

**ANTI-TERRORISM QUESTIONNAIRE
DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
ANTI-TERRORISM EDUCATION PROGRAMME
ON MALAYSIAN PUBLIC READINESS
REACTION AND WILLINGNESS**

MOHD SHAHARUDIN SHAH BIN CHE HAMZAH

Thesis Submitted in Fulfillment of The Requirements

for The Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

NOVEMBER 2018

ANTI-TERRORISM QUESTIONNAIRE
DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
ANTI-TERRORISM EDUCATION PROGRAMME
ON MALAYSIAN PUBLIC READINESS
REACTION AND WILLINGNESS

MOHD SHAHARUDIN SHAH BIN CHE HAMZAH

UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA

2018

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Foremost, I would like to thank God, the Almighty for giving me the courage to undertake and complete this study. This thesis could not have been completed without the encouragement, support, and guidance from many special persons. I also extend my sincere gratitude to my supervisors Professor Dr. Kamarudin Jaalam as the main supervisor, the late Professor Dr. Syed Mohsin Sahil Jamalullail (former co-supervisor), co-supervisors Dr. Mohd Ismail Ibrahim and Dr. Mohd Nazri Shafei for their time, expert guidance, counseling, support and patience throughout this study.

I am also grateful to Polis Di-Raja Malaysia (PDRM) and representative of Majlis Keselamatan Negara (MKN) for their support and permission to use all relevant data and information during the study. My special thanks also to Professor Dr. Rashidi Ahmad for his knowledge and expertise. Finally, to all my friends who know me and kept me motivated, their help, understanding and support are forever remembered.

Last but not least, a million thanks to my beloved wife Wan Ruslida Wan Harun, without her continuous and gentle encouragement, this thesis could not have become a reality. To my sons Aimal and Atiq, my daughter Ameerah and all family members thank you for your patience and encouragement during the writing and completion of this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments	ii
Table of Contents	iii
List of Tables	x
List of Figures	xiii
List of Appendices	xiv
List of Abbreviations	xv
Abstrak	xvii
Abstract	xix
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	
1.1 The Chronicle of terrorism	1
1.2 Terrorism in Malaysia situation	11
1.3 National disaster management policy in Malaysia	14
1.4 Justification of the study	17
1.5 Research questions	23
1.6 Null Hypotheses	23

CHAPTER 2: OBJECTIVES, OUTCOMES, IMPORTANCE AND BENEFITS

OF THE STUDY

2.1	General objective	25
2.2	Specific objectives	25
2.3	Outcomes	26
2.4	Importance and benefits of research contributions to the advancement of new knowledge	26

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1	Defining terrorism	27
3.2	The impact of terrorism on community	31
3.2.1	Evolution of the disaster and its significance towards terrorism	32
3.2.2	Primary impact of terrorism on economy sector	36
3.2.3	Secondary impact of terrorism on economy sector	38
3.3	The response of people to terrorism	42
3.3.1	The universality of human responses towards terrorism	44
3.3.2	Anticipation and preparedness	44
3.3.3	Warning system	47

3.3.4	The occurrence of attack	48
3.3.5	Information and the media	50
3.3.6	Recovery	55
3.4	The diversity of crisis situations and community readiness, reaction and willingness	63
3.5	Prevalence of terrorism in Malaysia	74
3.6	Conceptual Framework	80
 CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY		
4.1	Phases of the study	81
4.1.1	Part A: Development of a questionnaire and educational material	81
4.1.2	Part B: Determination of the level of readiness, reaction willingness and associated factors	88
4.1.3	Part C: Community intervention program and qualitative study	91
4.2	Study period	92
4.3	Study location	93
4.4	Reference population	93
4.5	Source of population	93
4.6	Sampling frame	93

4.7	Inclusion criterion	93
4.8	Exclusion criterion	93
4.9	Sample size determination	94
4.10	Sampling method	94
4.11	In-depth interview	95
4.12	Definition of the operational terms	96
4.13	Selection of the cut-off point	98
4.14	Ethical issues	98
4.15	Flowchart of the study	100
 CHAPTER 5: RESULTS		
5.1	Development of questionnaire	101
5.2	Development of educational material	104
5.3	Determination of the level of readiness, reaction, willingness and associated factors	105
5.3.1	Descriptive characteristic of the respondents	105
5.3.2	The level of readiness, reaction and willingness among respondents	106

5.3.3	The association between level of reaction with sociodemographic factors among respondents by simple logistic regression	107
5.3.4	The association between level of reaction with job category, race and gender among respondents using multiple logistic regression analyses	108
5.4	Intervention program and qualitative study	111
5.4.1	Characteristic of the control and intervention group in determining the effectiveness of anti-terrorism educational material towards readiness, reaction and willingness score	111
5.4.2	The effectiveness of interactive anti-terrorism educational material towards readiness domain: between-group difference with regards to time (time-intervention interaction)	113
5.4.3	The effect of interactive anti-terrorism packages (educational material) towards readiness score: within group difference (time-effect)	115
5.4.4	The effect of interactive anti-terrorism packages (educational material) towards reaction score: between-group difference with regards to time (time-intervention interaction)	116

5.4.5	The effect of interactive anti-terrorism packages (educational material) towards reaction score: within group difference (time-effect)	118
5.4.6	The effect of interactive anti-terrorism packages (educational material) towards willingness score: between-group difference with regards to time (time-intervention interaction)	119
5.4.7	The effect of interactive anti-terrorism packages (educational material) towards willingness score: within group difference (time-effect)	121
5.4.8	Qualitative study	122
 CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION		
6.1	Validation of the questionnaire	135
6.2	Development of antiterrorism educational material	139
6.3	Level of readiness, reaction and willingness and associated factors	141
6.4	The associations between level of reaction with socio-demographic variable among the public towards terrorist attack	150
6.5	Post-intervention perception (readiness, reaction and willingness) among respondents	153
6.6	The significance of public's anti-terrorism education program	178

