A WEAK STATE AND STRONG MILITANTS:

RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO JAKARTA, BALI, MALUKU AND POSO

SRI YUNANTO

UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA

2013

A WEAK STATE AND STRONG MILITANTS:

RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO JAKARTA, BALI, MALUKU AND POSO

by

SRI YUNANTO

Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

July 2013

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Writing a doctoral thesis is a long and exhausting journey. At the surface, it is like a work of mine alone. Beneath it, however, many people have directly and indirectly supported me in getting this work finished. It would not have been possible to write this thesis without the participation, support and understanding of family, friends and colleagues who have generously contributed time, energy and companionship throughout this project. Firstly, I thank my beloved wife, Dra. Budhy Trisnawaty. Her understanding and support helped me to endure this four and a half year intellectual odyssey. I am also indebted to my three children: Muhammad Sabila Rasyad, Isna Madania and Nahda Chairunnisa Utami who never complained about my inadequate attention on them as more time, effort, money and concentration were allocated to working on this project. I also thank my father Sugito Gitosudarmo and my mother-in-law Ratna Shaleh who provided me with endless spiritual support.

This thesis would not have been completed without the detailed and flexible attention given by my supervisor, Associate Professor Dr. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, an academic of high integrity and serious concern for quality, regardless of our informal relationship. I am grateful for his constant patience, consistency and cooperation in advising me to achieve excellence in the undertaking of any academic work. I am also thankful to all staff members of the political science section of the School of Distance Education, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, namely, Dr. Wan Asna Wan Mohd Nor, Associate Professor Dr. K. Ramanathan, Associate Professor Dr. Khairiah Salwa Hj. Mokhtar, Dr. Norraihan Zakaria, Dr. Low Yong San and Dr. Faridah Jaafar. They have all provided constructive input in several presentations at the School level to discuss the progress of my thesis.

It would not have been possible either to collect abundant first hand data without the availability and cooperation of my respondents from among policy makers, observers, actors and leaders of Muslim and Christian organizations who have openly provided data even on very sensitive issues. Therefore, it would be improper of me to not thank Drs. Ansyaad Mbai, the head of Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT); Basri Tuahuns, retired colonel of the Indonesian army in charge of the Maluku conflict; Dr Wawan Purwanto, observer and analyst of intelligence and security issues, and Syamsul Alam Agus, a human rights activist who spent most of his time in Poso during the conflict.

It would also be inappropriate not to thank Ustadz Abu Bakar Baashir, former MMI Amir, current JAT Amir and the alleged JI Amir who warmly welcomed me for interview in his POLRI prison quarters; Abu Jibril, leader of MMI; Atang Sutisna, an ex-DI activist; Nasir Abbas, ex-leader of JI; Zarkasyih or Nuaim or Mbah, the alleged JI leader now being imprisoned; Syahrul and Ateng, field leaders of militant Islamist groups in Poso; Jimmy, an ex-field leader of the Christian militant group in Poso; Abdul Wahab Lumaela and Rustam Kastor, Muslim leaders who played important roles in the Maluku conflict; and Rinaldy Damanik, who played a controversial role during the Poso conflict. Together with data from secondary sources, first hand, insightful information which I collected from them during interviews has distinguished the findings of this thesis.

I would also like to thank Anis SH, a Muslim legal advisor (TPM) who continuously provided legal defense to the detained militant Islamist leaders; K.H. Hasyim Muzadi, leader of Nahdlatul Ulama and Dr. Chaedar Nashir and Dr. Chairuddin Bashori, leaders of Muhammadiyah, who provided second opinions which balanced my analysis, resulting in its sound validity and reliability.

