The various conflicts presented severe challenges to Nigeria's national security as they keep posing dangers to the Nigerian state unabated. Be that as it may, the more disturbing over the last decade is the activities of the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) in the South-South region, Oodua People's Congress (OPC) in

South West, the Bakassi Boys Vigilante Group, and Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) of the South East region, the Arewa People’s Congress (APC), Fulani herdsmen and the BH extremists in NE.

Figure 1.1

Illustration of Nigeria’s security threats



Source: Adopted from Hassan(2018)

BH came into the public glare in 2002 in Maiduguri and became brutal, violent, and radical since 2009. Okene (2018) asserts that it started with the vague intent of instituting Shariah (Islamic Law and governance) starting from Borno and eventually, Nigeria. Its advocate and initiator, Muhammad Yusuf (1970 – 2009), was

born on 29 January, 1970 in Yobe State and earned Qur'anic knowledge, exegesis, Arabic, and Hadith. His active political Islam activities came to the fore in 1999. By 2002, Yusuf had become popular primarily through the mobilization of youths for social works like itinerant artisan works like wheel-barrow rental, petty building contracts, and motorcyclists transport system. The group clashed with the Nigerian security agents in 2009, bringing about its ruthless crackdown by the Nigerian army and a team with other security outfits. That inevitably prompted the arrest and resulted in the killing (without judicial pronouncement) of the terrorist group's charismatic ideologue Muhammad Yusuf and over 900 disciples of the group belief system (BBC News, 2009; Brigaglia, 2012).

After its crackdown in 2009, *BH* resurfaced on 8 September 2010, when they attacked and freed lots of their members serving jail terms in Yobe State (Akpotor and Oromareghake, 2013). The insurgents have since then expanded their level of expertise and precision as they assaulted police headquarters and other security posts, communities, and religious centres (Church/Mosques), in some northern parts and Abuja, the official capital of Nigeria. Persistent attacks by the group have had adverse effects on the general public; thus, debilitating social union and concordance among religious followers in the nation (Akpotor and Oromareghake, 2013). The assaults had negatively affected the populace's lives by denying them their fundamental rights, especially the freedom of association.

BH insurgents adopt the guerrilla warfare tactics of using motorcycle to attack, hit and run, use of suicide bombers, and car bombing of high-profile targets. These acts of violent onslaughts and the precision, with which they attack, particularly the August 26, 2011 bombing of the UN building, have accorded the *BH* terrorist group international notoriety, generated a culture of fear among

Nigerians, and destabilised the government. These acts forced the government to adopt military measures to counter the *BH* terrorist group's activities in states primarily affected, such as Adamawa, Borno, Bauchi, Yobe, Kano, and Kaduna, among others (Adeoye, 2018). This generated intense conflict between the Nigerian state and the *BH* terrorist, with an attendant adverse effect on the civilian populace. While the *BH* terrorist acts involve the indiscriminate killings of the civilian populace without remorse, the activities of the security agencies (Joint Task Force [JTF]) have also constituted a source of insecurity to the harmless populace and serious casualty challenges (Romoke, 2015).

The *BH* terrorist has further carried out a wide range of attacks on civilian population and security agencies. Its modus operandi include bombing, massacre and kidnapping among others. It helped them in order to evade easy detection. As a result of this, *BH* has been able to launch attacks on villages, security agencies and perpetrate atrocities with its attendant effects on national security (Omotola, 2014).

The *BH* insurgents have carried out a wide range of attacks on civilian population and security agencies. The *BH* terrorist went further to occupy parts of Nigeria equivalent to 10,000 square kilometres, as at January 2013 until a recapture of the area. Thus, the group constitutes real threat to the existence of Nigeria by undermining government's legitimacy in the affected areas. The *BH* terrorist as compared with other insurgent groups like Maitatsine, OPC, amongst others, has been adjudged as the most devastating insurgent phenomenon undermining the peace and security of Nigeria. Between March 2009 and June 2015, Nigeria has witnessed over 160 attacks by the *BH* insurgents in the North East (NE), leading to massive lost

of lives and destruction of critical infrastructure (Kilani, 2019). The detailed trends of BH attacks from 2009-2015 is in Appendix 1.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) ranked Nigeria as the third most terrorised nation in its 2018 Global Terrorism Index (ICC, 2019). The ongoing terrorism perpetrated by the *BH* terrorist group in parts of northern Nigeria, especially in the NE, has therefore resulted in high destruction of many human habitations and livelihoods. It was estimated that as at August 2018, over 19,500 deaths were recorded in several BH attacks (Ogunlesi, 2019:2); while 1,214 deaths were recorded in 2019 (Sahara Reporters, 2020). Hence, the Islamist extreme group wants a change from the contemporary status-quo to a Sharia-based system. From that point onward, it is evident that the radical Islamist group has constituted serious impediments to numerous democratic practices in parts of the world, including Nigeria, as evidenced by the ascent of BH.