CHAPTER 7: LIMITATION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1	Limitation	198
7.2	Conclusion	199
7.3	Recommendations	200
	REFERENCES	202
	APPENDICES	

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of the respondents of validation study (n=150)	100
Table 2: Extracted factors, factor loadings, commonality and reliability (n=150)	103
Table 3: Demographic characteristic of respondents for development of educational material (n=200)	104
Table 4: Pamphlet characteristic among respondent (n=100)	105
Table 5: Role-play characteristic among respondent (n=100)	105
Table 6: Socio-demographic characteristic of the respondents (n=400)	106
Table 7: The association between the level of reaction among respondents with sociodemographic variables using simple logistic regression analyses (n=400)	107
Table 8: The association between a sociodemographic characteristic with reaction among respondents by multiple logistic regression (n=400)	109

Table 9:	Comparison of sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents between control and intervention groups	112
Table 10:	Comparison of readiness score between control and intervention group based on time	113
Table 11:	Comparison of readiness domain score within each group based on time (time-effect)	115
Table 12:	Comparison of reaction domain mean score between control and intervention group based on time	116
Table 13:	Comparison of reaction domain score within each group based on time (time-effect)	118
Table 14:	Comparison of willingness domain mean score between control and intervention group based on time	119
Table 15:	Comparison of willingness domain score within each group based on time (time-effect)	121
Table 16:	Sociodemographic characteristic of interviewed respondents	122
Table 17:	Distribution of respondent base on readiness themes	128
Table 18:	Distribution of respondent base on reaction themes	131

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 1: Recent militant activities in Malaysia	21
Figure 2: Conceptual framework	80
Figure 3: The process of data collection	100
Figure 4: ROC curve of the final model for a factor associated with reaction	110
Figure 5: Profile plot of the estimated mean (estimated marginal mean) of the mean score of readiness domain score for each group for pre, post-0 week and post-6 weeks intervention	114
Figure 6: Profile plot of the estimated mean (estimated marginal mean) of the mean score of reaction domain score for each group for pre, post-0 week and post-6 weeks intervention	117
Figure 7: Profile plot of the estimated mean (estimated marginal mean) of the mean score of willingness domain score for each group for pre, post-0 week and post-6 weeks intervention	120

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix 1: The map of Kelantan state divided according to district

Appendix 2a: Booklet of pre-validated TeRRW questionnaire

Appendix 2b: Booklet of post-validated TeRRW questionnaire

Appendix 3: Anti-terrorism educational material

Appendix 4: In-depth interview questionnaire frame

Appendix 5: Informed consent form

Appendix 6: Publications

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APM	Agensi Pertahanan Awam Malaysia
ATP	Anti-Terrorism Program
CDC	Center for Disease Control
CDERT	Civil Defense Emergency Response Team
DAESH	Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya Al-Iraq Al-Sham
DEMAT	Disaster and Emergency Assistant Team
ESSCOM	Eastern Sabah Security Command
HDI	High Development Indicator
IDI	In-Depth Interview
LDI	Low Development Indicator
MERCY	Malaysia Medical Relief Society
MKN	Majlis Keselamatan Negara
MMEA	Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PDRM	Polis Di Raja Malaysia

PTSD	Post-traumatic Stress Disorder
QRA	Qualitative Research Approach
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SOP	Standard Operation Procedure
TeRRW	Terrorism Readiness, Reaction and Willingness
USA	United States of America
USM	Universiti Sains Malaysia
WHO	World Health Organization

**MEMBANGUNKAN SOALAN ANTI-KEGANASAN DAN KEBERKESANAN
PRPROGRAM PENDIDIKAN ANTI-KEGANASAN TERHADAP
KESIAPSIAGAAN, REAKSI DAN KESANGGUPAN DIKALANGAN RAKYAT
MALAYSIA
ABSTRAK**

Keganasan sekarang telah menjadi perkara biasa di banyak tempat di seluruh dunia dan kini menular ke Malaysia. Perkembangan terkini telah menyaksikan keganasan berkembang dalam kerumitannya sejajar dengan perkembangan teknologi. Kini ia mengancam kesejahteraan kehidupan masyarakat. Kajian ini dimulakan dengan membangun dan mengesahkan set soalan (TeRRW) untuk menilai tahap kesediaan, tindak balas dan kesanggupan orang awam terhadap antikeganasan. Kebolehpercayaan dalaman yang konsisten berdasarkan kepada nilai *Cronbach's alpha* adalah melebihi 0.70 (dari 0.730 hingga 0.883) dan ini menunjukkan bahawa *TeRRW* adalah sah untuk menilai tahap kesediaan, tindak balas dan kesanggupan orang awam terhadap antikeganasan. Kemudian diikuti dengan membangunkan program pendidikan antikeganasan yang berdasarkan kepada keperluan masyarakat setempat. Dengan menggunakan bahan-bahan ini, kajian rentas dan intervensi komuniti yang melibatkan 400 penduduk Kota Bharu dan daerah Gua Musang telah dijalankan dalam tempoh setahun dari Januari 2017 sehingga Disember 2017. *TeRRW* bertujuan untuk mengenal pasti dan menilai status kesediaan, tindak balas dan kesanggupan terhadap antikeganasan dalam masyarakat. Kesan faktor sosiodemografi terhadap tiga domain ini juga turut di analisis. Daripada 400 responden, hanya 250 (62.5%) menunjukkan tindak balas dan 150 (37.5%) tidak bertindak balas dan hanya memperlihatkan faktor bangsa atau etnik dan kategori pekerjaan yang