In administrative matters, I am also grateful to USM for providing me with grants from its Fellowship Scheme and the Postgraduate Research Scheme. Therefore, I thank Associate Professor Dr. Habibah Haji Lateh, Dean of the School of Distance Education, Associate Professor Dr. Mustafa Fadzil Farid Wajidi, Deputy Dean of Postgraduate Studies and Research of the School of Distance Education, staff of the Research and Innovation office of the USM, administrative staff members of the School of Distance Education and the Institute of Postgraduate Studies (IPS). They have all provided me with the necessary administrative support. I also thank Associate Professor Omar Majid, former Dean of the School of Distance Education and Professor Hanafi Atan, former Deputy Dean Of Graduate Studies and Research of the School. They both facilitated me in my registration and application for the USM fellowship scheme.

I also thank my bosses and colleagues at the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) where I work as expert advisor, and the Department of Political Science, University of Indonesia, where I teach. Without their understanding and granting of spare time, I would not have finished this thesis. Lastly, I dedicate this thesis to my beloved mother (late) Suharni Gitosudarmo, who passed away in the middle of the thesis project, my late beloved father-in-law H. Abdus Shaleh, and Professor Ahmad Suhelmi, my former teacher and teaching coordinator at the Department of Political Science, University Of Indonesia.

TABLES OF CONTENTS

Pages

CHAPTER 2 - PERSPECTIVES IN EXPLAINING ISLAMIC MILITANCY IN INDONESIA AND THEIR CRITIQUES: A LITERATURE REVIEW

CHAPTER 3: THE STRONG MILITANTS: THE RISE OF MILITANT ISLAMISTS GROUPS IN TERRORISM AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN INDONESIA

APPENDICES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONs

ACCT	:	ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism
ACPOA	:	ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action
AMMTC	:	ASEAN Minister Meeting on Transnational Crime
AMNM	:	*Amar Makruf Nahi Munkar (Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil)*
AQIM	:	Al Qaeda Islamic Maghrib
ASKOBI	:	Asosiasi Korban Bom Indonesia (The Association of the Indonesian Bombing Victims)
ASG	:	Abu Sayyaf Group
BARINDO	:	Barisan Indonesia (Indonesian Group)
BAKIN	:	Badan Kordinasi Intelijen Negara (State Coordinating Intelligence Agency)
BAIS	:	Badan Intelijen Strategis (Strategic Intelligence Agency)
BIMM	:	Badan Imarah Muslim Maluku
BIN	:	Badan Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Agency)
BRN	:	Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Troops)
BPK	:	Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (State Auditory Body)
BTI	:	Bertelsmann Transformation Index
CADEK	:	Catur Dharma Eka Karma (The Four Principles of TNI Doctrine)
COKER	:	Cowok Kerempeng (Slim Boys)
DENSUS 88	:	Detasemen Khusus 88 (POLRI Counter Terror Squad 88)
DI/NII	:	Darul Islam / Negara Islam Indonesia

		(Home of Islam / Islamic State of Indonesia)
DPR	:	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat
		(People's Representative Assembly)
DPRD	:	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah
		(Local People Representative Assembly)
DPD	:	Dewan Perwakilan Daearah
		(Regional Representative Assemby)
FKAM	:	Forum Komunikasi Aktivis Masjid
		(Communication Forum Of Mosque Activists)
FKAW	:	Forum Komunikasi *Ahlussunah Waljamaah*
		(*Ahlussunah Waljamaah* Communication Forum)
FPI	:	Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front)
FSUIM	:	Forum *Silaturrahmi* Umat Islam Maluku
		(*Silaturahmi* Forum Of Maluku Muslims)
FSUIP	:	Forum *Silaturahmi* Umat Islam Poso
		(*Silaturahmi* Forum Of Poso Muslims)
GAM	:	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
		(Aceh Independence Movement)
GKPI	:	Gereja Kristen Protestan Indonesia
		(The Association of Indonesian Protestant Chruches)
GKPS	:	Gereja Kristen Protestan Simalungun
		(The Association of Simalungun Protestant Chruches)
GMNI	:	Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia
		(The Nationalist Student Movement of Indonesia)
HTI	:	Hizbuttahrir Indonesia