More so, the Internally Displaced Monitoring Centre (IDMC, 2017) reports that brutality executed by the aggressive, violent *BH* terrorist group as well as Counter Insurgency (COIN) activities against the *BH* terrorist group kept on causing majority of the new dislodgements in 2017, prompting 279,000 new dislodgements, and raising the figures of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) towards the end of 2017 to an estimated 1,707,000. Recent data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) puts Nigeria as the third highest number of IDPs in Africa. In 2020, it counted 2.7 million internally displaced people (NBS, 2020 & IDMC, 2020).

Also, the attacks on worship centres, particularly the churches, could have been planned to cause a religious crisis. This has caused many observers to see the BH's activities as a ploy by the northern elites to Islamise Nigeria. This, if not

curtailed, could call for scepticism and eliminate mutual trust among beliefs in the country. The extremists' continued assaults on communities led the Federal government on 14 May 2013, under the leadership of former President Goodluck Jonathan, to declare a state of emergency in the most hard-hit states (Adamawa, Yobe and Borno States) as a COIN measure (Haruna, 2019).

The Federal Government's efforts to regain control of the territories under siege from the insurgents through its COIN measures was put to play, with tenets of further jeopardising the means of socio-economic survival of the NE inhabitants. Comolli (2018) opines that 75% of the northern populace dwells in abject poverty, with the northern zone being the most impoverished region in the country. Moreover, the dislodgement of individuals has brought about the loss of their means of survival and the migrating of many residents from their homes to different parts of the nation that were generally more secure and safe (Samson & Robinson, 2015). Furthermore, the ban of the use of motorcycles by state governments in some selected LGAs in Adamawa and Yobe States seems to have deprived many youths of their legitimate means of survival (David & Musa, 2016). From his own perspective, Awortu (2015) subscribes that the intensity of the BH terrorism has negatively affected businesses; as there is a significant reduction in governmental income, and declining Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) profile.

Moreover, the insurgent group's operations in the NE and other areas of the north have also worsened the standard of living of the people that are presently lagging in terms of education and access to formal training when compared to other regions in Nigeria. For instance, between 2009 and 2016, terrorism attacks in the NE zone of Nigeria destroyed more than 910 schools and forced at least 1,500 to be

closed (Ewan, 2018). In addition, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Report indicates that there are over 10.5 million out-of-school children in Nigeria as at 2015. However, in 2019, Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) reports that Nigeria's population of out-of-school children had increased from 10.5 million to 13.2 million and thus, the country was adjudged as having the highest number of such children in the world. In addition, out of the 13.2 million out-of-school children in Nigeria, 2,001,038 were residing in the NE zone (UBEC, 2019). The terrorism attacks perpetrated by the BH insurgents, which are prevalent in the NE zone, therefore appears to be devastating in an already bad education system characterised by severe lack of infrastructure, qualified teachers, teaching materials and overcrowded classrooms (Imrana, 2019).

The *BH* terrorist group attained global attention following the abduction of students in Chibok area of Maiduguri, Borno State in April 2014. Apparently, more than 250 students were captured in Borno State (Zenn, 2014), and the Buni Yadi killings by *Boko Haram* are some of the peaks of the group's operations. In addition, the abduction of about 100 girls from Government Girls Science and Technical Secondary School in Dapchi village in Yobe State in February 2018 attracted the attention of the global community. The Dapchi attack amongst several BH terrorism attacks on educational institutions in the northern region of the country is an indication that the continuous acts of terrorism endanger the educational objectives of the government and denies the right to education for a large number of citizens and residents (Okene, 2020). This raises concern on the security and safety of students, teachers, lecturers, infrastructure and staff of the educational institutions in the region, despite the ongoing COIN efforts within the area.