mempengaruhi keputusan di atas. Intervensi masyarakat menggunakan program pendidikan antipenganas menunjukkan bahawa ketiga-tiga domain tersebut telah berubah dengan signifikan. Program yang dibangunkan untuk mendidik dan mendedahkan orang ramai terhadap antikeganasan di kalangan masyarakat tempatan didapati berkesan tetapi kesanya menurun dalam masa yang singkat. Kajian ini merumuskan bahawa respon komuniti terhadap program pendidikan antikeganasan adalah positif dalam mendidik dan mendedahkan orang ramai terhadap antikeganasan tetapi perlulah dijalankan secara berkala untuk memaksimumkan kesannya. Program seperti ini dipercayai dapat meningkatkan tahap kewaspadaan masyarakat terhadap keganasan di Malaysia.

Kata kunci: soalan antikeganasan, program pendidikan antikeganasan, kesiapsiagaan, tindak balas, kesanggupan

**ANTI-TERRORISM QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT AND THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF EDUCATION PROGRAMME ON MALAYSIA PUBLIC
READINESS, REACTION AND WILLINGNESS**

ABSTRACT

Terrorism nowadays has become common in many parts of the world and it is slowly coming to Malaysia. Recent developments have seen terrorism evolved in its complexity with the age of information and technology. It now threatens the well-being of innocent life and civil society. This study was initiated by developing and validating a questionnaire, namely TeRRW to assess the level of readiness, reaction and willingness among the Malaysia public towards antiterrorism. The internal consistency reliability based on the value of Cronbach's alpha of TeRRW questionnaire was above 0.70 (ranging from 0.730 to 0.883) and this showed that questionnaire is valid to assess the public perception towards terrorism. Then followed with the development of an anti-terrorism educational material which was based on local needs. Using these materials, a cross-sectional study and community intervention involving 400 residents from Kota Bharu and Gua Musang districts was conducted within a year from January 2017 until December 2017. The TeRRW questionnaire aims to identify and evaluate the status of readiness, reaction and willingness against terrorism in the community. The association of sociodemographic factors with these three domains were also analyzed. Out of 400 respondents, only 250 (62.5%) showed a reaction and 150 (37.5%) did not react and it further showed only race or ethnicity and job category were found to be significantly associated with those results. The community intervention using anti-terrorism educational material analysis showed that these three domains changed significantly after

an intervention was conducted. The anti-terrorism educational material developed to educate and expose the public towards antiterrorism among local communities were found to be effective, but the impacts were decreased within time. This study concluded that the community response towards intervention of antiterrorism such as anti-terrorism educational material was positive to educate and expose the public towards antiterrorism but need to be done in a schedule in order to maximize the impact. This kind of program could increase community alertness level towards terrorism in Malaysia.

Keyword: antiterrorism questionnaire, antiterrorism education material, readiness, reaction, willingness

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Chronicle of terrorism

The literature review reveals that the earliest known organization that exhibited aspects of a modern terrorist organization was the Zealots of Judea. Known to the Romans as *Sicarii* or dagger-men, their main function was to carry an underground campaign of assassination of Roman occupation forces, as well as any Jews they felt had collaborated with the Romans (Birnbaum and Roger, 2011; Cutter *et al.*, 2004). Their motive was an uncompromising belief that they could not remain faithful to the dictates of Judaism while living as Roman subjects. Eventually, the Zealot revolt became open, and they were finally besieged and committed mass suicide at the fortification of Masada (Cutter *et al.*, 2004).

The Assassins was the next group to show recognizable characteristics of terrorism, as we know it today. The Assassins is a comprehensive, readable and authoritative account of history's first terrorists. An offshoot of the Ismaili Shi'ite sect of Islam, the Assassins were the first group to make systematic use of murder as a political weapon (Birnbaum and Roger, 2011). Established in Iran and Syria in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, they aimed to overthrow the existing Sunni order in Islam and replace it with their own. They terrorized their foes with a series of dramatic murders of Islamic leaders, as well as of some of the crusaders, who brought their name and fame back to Europe (Carter *et al.*, 1998). This radical group, studying its teachings and its influence on Muslim thought. Particularly insightful considering the

rise of the terrorist attacks in the U.S. and in Israel, this account of the Assassins, whose name is now synonymous with politically motivated murderers places recent events in historical perspective and sheds new light on the fanatic mind (Carter *et al.*, 1998). A breakaway faction of *Shia Islam* called the *Nizari Ismailis* adopted the tactic of the assassination of enemy leaders because the cult's limited manpower prevented open combat. Their leader, *Hassam-I Sabbah*, based the cult in the mountains of Northern Iran. Their tactic of sending a lone assassin to successfully kill a key enemy leader at the certain sacrifice of his own life (the killers waited next to their victims to be killed or captured) inspired fearful awe in their enemies (Aksoy *et al.*, 2015; Alexander, 2002). Even though both the Zealots and the Assassins operated in antiquity and occurred during 1st – 14th century AD, their tactics are still relevant today. First as forerunners of modern terrorists in aspects of motivation, organization, targeting, and goals. Secondly, although both were ultimate failures, the fact that they are remembered hundreds of years later demonstrates the deep psychological impact they caused.

The phenomenon of brutality keeps extending and expanding from time to time. In the early 14th to 18th century, terror and barbarism were widely used in warfare and conflict but key ingredients for terrorism were lacking. Until the rise of the modern nation-state after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 also known as the time where the early origins of terrorism begin (Alexander, 2002). The sort of central authority and cohesive society that terrorism attempts to influence barely existed. Communications were inadequate and controlled, and the causes that might inspire terrorism (religious schism, insurrection, ethnic strife) typically led to open warfare. By the time kingdoms

and principalities became nations, they had sufficient means to enforce their authority and suppress activities such as terrorism.