HMI	:	Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia
		(The Islamic Student Association Of Indonesia)
HKBP	:	Huria Kristen Batak Protestan
		(The Association Of Huria Batak Protestant)
ICMI	:	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia
		(The Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals)
IIRO	:	International Islamic Relief Organization
IILF	:	Indonesian Islamic Liberation Front
ICW	:	Indonesian Corruption Watch
IMM	:	Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah.
		(The Muhammadiyah Student Association)
JI	:	Jemaah Islamiyah
JAT	:	Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid
KISDI	:	Komite Internasional Solidaitas Islam
		(The International Committee For Muslim Solidarity)
KOMJI	:	Komando Jihad
KOMPAK	:	Komite Penanggulangan Krisis
		(The Crisis Prevention Committee)
KMM	:	Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia
		(The Malaysian Mujahidin Group)
KPPSI	:	Komite Penyelenggara Penegakan Shariah Islam
		(The Committee For the Implementation of *Shariah* Law)
KPK	:	Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi
		(The Corruption Eradication Commission)

KKN	:	Korupsi Kolusi Nepotisme (Corruption , Collusion and Nepotism)
KNPI	:	Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (The National Committee For Indonesian Youths)
KODAM	:	Komando Daerah Militer (Provincial Military Command)
KOREM	:	Komando Resort Militer (Regional Military Command)
KODIM	:	Komando Distrik Militer (District Military Command)
KORAMIL	:	Komando Rayon Militer (Regency Military Command)
LP3ES	:	Lembaga Penerangan Pemberdayaan Pendidikan Ekonomi dan Sosial (Agency For Information Empowerment, Economic and Social Affairs)
MUI	:	Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council).
MMI	:	Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (The Indonesia Mujahidin Council)
MILF	:	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	:	Moro National Liberation Front
MerC	:	Medical Emergency Rescue Committee
MPR	:	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Assembly)
MKGR	:	Musyawarah Kerja Gotong Royong (The Association of Collective Works)
NU	:	Nahdatul Ulama
OPSUS	:	Operasi Khusus (Special Operation)
POLRI	:	Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (The National Police)

PAM

SWAKARSA	:	Pengamanan Swakarsa (Private Paramilitary)
PAN	:	Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)
PBB	:	Partai Bulan Bintang (The Crescent and Star Party)
PETI	:	Political and Economic Transformation Index
PKJM	:	Pusat Komando Jihad Maluku (Maluku Jihad Command Centre)
PPP	:	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (The United Development Party)
PKS	:	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (The Justice and Prosperity Party)
PKB	:	Kebangkitan Bangsa (State Awakening Party)
PKNU	:	Partai Kebangkitan Nahdlatul Ulama (The Ulama Awakening Party)
PUPJI	:	Pedoman Umum Pelaksanaan Jemaah Islamiyah (General Guidance for Jemaah Islamiyah)
PBR	:	Partai Bintang Reformasi (The Star Reform Party)
PMB	:	Partai Matahari Bangsa (The Sun of the Nation Party)
PDIP	:	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (The Indonesian Democratic Party Of Struggle)
PDR	:	Partai Daulat Rakyat (The People's Sovereign Party)
PII	:	Partai Islam Indonesia (The Indonesian Islamic Party)
RMS	:	Republik Maluku Selatan (The South Maluku Republic)

SALW	:	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SOMTC	:	Senior Official Meeting On Transnational Crime
SDSB	:	Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah (Social Lottery)
TNI	:	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (The Indonesian National Military)
TNI AD	:	Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat (The Indonesian National Army)
TNI AL	:	Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut (The Indonesian National Navy)
TNI AU	:	Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Udara (The Indonesian National Air Force)
TRIDEK	:	Tridarma Eka Karma (Three Principles Of TNI Doctrine)