From the start of the vicious onslaught of BH in 2009, it immediately developed as the most dynamic insurgent group in Africa (Albuquerque, 2017). The *BH* terrorist group speedily embarks on monumental media promotion and production of its resolve to set out on assaults against chiefly two sets of enemies. The first is those who carried out the killing of their leaders and destroying of their houses and places of worship. The second is the state machinery that prevents the *BH* terrorist group from achieving its Islamic Shari'a agenda. Issuing leaflets, press releases, and online messages were the medium through which *BH* made their interest known and publicised it. Thus, the group declared war against Nigeria's security agencies and "irresponsible politicians" that made the enforcement of Shari'a impossible (Okene, 2018).

The asymmetric tactics employed by the insurgents caught the Nigerian government unaware. The Nigerian military is highly respected on the continent, and no one could have thought that the fight against terrorism would have been this prolonged. The *BH* terrorist group asymmetric strategy became more devastating in causing fear, anxiety, and terror on the members of the public in the past years. Most members of the BH reportedly use "diluted and absorbed" approaches to hide among the citizens. From within civilian settlements, they planned their crimes and criminality against the state, the innocent and armless civilians from within (Okene, 2018). The tactics were devastating as target locations like religious worship centres, football viewing halls, motor parks, large conurbations, and market clusters were hit successfully with relative ease. *BH's* devious and destructive bombings using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and crude weapons were deployed for the utmost mass human destruction, with implications for national security.

This research's thrust is to evaluate asymmetric warfare as a major tactic adopted by the *BH* insurgents and its implications on Nigeria's national security. There are several works of literature on the intellectual landscape and global academic arena on the gamut of *BH* terrorism. However, none of those works have linked the *BH* terrorism with asymmetric warfare and how it affects Nigeria's security architecture. Therefore, this researcher is motivated by the need to disentangle the nexus among *BH* insurgents and its strategic way to deal with the asymmetric war, and inherently establish how it influences its security apparatus. *BH*'s open attack on the Nigerian police, the military, the innocent civilians, shelling of soft targets, utilisation of IEDs, abduction, and armed robbery all have grave consequences on the fostering of Nigeria's national security. It is therefore imperative to analyse the effects of the asymmetric warfare posed through the *BH* terrorism, with a focus on how it impacts on national security in Nigeria.

Problem Statement

There has been a massive increase in terrorism across the globe, especially since the post Cold War period (Fukuyama, 1992). Researches have shown that the post Cold War era has witnessed increased intrastate wars, with many casualties. The situation worsened within the global sphere with the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorism attack on the United States of America. Many countries of the world have witnessed terrorism attacks of various dimensions and magnitude. The activities of Violent Non-State Actors are spreading quickly in weak nations across the Middle East, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel. The Violent Non-State Actors such as the Al-Qaeda and the Islamic States have capitalised on weak government

structures in weaker nations to harness volatile territories, and attempt to prove they can administer better rulership in the targeted countries (Hamilton & Kean, 2019).

The act of terrorism is a global phenomenon, with several Violent Non-State Actors operating across different continents. For instance, in Europe, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the United Kingdom, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) of Spain, the Italian Red Brigade in Italy, the German's Red Army Faction (RAF), and the Chechen separatists in Russia. In America, there exists the US Weathermen, the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), and the Canadian Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ). In Asia, Daesh or ISIS or ISIL exists in Syria, Yemen's Houthi Rebel and Al Qaeda in Peninsula, Communist Party in India (Maoist), also known as Naxals in India, and Taliban in Afghanistan, Hamas in Palestine, as well as Jemah Islamiyyah in Indonesia, amongst others (Sirseloudi, 2005; Crouch, 2010; Dudley, 2018).

The activities of Violent Non-State Actors have been prominently visible within the African continent; with many countries in Africa having experienced terrorism that jeopardised the continent's peace and security. Most insurgent organisations operating on the continent include the Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb AQIM in Algeria, Mali, and Niger; Al Shabbab of Somalia, the Janjaweed of Darfur, Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), both in Sudan, Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), an Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Sierra Leonean Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), M23 Rebels in Democratic Republic of Congo and BH of Nigeria.

Most terrorist groups generally deploy different operational tactics and methods, depending on the fighting force, strategic skills and capabilities, and access to arms and ammunition. Funding and systemic support networks play a role in determining how the insurgents mobilise new members and other materials (Staniland, 2010). This is because the insurgents usually face high attrition rates, steady recruitment, and massive media hypes and publications to refill their ranks.