The French Revolution provided the first uses of the words "Terrorist" and "Terrorism". Use of the word "terrorism" began in 1795 about the Reign of Terror initiated by the Revolutionary government. The agents of the Committee of Public Safety and the National Convention that enforced the policies of "The Terror" were referred to as "Terrorists" (Alexander and Klein, 2005). The French Revolution provided an example to future states in oppressing their populations. It also inspired a reaction by royalists and other opponents of the Revolution who employed terrorist tactics such as assassination and intimidation in resistance to the Revolutionary agents. The Parisian mobs played a critical role at key points before, during, and after the Revolution. Such extra-legal activities as killing prominent officials and aristocrats in gruesome spectacles started long before the guillotine was first used.

During the modern era (19th century), radical political theories and improvements in weapons technology spurred the formation of small groups of revolutionaries who effectively attacked nation-states (Abraham *et al.*, 2012). Anarchists espousing belief in the "propaganda of the deed" produced some striking successes, assassinating heads of state from Russia, France, Spain, Italy and the United States. However, their lack of organization and refusal to cooperate with other social movements in political efforts rendered anarchists ineffective as a political movement. In contrast, Communism's role as an ideological basis for political terrorism was just beginning and would become much more significant in the 20th century (Alexander, 2003).

Another trend in the late 19th century was the increasing tide of nationalism throughout the world, in which the nation (the identity of a people) and the political state were combined. As states began to emphasize national identities, peoples that had been conquered or colonized could, like the Jews at the times of the Zealots, decide for assimilation or struggle. The best-known nationalist conflict from this time is still unresolved such as the multi-century struggle of Irish nationalism. Nationalism, like communism, became a much greater ideological force in the 20th century (Abraham *et al.*, 2012). The terrorist group from this period that serves as a model in many ways for what was to come was from Russian and known as *Narodnya Volya* (Peoples Will). They differed in some ways from modern terrorists, especially in that they would sometimes call off attacks that might endanger individuals other than their intended target (Aradau and Van Munster, 2012). Other than this quirk, we see many of the traits of terrorism here for the first time; clandestine, cellular organization; impatience and inability for the task of organizing the constituents they claim to represent; and a tendency to increase the level of violence as pressures on the group mount.

The first half of the 20th century saw two events that influenced the nature of the conflict to the present day. The effects of two World Wars inflamed passions and hopes of nationalists throughout the world, and severely damaged the legitimacy of the international order and governments. Nationalism intensified during the early 20th century throughout the world. It became an especially powerful force in the peoples of various colonial empires. Although dissent and resistance were common in many colonial possessions, and sometimes resulted in open warfare, nationalist identities became a focal point for these actions. Gradually, as nations became closely tied to concepts of race and ethnicity, international political developments began to support

such concepts (Ablah *et al.*, 2006). Members of ethnic groups whose states had been absorbed by others or had ceased to exist as separate nations saw opportunities to realize nationalist ambitions. Several of these groups chose terror as a method to conduct their struggle and make their situation known to world powers they hoped would be sympathetic. In Europe, both the Irish and the Macedonians had existing terrorist campaigns as part of their ongoing struggle for independence but had to initiate bloody uprisings to further their cause. The Irish were partially successful, the Macedonians failed.

The "total war" practices of all combatants of world war II (WWII) provided further justification for the "everybody does it" view of the use of terror and violations of the law of war (Enders and Sandler, 1999). The desensitization of people and communities to violence that started in World War I accelerated during World War II. The intensity of the conflict between starkly opposed ideologies led to excesses on the part of all participants. New weapons and strategies that targeted the enemies' civilian population to destroy their economic capacity for conflict exposed virtually every civilian to the hazards of combatants (Caruso and Schneider, 2011; Enders *et al.*, 2006). The major powers' support of partisan and resistance organizations using terrorist tactics was viewed as an acceptance of their legitimacy. It seemed that civilians had become legitimate targets, despite any rules forbidding it.

The bi-polar world of the Cold War changed the perception of conflicts the world over. Relatively minor confrontations took on significance as areas where the superpowers could compete without risking escalation to full nuclear war. Warfare between the East and the West took place on the peripheries and was limited in scope

to prevent escalation. During the immediate postwar period, terrorism was more of a tactical choice by leaders of nationalist insurgencies and revolutions. Successful campaigns for independence from colonial rule occurred throughout the world and many employed terrorism as a supporting tactic. When terrorism was used, it was used within the framework of larger movements, and coordinated with political, social, and military action (Anderton and Carter, 2005). Even when terrorism came to dominate the other aspects of a nationalist struggle, such as the Palestinian campaign against Israel, it was combined with other activities. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union provided direct and indirect assistance to revolutionary movements around the world (Aradau and Van Munster, 2012). Many anti-colonial movements found the revolutionary extremism of communism attractive. Leaders of these "wars of national liberation" saw the advantage of free weapons and training. They also realized that the assistance and patronage of the Eastern Bloc meant increased international legitimacy. Many of these organizations and individuals utilized terrorism in support of their political and military objectives. The policy of the Soviet Union to support revolutionary struggles everywhere, and to export revolution to non-communist countries, provided extremists willing to employ violence and terror as the means to realize their ambitions (Alexander, 2002; Aradau and Van Munster, 2012).