NEGARA LEMAH DAN MILITAN KUAT: KEGANASAN AGAMA DI INDONESIA DENGAN RUJUKAN KHUSUS KEPADA JAKARTA, BALI MALUKU DAN POSO

ABSTRAK

Tesis ini cuba untuk menganalisis penglibatan kelompok militan Islam dalam serangan keganasan di Jakarta, Bali dan konflik agama berkait rapat dengan serangan pengganas di Maluku dan Poso serta dimensi politik dan keselamatan negara yang lemah bagi menjelaskan kebangkitan mereka. Dengan menggunakan kaedah perbandingan, tesis ini menghasilkan tiga penemuan penting. Pertama, Jemaah Islamiah (JI) didapati sebagai pelaku utama serangan pengganas di Jakarta, Bali, dan tempat-tempat lain di Indonesia. Kedua, corak yang sama penglibatan kumpulan-kumpulan militan Islam tempatan, kebangsaan, dan penglibatan kelompok militan Islam antarabangsa telah dikenal pasti dalam konflik Maluku dan Poso. Walau bagaimanapun, beberapa perbezaan juga telah diperhatikan, termasuk penglibatan tertentu Laskar Mujahidin di konflik Maluku bukannya Poso dan sifat yang berbeza daripada serangan pengganas di Maluku dan konflik Poso. Ketiga, kewujudan hubungan antara institusi politik dan keselamatan yang lemah bertanggungjawab terhadap ketidakupayaan kerajaan untuk mencegah serangan keganasan dan konflik agama. Konflik berlapis, kontroversi yang menyelubungi golongan elit politik, amalan rasuah yang berleluasa dan nepotisme yang menjadi cabaran politik di peringkat pusat parti-parti politik, parlimen dan birokrasi, akhirnya melimpah ke peringkat tempatan. Satu-satunya perbezaan yang nyata ialah amalan rasuah yang dilakukan secara terbuka di Poso. Walau bagaimanapun, masalah yang sama berkaitan reformasi keselamatan juga ditemui di Jakarta yang telah membawa kepada politisasi dan konflik dalam kalangan tentera dan pegawai polis. Masalah ini membawa kepada keperpihakan terhadap mereka yang seagama, perkhidmatan

perisikan yang tidak berkesan, pengkomersialan perkhidmatan keselamatan, penguatkuasaan undang-undang yang lemah, pengurusan penjara yang teruk, dan kawalan sempadan yang lemah. Yang terakhir ini telah membuka jalan bagi penghijrahan haram pengganas dan militan, penyeludupan senjata dan bahan letupan, dan penyebaran senjata haram. Apa yang menjadikan kes Poso sedikit berbeza ialah pengkomersialan perkhidmatan keselamatan adalah lebih jelas terlihat.

A WEAK STATE AND STRONG MILITANTS:
RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO JAKARTA, BALI, MALUKU AND POSO

ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to analyze the involvement of militant Islamist groups in terror attacks in Jakarta and Bali and religious conflicts intertwined with terror attacks in Maluku and Poso. It also looks at the political and security dimensions of a weak state to explain their rise. Using the comparative method, this thesis generates three important findings. First, the Islamist organization JI is found as the major perpetrator of terror attacks in Jakarta, Bali, and other places in Indonesia. Second, a similar pattern of local, national, and international Islamic militant groups' involvement was identified in the Maluku and Poso conflicts. However, some differences have also been observed, including the particular involvement of Laskar Mujahidin in the Maluku conflict-instead of the Poso one and the distinct nature of terror attacks in the Maluku and Poso conflicts. Third, the presence of a nexus linking weak political and security institutions is responsible for the government's incapacity to prevent terror attacks and religious conflicts. Multi-layered conflicts and controversies surrounding political elites and rampant practices of corruption collusions and nepotisms, which serve as political challenges at central levels of political parties , parliament and bureaucracy, eventually spill over to local levels. The only stark difference is the relatively higher intensity of corruption openly practiced in Poso. However, similar problems in security reform is also found in Jakarta, which lead to the politicization and conflicts among military and police officers. This degradation results in partisanships to their co-religionists, ineffective intelligence services, commercialization of security services, poor law enforcement, poor prison management, and poor border control. The latter opens the way for

illegal migration of terrorists and militias, smuggling of weapons and explosives, and diffusion of illegal arms. What makes the Poso case slightly different is its higher prevalence of security services commercialization.