The increasing incidences and activities of ANSAs across Nigeria have raised serious questions about the institutionalisation of violence as a means of expressing grievances and attracting attention and recognition. These incidences of violence weaken Nigeria's capability to realise the provisions of security, peace, and order, which are its primary responsibilities. This has caused many humanitarian crises, governance crises, political instability, economic downturn and conflicts, leading to national security challenges.

The BH terrorist group which has threatened the fostering of national security in Nigeria for over a decade has been through three different phases. With the first phase which was between 1995 and 2002; the government viewed it as the usual civil protest or unrest (Perouse de Montclos, 2014). In the second phase, between 2002 and 2009, BH became known as a religious revolt with a clear identity, as the *BH* terrorist group capitalised on the internal grudges to enlist the insurgents. They became brutal after the demise of one of its leaders, Yusuf, who was in police detention in 2009. Furthermore, the third phase occurred between 2010 and 2017. During this phase, the *BH* terrorist group thoroughly established itself as a group capable of supplanting the existing political status quo, using asymmetric warfare to

achieve the goal. It is in this last phase that the real nature of the insurgents can be gleaned.

BH has displayed high resilience and capability to capture and control some Local Government Areas (LGAs) in the NE zone. The source of the *BH* terrorist group strength became challenging to fathom, as BH embarks on "hit-and-run" tactics, and became notorious for that. Apparently, BH's tactics are evolving. The insurgents' action was amplified by the work of Chinese writer; Sun Tzu "*the art of war*" over 2500 years ago. He asserted that, "If the enemy is superior in strength, evade him. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him where he is unprepared. Appear where you are not expected." Exploring the enemy's weaknesses while utilising one's potentials is the heart of the 'art of war' (Miles, 1999). This is the crux of the *BH* tactics.

Furthermore, *BH* became so familiar with the rugged terrain of NE Nigeria, especially their strongholds - Sambisa forest, the Mandara Mountains, and the Marshlands surrounding the Lake Chad area. These seem to be rough terrains for the COIN efforts of the Nigerian military forces to materialise due to lack of knowledge on the insurgents; mode of operations. Thus, the insurgents seem to enjoy a comparative advantage in those areas and use them as their base to coordinate their attacks (Torbjornson & Jonsson, 2017).

The *BH* terrorist group principally started its activities utilising light weapons in assaults against soft targets before calibrating to the utilisation of sophisticated arms and explosive devices against targets, as well as armed or harmless victims. It seized most of its arms and ammunition from the attack on government security outfit and smuggled in arms and other contrabands goods in the early years of the

terrorism through the porous borders. Most of the *BH* terrorist group's first set of weapons were seized during attacks on government security outfits, and others were smuggled into Nigeria through the porous borders. Through its connections with other insurgent groups in other countries, the *BH* terrorist group could achieve more refinement in its assault capacities that consolidated IEDs' usage (Al Jazeera, 2018).

Strategically, BH has advanced significantly in recent times. It did not start executing aggressor operations until 2009. The group practically assaulted the Nigeria Police Force headquarters, security watch posts, and prison facilities from the outset, releasing many imprisoned individuals in the process. The *BH* terrorist group, through a renewed modus-operandi, attacks different targets, such as initiating vehicle-borne IED and suicide bombings. These assaults have been aimed against easy prey most times, though there have been a couple of rare cases; for instance, the August 2011 occurrence at a UN building in Abuja. Attacks that were carried out utilizing vehicle-borne IEDs reduced greatly in 2013; however, they increased during the first half of 2014.

BH assaults have dislocated economic projects, smashed economic developments, and caused the most horrendous type of human-centred crisis in the NE ever. Due to these assaults, many individuals are dislodged from their homes, occupations, and societies (Kam, 2017). In the fallout of BH terrorism, assaults, frenzy, and strain have increased among the immediate communities and those who reside beyond the region where Boko Haram began. The insurgents' main goal is to change the status quo or subvert the government in power to obligate their values on the other members of the society. Despite the various attempts to decimate the BH

terrorism that poses the biggest threats to the country's focal strategy for national cohesion, the success level is minimal, and the crisis looks unstoppable.