The age of modern terrorism might be said to have begun in 1968 when the Popular Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an El Al airliner en-route from Tel Aviv to Rome (Alexander, 2002). While hijackings of airliners had occurred before, this was the first time that the nationality of the carrier (Israeli) and its symbolic value was a specific operational aim. Also, a first was the deliberate use of the passengers as hostages for demands made publicly against the Israeli government. The

combination of these unique events, added to the international scope of the operation, gained significant media attention. The founder of PFLP, Dr. George Habash observed that the level of coverage was tremendously greater than battles with Israeli soldiers in their previous area of operations. "At least the world is talking about us now." Another aspect of this internationalization is the cooperation between extremist organizations in conducting terrorist operations (Feucht *et al.*, 2011). Cooperative training between Palestinian groups and European radicals started as early as 1970, and joint operations between the PFLP and the Japanese Red Army (JRA) began in 1974 (Alexander, 2002). Since then international terrorist cooperation in training, operations, and support has continued to grow and continues to this day. Motives range from the ideological, such as the 1980s alliances of the Western European Marxist-oriented groups, to financial, as when the Irish Republican Army (IRA) exported its expertise in bomb-making as far as to Colombia.

Until today, there are so many definitions given to simplify the term of terrorism. A study record for the US army quoted a source that counted 109 definitions of the word terrorism (Laqueur, 1996b) that covered a total of 22 difference definitional elements. Furthermore, terrorism expert also has counted over 100 definitions and concludes that the only general characteristic generally agreed upon is that terrorism involves violence and the threat of violence (Laqueur, 1996a). For this present study, the researcher adopted the definition which describes the terrorist attack as the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence to place the public or any section of the public in fear (Garrick *et al.*, 2004).

For the last 30 years, thousands of terrorist's attacks happened worldwide resulting in many casualties. Below is a list of high profile terrorist events, which happened throughout the world during the period (Van Assche, 2009). The events were:

1. New York City, New York; 1993

February 26, the first attack of World Trade Center (WTC) took place when a truck bomb exploded resulting in 6 people killed and 1043 people needed medical attention. Over 50,000 people had to be evacuated which take 12 hours to complete and recovery phase took 22 days.

2. Matsumoto, Japan; 1994

June 27, a deadly poisoning gas sarin was released by members of Aum Shinrikyo from a truck using heater and fan into a civilian residential area which killed 7 people. Another 58 victims were admitted to hospital and 600 people had to be evacuated, which took almost 5 hours.

3. Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; 1995

April 19, a truck equipped with ammonium nitrate and fuel detonated in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. This event caused a partial collapsed of the nine-story building and smashed another hundred other building. A total of 168 people was killed and over 800 people were wounded. The last live rescue occurred 13 hours after a blast and the retrieval phase took 21 days.

4. Tokyo, Japan; 1995

March 20, members of Aum Shinrikyo cult released sarin in 5 difference subway trains on 3 separate subways lines. Thus, 15 subways were affected and

killed 12 persons. More than 5500 individuals sought medical attention at more than 200 hospitals and clinics within hours of the incident.

5. United States of America Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania; 1998

August 7, bombing occurred outside the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In Tanzania itself, 12 were killed and 85 injured whereas in Kenya, over 200 were killed and 4000 people were injured.

6. New York City, New York; 2001

September 11, two-hijacked civilian airliners were flown into North and South tower of World Trade Center. 2726 were confirmed killed and 1100 people were treated for various injuries and complications at 5 local hospitals and a day after.

7. Arlington, Virginia; 2001

A hijacked civilian airliner crashed at the Pentagon, 189 were killed and the phase of response lasted for 10 days.

8. U.S. Anthrax Incidents; 2001

From 4th to November 20, anthrax was disseminated through the postal system causing 22 cases of illnesses in 7 locations resulting in 5 deaths. Over 10,000 people were offered antimicrobial prophylaxis.

9. Bali, Indonesia; 2002

October 12, several explosions killed 185 people; hospitalized over 316 people and 120 were evacuated from the island. Most of them were foreigners.

The largest act of international terrorism occurred on September 11, 2001 in a set of coordinated attacks on the United States of America, where Islamic terrorists were accused of hijacking civilian airliners and used them to attack the World Trade Centre (WTC) towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington D.C (Bulmer-Thomas, 2001). The effects of September 11 had a significant impact on the American mentality and led to global reverberations. Other major terrorist attacks have also occurred in New Delhi (Indian Parliament building); Bali car bomb attack; London subway bombings; Madrid train station bombings; attacks in Mumbai (hotels, train station and a Jewish outreach center), Nigeria, Pakistan, Paris, and more (Gray and Wilson, 2006). Perhaps, what happened in Indonesia was the nearest major activities of terrorism that took place in our region. The 2002 Bali bombings occurred on 12 October 2002 in the tourist district of Kuta on the Indonesian island of Bali (The Malay Mail Online, 2017). The attack killed 202 people. A further 209 people were injured. Members of Jemaah Islamiyah, a violent Islamist group, were convicted in relation to the bombings. The attack involved the detonation of three bombs: a backpack-mounted device carried by a suicide bomber and a large car bomb, both of which were detonated in or near popular nightclubs in Kuta and a third much smaller device detonated outside the United States consulate in Denpasar, causing only minor damage. Then, in 2005, another series of the terrorist suicide bomb and car bomb occurred on 1st October in Bali. The bombs exploded at two sites in Jimbaran Beach Resort and in Kuta 30 km away, both in south Bali. The terrorist attack claimed the lives of 20 people and injured more than 100 others. The three bombers also died in the attacks. All these incidents were traced from the middle east countries where the jihadist groups were active. Malaysians had also been recruited by these groups and their ideology had already spread among us without we realized it.

1.2 Terrorism in Malaysia situation

Lately, a new trend of disaster caused by human known as a hybrid disaster such as war, civil unrest, and terrorism is happening mostly in the Middle East and African regions. To be more precise, it was best described as many people trying to do as quickly as they can what they do not ordinarily do in the environment which they are not familiar with (Wilson, 2001). In Burma, the ongoing crisis in Maungdaw district represents the most serious and widespread violence against the Rohingya ethnic. This was a campaign of ethnic cleansing carried out in June and October 2012. Four years after the 2012 violence, about 120,000 ethnic Rohingya remain displaced in camps in Rakhine State (Human Right Watch, 2016). Humanitarian conditions for both remaining the internally displaced person (IDPs) and newly resettled persons remain dire due to restrictions on movement and lack of access to livelihoods and basic services, similar to conflicts in Palestine, Syria, and Iraq.

Based on the above phenomena, it is not impossible for us to experience with similar situation. Our country had already experienced several emergency events. Below are some examples of major situations that had happened in Malaysia (Fong, 2005; Wikipedia, 2013):

1. 13 May 1969. A situation refers to the Sino-Malay sectarian conflict in Kuala Lumpur. Based on the report by Time Magazine, the event spread throughout the city within 45 minutes. In the end, 143 of the dead were Chinese and 25 Malays, 439 were recorded as injured. 753 cases of arson were logged and 211 vehicles were destroyed or severely damaged.

2. 19 November 1985. The Memali incident Baling, Kedah. About 200 policemen under command laid siege to several village houses in Memali, in Baling Kedah which consists of 400 people, led by Ibrahim Mahmud a.k.a. Ibrahim Libya. The incident resulted in 14 civilians and 4 policemen dead and 159 people detained, including women and children.
3. 31 July 1988. The collapsed of Penang Ferry Terminal-Jeti Pengkalan Sultan Abdul Halim which killed 32 and more than 1674 people injured.
4. 7 May 1991. Sungai Buloh fireworks factory explosion that caused 22 deaths and 103 injured.
5. 20 June 1992. The oil tanker Choon Hong III at Port Kelang explosion resulting in 10 deaths and more than 1000 people evacuated from the area.
6. 11 December 1993. The Highland Tower Condominium collapsed with 48 people killed and complete evacuation of another 2 blocks of condominium nearby.
7. 30 June 1995. Landslide at Karak Highway, KM 34 Susur Genting Highland that killed 20 tourists and injuring another 22 victims.
8. 15 July 1996. Landslide accident happed at KM 1.5 Jalan Genting Highland and 17 people were killed.
9. 29 August 1996. Sudden mud flood ravaged Pos Dipang Perak killing 44 people and destroyed 30 homes.
10. 26 December 1996. Typhoon and floods which hit west coast of Sabah resulting in 230 people killed and 500 houses destroyed.

11. April 2013. The Lahad Datu incident which killed 14 and injured 3 Malaysian enforcement members.

All the above incidents were not caused directly by terrorist action. The incident on 13 May 1969 was an ethnic conflict phenomenon, which was referred to as the Sino-Malay sectarian riot in Kuala Lumpur (Tuanku Abdul Rahman, 1972). During this incident, as stated by National Operations Council was a result of an interaction of several forces. These contain a group breach and differences in understanding of the legitimate structure by the different races in the country; the agitation, uncontrolled reports and offensive actions of certain racialist party members and supporters during the recent General Election; the part played by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and underground citizens in seditious racial feelings and doubt; and the worried, and later frantic, attitude of the Malays with a background of Sino-Malay distrust, and recently, just after the General Elections, as a result of racial insults and threat to their future survival in their own country (Tuanku Abdul Rahman, 1972). This conflict looks like being related to the political environment. This issue is still considered as a threat to Malaysia as a country with multi-racial and multi-religious society. The Lahad Datu tragedy was related to the Mindanao or Philippine people trying to invade Malaysia using military force (Muguntan, 2013). These two events that happened earlier were close to the art of terrorism already experienced by Malaysia public.

Currently, with the ongoing crisis and conflict in the middle east and Afghanistan related to religious and political issues, could influence this nation to have

a great potential threat. Based on the above scenarios, it is not surprising for Malaysia to one day face terrorist threats or social upheaval. On the other hand, with limited previous experiences in dealing with such threat, the Malaysia government agencies under the *Majlis Keselamatan Negara* (MKN) and private-sectors organization perhaps need to develop the ideal and effective plan to cope or respond to various kinds of disaster threat specifically terrorism. Reacting efficiently to such threat are very challenging since it involves not only to provide treatment to the injured victims but also taking quick action to protect a much larger population who are exposed to the risk of further illness or injuries because of the incident (Fong, 2005).

1.3 National disaster management policy in Malaysia

Nature and economies are the main sources of crises that negatively reflect on mankind development throughout the world including Malaysia. To deal with these conflicts and problems, the governing body of a society or authorities will make rules and orders, duties and directives that every individual should live their lives by but until today, several questions are raised when discussing the issue of state disaster policy, especially the role of the public in helping the government during the initial phase of development of the plan itself (Fong, 2005).

Currently, there were no direct answers to the above questions. The reality is the public themselves only had a little or no role at all in helping the government or non-government organizations (NGO) in developing a preparedness plan against terrorism (Fong, 2005). On top of it, the government of Malaysia previous experiences dealing with terrorism was limited, only during the communist insurgency in the early

days of the nation building, the Indonesian–Malaysian Confrontation during 1963 to 1966 (Arkib Negara, 2010), the 13 May 1969 incident referred to the Sino-Malay sectarian violence in Kuala Lumpur and the latest was Lahad Datu episode in Sabah involving Sulu’s tribe as mentioned before. Based on these scenarios, the action plan against terrorism which existed today as claimed by the authority, perhaps being developed using assumptions of people reaction towards a similar threat. These concepts are totally based on the government policy maker expectations of peoples need and anticipated reaction during those crises (Muguntan, 2013).