Military deployment for COIN Operations has succeeded in saving lives and mitigating the destructive consequences of some conflicts (Gberevbie, (2014). The scaling up of the COIN Operations by the JTF in the NE appears to have dislodged BH insurgents from areas they had earlier captured. Nonetheless, there have been recurring attacks and bombings in parts of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, which pose threats to both kinetic and non-kinetic efforts towards enhancing Nigeria's national security.

Researchers and analysts have explored the rise in the terrorism as orchestrated by BH in Nigeria by assessing its nature, its causes, ideologies, and how Nigerian government endeavours to battle it (Akpan, Ekanem & Olufu-Adeoye, 2014). Despite that the search through different works of literature does not articulate a thorough comprehension and analysis of the insurgents' asymmetric approach and how it affects Nigeria's national security, policymakers, and the military forces can understand why past efforts have not been successful. The lack of literature on BH's tactics created a gap in understanding BHI's asymmetric warfare and why it is challenging to curtail it. This research covers eight years (2009-2017) to provide policymakers and other stakeholders in the fight against BH with useful analysis and information to improve their efforts to counter the insurgent group.

Garnering from the foregoing, the primary strategy employed by the *BH* insurgents is the guerrilla tactics. The tactics are asymmetric warfare-like (Ottoh, 2015), which is also not amenable to conventional military engagements. All the aforementioned explained scenarios elicit some vital questions crucial to

understanding asymmetric warfare tactics as have been employed by BH insurgents and its implications on Nigeria's national security.

Research Questions

The following research questions are articulated for the study:

1. What are the underlying factors responsible for the formation of BH?
2. What are the existing and motivating factors that have aided the BH terrorism to flourish since 2009?
3. What are the asymmetric warfare tactics adopted by BH terrorism?
4. Why is it difficult for Nigeria's military forces to decimate BH terrorism and their asymmetric warfare tactics?
5. What are the implications of the BH activities on human and socio-economic development of the NE and its resultant implications on the country's national security at large?

Research Objectives

The study aims to accomplish the following objectives:

1. to examine the underlying factors responsible for the formation of BH;
2. to establish the existing and motivating factors that have aided the BH terrorism to flourish since 2009;
3. to inquire into and describe the asymmetric warfare tactics adopted by BH terrorists over the years;

4. to investigate the reasons why the Nigerian military forces cannot decimate the asymmetric warfare of the BH terrorism since 2009; and
5. to assess the implications of BH activities on human and socio-economic development in the NE and its implications on Nigeria's national security at large.

Significance of the Study

This study represents a qualitative addition to the literature on BH terrorism and Nigeria's national security. This research's uniqueness is that it offers an insight into the understanding of asymmetric warfare tactics adopted by the BH and its implications on the national security architecture of Nigeria. This research is important because it has made it clear that the social, economic and political consequences of Boko Haram terrorism in the northeast and their lived experiences are as a result of their exposure to violent acts of the terrorists. Hopefully, the study's findings will help expand the literature on asymmetric warfare tactics of Boko Haram terrorism and its implications on the people of Adamawa, Borno and other states in northeastern Nigeria. The understanding may place the government and other stakeholders in a better position to develop policies to manage consequences on victims of future disasters.

This research will be significant to the governments of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger Republic, and Chad who are strategic partners in the counterterrorism measures as well as Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) interested in the decimation of BH terrorism. The research will also attempt to comprehend and clarify different forms of asymmetric warfare; evaluate the factors that allowed the BH to flourish

over the years and the right steps towards curtailing the BH terrorism threats to national security in Nigeria.

Apart from this research's academic importance, it is also a critical addition to Nigeria's attempt to resolve the lingering terrorism and decimate it. In addition to the current military-centric approach, this research will proffer recommendations that will help inquire into factors that aided BH's asymmetric strategy and its source of resilience. It would also assist in ensuring enhanced operational efficiency and performance improvement for troops of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) and other relevant security agencies involved in COIN Operations in the NE zone of Nigeria.

The study is equally of great significance to various categories of stakeholders. It offers new insights for policymakers, governmental institutions, military formations, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), scholars and students of political science and international relations, as well as academic researchers. Specifically, they will benefit from this qualitative and resourceful study because it is a useful source of information to many concerns about curtailing BH's threat. The research work will also function as a veritable data source to the Nigerian, Cameroonian, and Chadian security agencies in their bids to curb BH terrorism and other security challenges in the region.