Most of the expectations or assumptions on public behavior on how people will react to emergencies or crisis were basically established by past experiences (Mair, 2007). Such expectations are those things may not be necessarily correct, perhaps it also would be wrong. Dissimilarity among policymaker in the government would be another source of ambiguity. Most of the times, they have differences in opinion on how the public will respond to a disaster condition. The most concern is the fact that the policymaker assumptions about the community reaction during the crisis had often been wrong and the impact is very bad to the community (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007; Aradau and Van Munster, 2008; Birnbaum and Roger, 2011; Bolton, 2015). Several examples in the literature proved that public or communities will react differently from what the government expected. Furthermore, crisis contingency plan of action developed based on miscalculations of how people would react would generate more problems rather than the solution themselves (Lemyre *et al.*, 2006; Martens and Van den Brande, 2015). For an example, the USA governments failed to anticipate the behavior of health care workers in the Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention (CDC) Smallpox Vaccination Program. Thus, 4 months after successful completion of the program, only 8.5% of the targeted 440,000 health care workers were vaccinated (Mack, 2003).

In the Malaysia situation, with minimal previous experiences of terrorist incidents, this mistake could also have happened. The best practice is the government or planners do not have to speculate what the public concern was or would react in a disaster event. They need to identify the significance of plans on the most precise evidence potential, leaders involved in terrorist preparation must encourage policymakers to acquire material from the public directly (Anderton and Carter, 2005; Anderton and Carter, 2006; Aradau and Van Munster, 2007; Aradau and Van Munster, 2008; Aradau and Van Munster, 2012). The working group on “Governance Dilemmas” in Bioterrorism Response, as Julie Gerberding, the former Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) stated in a July 2002 interview mentioned that in terrorism, certain action needs to be done on ground level by the officer themselves and not to speculate by hearing the news (Bhattacharjee, 2006a; Bhattacharjee, 2006b; Bhattacharjee, 2008). Using the above concept, the Health Campus of Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) team known as Disaster and Emergency Assistant Team (DEMAT) had been actively involved on-ground in disaster relief. The DEMAT team have good cooperation with the Malaysian Medical Relief Society (MERCY) and was sent to Darfur, Kosovo, Gujarat, Pakistan, Maluku and Cambodia in support of humanitarian relief after disaster strikes (Unit Perhubungan Awam, 2005) to gain more on-field experiences.

The literature review also revealed that in the Malaysian situation, there is very limited information written about disaster preparedness plan pertaining to terrorism. The present situation showed that the strength of the chain of disaster management preparedness in Malaysia is still unclear. This situation seems to be relatively in-line with the way the Malaysian public thinking towards terrorism. As on when, how and why they should be involved with this kind of situation were considered not important to them at that point in time (Rashidi Ahmad, 2006). The United States of America (USA) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and International Disaster Database, stated that for any event to be put in the list of disaster databank, a minimum of one of the following criteria below need to be fulfilled (Van Sliedregt and Van Den Herik, 2011):

1. more than 10 people reported killed
2. more than 100 people reported affected
3. international assistance is needed
4. declaration of an emergency at the state level

1.4 Justification of the study

In Malaysia situation, the opportunity for Malaysia public to discuss on how their response to the Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) or manual during disaster event are very rarely discussed especially pertaining to any terrorism (Rashidi Ahmad, 2006). Thus, the Malaysia public knowledge and experience towards that threat were very limited or perhaps none. Previous experiences such as communist insurgency in the early days, the Indonesian–Malaysian Confrontation, the Sino-Malay sectarian violence in Kuala Lumpur and the latest Lahad Datu episode in Sabah involving the

Sulu's tribe, were still not enough to persuade the Malaysia public to seriously think the seriousness of the threat. Terrorism is relatively new for Malaysia people and perhaps would not happen within recent years, but somehow, we need to prepare for it. This is the appropriate time to address that phenomenon in a good manner. What we need is a comprehensive, effective and functioning plan to deal with terrorism. We knew very much for the plan to succeed; the public must be involved from the beginning and all the way as in its planning and rehearsed as well. Presently, the degree of public involvements is very minimal and need to be re-assessed.

Recent developments suggest that Malaysia's jihadist individual was involved in terrorism activities internationally especially in the middle east, Philippines, and Indonesia. This groups of people had recruited new members to spread their ideology in this country and in the region. This latest phenomenon proves that our people were already involved with terrorist activities. This threat is evolving and growing drastically in a recent year. For examples, on May 8, 2017, the country's national police chief announced that Muhammad Wandy Mohamad Jedi, a Malaysian jihadist recruiter based in Syria, was killed in an airstrike on Raqqa in late April (Startfor, 2017). Five days earlier, investigators in the country revealed that they had arrested six suspected terrorists over the past month for allegedly smuggling weapons in from Thailand, ostensibly in preparation for an attack. The incidents offer a cogent reminder that Malaysia is no less susceptible to jihadist violence, despite its relative inexperience with it. In fact, its historically low incidence of attacks may prove to be a disadvantage.

The news of Wandy's death could create more opportunities for jihadists targeting the country. Wandy, though a prominent and influential jihadist figure in Malaysia, wasn't a terribly effective leader. Under his guidance, the Islamic State's biggest achievement in Malaysia was an attack on the Movida nightclub near Kuala Lumpur on June 28, 2016 (Startfor, 2017). Early that morning, two assailants tossed a grenade into a crowd gathered outside the bar, injuring 8 people. The incident was so similar to previous criminal acts in the area that police were hesitant to label it a terrorist attack until the Islamic State took responsibility for it. The strike involved the Islamic State's first in Malaysia was hardly the kind of spectacular, shocking attack that terrorists strive for. Police have arrested dozens of suspected Islamic State members and have disrupted several attack plots connected to Wandy in the months since. In December 2016, authorities detained seven people who were in contact with Wandy for allegedly conducting surveillance on an international school in preparation for an attack. The suspects were also planning attacks against entertainment venues in Kuala Lumpur and Malacca. Their modus operandi targets were similar to the Movida bar. By the time police disrupted the plots, they were still in the early stages of the attack cycle. Few weapons were seized, suggesting that the plotters hadn't made it past. Early interception is ideal for counterterrorism forces because it reduces the risk of violence. And in this case, it suggests that authorities were monitoring Wandy's communications with his followers in Malaysia. Investigators knew that Wandy was using the Telegram chat app to reach the suspects and routinely cited their correspondence with him. In addition, Malaysian authorities appear to have been using aggressive intelligence collection to identify his co-conspirators in Malaysia while cooperating with foreign partners to track down Wandy himself in Syria.

The United States added the Malaysian jihadist leader to its Specially Designated Global Terrorists list in late March, and a month later, he was allegedly killed in a targeted drone strike (Startfor, 2017). Malaysia, like most Southeast Asian countries, heavily regulates firearms and gun violence is rare. Even so, those with the right connections can access firearms on the black market. Southern Thai rebels allegedly supplied the suspected jihadists with weapons. Though Malaysian and Thai authorities aggressively patrol their shared border, where an insurgency has been raging sporadically since 1948, they can't possibly stop everything. The aspiring attackers managed to exploit a blind spot in intelligence collection to procure weapons, advancing their plot further in the attack cycle than other jihadists in the country got in their own planning. Of course, authorities thwarted the attack nonetheless. But just because previous plots have been detected and averted doesn't mean future attacks will also fail. Replacing Wanndy could be the change Malaysian jihadists need to succeed. The country, after all, is home to a relatively open society rife with soft targets. Furthermore, its ethnic diversity creates the same kinds of political rifts that terrorists have exploited in other predominantly Muslim countries. And given the rarity of terrorist attacks in Malaysia, even a modest strike there would likely attract the level of media and political attention that assailants desire. Indonesia, by contrast, took the attack in Jakarta in January 2016 in stride, having weathered far more severe strikes in the previous decade. No matter the shortcomings among Malaysia's jihadist groups, they have capabilities enough to sow terror in the country. The figure below showed the incident of terrorism throughout Malaysia recently (Startfor, 2017).




Figure 1: Recent militant activities in Malaysia

Based on the above example, it showed that the terrorist activities in this country need a serious attention from the authority. Furthermore, they need to address well to avoid further impact on our society. In order to do that, the public perception of readiness, reaction, and willingness towards terrorism need to be reviewed. Currently, the plan or perhaps SOP that were already established to face such kinds of disaster conditions especially terrorism basically rely on government policymaker expectations on what people needed or concerned and how they will react to those events. All these expectations may be based on a previous limited experience of against terrorist activities as mentioned before. If the Malaysian government expectation or assumptions about the public were wrong, as happened in the past, the plans which were developed will not work as expected. The best example was the

tragedy of flood in Kuantan, Pahang. The state capital was almost paralyzed, and many victims evacuated to flood relief centers. The help was delayed, and several relief centers were experiencing problems in food supply and other necessities as they had been cut off due to the floods. Fresh and clean water and electricity supply have been cut off in most areas in Kuantan while roads in and around the town were inundated by up to one meter of water (The SUNDAILY, 2014). This kind of scenario was not supposed to happen because we had experienced several floods almost every year. The government or authorities themselves claimed that they have SOP, experiences, and expertise in dealing with this seasonal monsoon. If everything was put in order, this mistake should not have repeatedly happened. Our best explanation for such a situation was, this could be due to assumptions made by the government that went wrong.

A poor planning could put our public in a dangerous situation. They are supposed to be protected but will be exposed to unnecessary injuries or problems. In view of the importance of public perception in defining the success of terrorism SOP action plans, the present researcher strongly believes the following issues noted below are very important in the planning and assisting the public to develop a good action plan:

- How would communities or Malaysia public react in the event of a terrorist attack?
- Problem or issue that they concern during that event.
- The reasons to support them to do what they are told to do in such an event and whether the terrorist attack could make them feel unsafe and are they ready?

It can be assumed that the level of readiness, reaction, and willingness towards antiterrorism among Malaysian from this study or survey can help the government to have the source of information or opinion from on-ground users towards a campaign against terrorism. Based on that kind information, the government may produce a plan of action against terrorism which is developed accordingly to our norm of life and can function well during the implementation phase.

1.5 Research Question

1. Is there any tool to determine the level of readiness, reaction, and willingness towards antiterrorism among the community?
2. What are the levels of readiness, reaction, and willingness among community towards antiterrorism and is there any difference in readiness, reaction, and willingness between rural and urban setting?
3. Is there any association of socio-demography variables with the level of readiness, reaction, and willingness among community towards terrorism?
4. Can community readiness, reaction, and willingness be improved by using educational material intervention?

1.6 Null hypotheses

1. Community readiness, reaction, and willingness in two difference geographical setting [urban (Kota Bharu) and rural (Gua Musang)] towards antiterrorism threat are not similar.

2. Socio-demographic variables are not associated with the level of readiness, reaction, and willingness among the community in Kota Bharu and Gua Musang towards antiterrorism.
3. Anti-terrorism educational material is not effective to educate the community in Kota Bharu and Gua Musang.
4. There are no other factors qualitatively contribute to the level of readiness, reaction, and willingness towards terrorism