This study will also undoubtedly elicit new research interest among scholars, researchers, students, and policy makers towards re-channeling their research to avoid the repeats of those factors that led to the emergence of BH terrorism. It will encourage synergy between the governmental and non-governmental agencies to evolve new and efficient strategies to decimate or tackle BH insurgents and other

security threats in Nigeria at large. To this end, this study will endeavour to make-up for the limited scholarly materials available for discourse on asymmetric warfare and the challenges of BH terrorism.

Scope of the Study

The study focuses on the nature of asymmetric warfare strategy employed by BH as object of terrorist actor and how it impacts on Nigeria's national security, covering the period from 2009 to 2017. This is in line with the proscription and gazetting of an order declaring the activities of BH as acts of terrorism. The scope is purposely chosen to start from when the *BH* terrorist group became more violent. This period witnessed consistent and ruthless attacks by the BH terror group in NE Nigeria, with devastating consequences on the national security architecture of Nigeria. Since 2009, BH has consistently become a bad dream, a recurring decimal, and anguish to Nigeria in particular and the world at large. The study will cover the activities of BH across three different presidential regimes of the Federal Republic of Nigeria between 2009 and 2017.

Although Nigeria is a 36 states federation, BH activities originated from the NE region comprised of six states (Yobe, Taraba, Gombe, Bornu, Bauchi, and Adamawa). However, despite that the effects of the Boko Haram terrorism are being felt across the country, the most affected states are Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno and Yobe. Purposive and Simple Random Sampling (SRS) was used in ascertaining the states to be examined in the NE. As such, Borno State was selected based on purposive sampling because it is the epicentre of BH terrorism and the most affected in the NE geopolitical zone. While the selection of Adamawa State was made through simple random sampling, which was achieved with the names of the five

remaining states (Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe) folded in a paper raffle draw technique.

Furthermore, the Sambisa forest is one of the strongholds of the BH. It was a game reserve situated not too far away from Maiduguri, Borno State. A Professor at the University of Maiduguri, Umar Maryah describes the size of the forest as covering approximately 60,000 square kilometers across the NE from Borno, Yobe, Gombe, and Bauchi states along the Darazo corridor, Jigawa and straight up to some regions of Kano State in the far North-West (Bodunrin, 2014). The Mandara Mountains are another dangerous hideout for the BH insurgents. The hills are located in Gwoza Local Government Area on the eastern flank of Sambisa. The hills are of average heights of 1,300 metres above the sea level. The mountains are a type of natural barricade between Nigeria and Cameroon (Bodunrin, 2014).

Research Design

An appropriate design template is indispensable in research. This is because it sets the basis for attaining research objectives in a coherent, holistic, and logical manner. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) posit that a researcher uses research design to guide the research's conduct and find solutions to research questions. It is a detailed plan or structure of how the researcher intends to generate relevant data for a study. In other words, a research design serves as a 'master plan' which enables a researcher to bring forth a viable suggestion to the problem under study (McNabb, 2015). For this study, the researcher adopts a phenomenological qualitative approach. Qualitative research is used to explain a set of nonstatistical enquiry methods and procedures used to assemble data about a social phenomenon. A phenomenology is an approach to qualitative research that emphasizes a lived

experience's commonality within a particular group. According to Cresswell (2013), this approach's ultimate goal is to reach a description of the nature of a particular event or phenomenon. Usually, interviews are conducted with a group of people who have first-hand information or knowledge of an event, situation, or experience. According to Cresswell (2013), such interviews attempt to answer two general questions; one, what have you experienced in terms of the happenings or phenomenon? Two, what conditions or situations have influenced the experiences of the phenomenon?

The choice of phenomenological qualitative approach was established on the notion that the asymmetric warfare of the Boko Haram terrorist group can be appreciated from viewpoints of those who have at any one time been involved or engaged in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism, and those who are victims of the insurgents' attack. Therefore, the phenomenological qualitative approach gives a better comprehension of why BHI has not been decimated since 2009 and describes the factors that have made it flourish.

In line with Cresswell's submission on the phenomenological approach, the researcher conducted KII and FGD, which serve as a primary data collection source. The primary source involves interviews with selected key informants that are pertinent to the study. Focus Group Discussions with the Internally Displaced Persons, the religious and community leaders, immediate victims of the terrorism were also utilized in the study. The secondary source includes textbooks, journal articles, online materials, and newspapers. The study areas are the states of Borno and Adamawa in northeastern Nigeria.