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Background

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the militant face of political Islam has come under the global media spotlight. Its challenge to Western democracy and US hegemony replaces that of communism during the Cold War era. There are also fears that political Islam will challenge the tolerant and harmonious relations between not only Islam and the West but also between Muslims and adherents of other religions, especially Christians. Between 1980 and 1990, tolerance between Muslim and Christian communities declined significantly and the conflict between Muslims and the West intensified (Huntington, 2002:211). As a result of the current unique geo-political developments, Islam has arguably become the adversary of many followers of other religions: for example, Jews in the Middle East; Christians in the Balkans, the Czech Republic, Nigeria, Sudan and sporadically in Indonesia and the Philippines; Hindus and Buddhists in South and Southeast Asia (Ahmed, 2003:25).

The history of the conflict between Muslims and Christians and, more broadly, Islam and the West, can be traced from the former relationship between the two cultures and the power inherited from the alternate hegemonic interaction between followers of both these religions and civilizations. In the current context, this tension has resulted in a number of intertwining factors, including: a population boom in Muslim societies creating unemployment and thus jealousy; militancy towards the West and migration to western countries; the reinvention of Muslim confidence stimulated by Islamic resurgence; Muslim opposition towards the military; Western economic and

political intervention in Muslim countries and an awareness of differences between Muslim and Western identities (Huntington, 2002:211-212).

Tensions between both Muslims and Christians and Muslims and the West appear to be grounded in Indonesia, a country with a majority Muslim population. Since the downfall of Suharto‟s New Order in 1998, Indonesia has suffered from religious conflicts and terrorism along the path to political democracy. During its transition to democracy, Indonesia experienced a mushrooming of radical and militant Islamist groups, which seek to promote *shari'a* law using violent means to achieve their goals and using Islamic doctrines and Islamic symbols to justify their actions. Their militancy takes the form of communal conflict, physical assault and terrorism. The rise of militant Islamist groups like Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam and others serves as examples of the rise of Islamic politics during *reformasi* (reformasi).[1] This is different from the development of cultural Islam during the New Order (1967-1998). These small groups split from mainstream Islamic civil society organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. The other type of Islamic politics is the rise of Islamic political parties which contest in the general election (Azra, 2005:10).

The origins of these militant Islamist groups can be classified into four categories. The first category consists of groups which emerged at the beginning of the *reformasi* with neither relation to past Islamist militant movements such as Darul Islam (DI), nor linkage to international Islamic groups. These groups include Laskar

[1]*Reformasi* or usually called democratic transition in Indonesia refers to the era after the downfall of Suharto‟s New Order in 1997. It was marked by the social upheaval, following the financial and monetary crisis that swept the country and other southeast asian countries in the late of eightiest. In Indonesia, *reformasi* becomes the social framing to push significant political, social and economic changes to achieve democratic life (www. alumnisejarah.ucoz.com, 1998).

Jihad (Jihad Troops), Front Pembela Islam (FPI/Islamic Defender Front), Komite Internasional Solidaritas Dunia Islam (KISDI/International Committee for Muslim Solidarity) and some local Islamist groups. The second category includes groups with international networks, for example, Hizbut-tahrir Indonesia (HTI), which is a chapter of its main branch in Jordan. The third category includes groups connected to DI, but are not connected to any international network, for example, the Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI). The fourth category includes groups with international networks and connections with the former DI, for example Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Other pivotal characteristics of these four groups are their rejection of the democratic political system and their support for the inclusion of *Shari'ah* law in the Indonesian constitution. These groups can be classified according to the way in which they achieve their mission, that is, those who justify the use of violence, such as Laskar Jihad, FPI, Laskar Mujahidin, and Jemaah Islamiyah, and those who do not, such as HTI and KISDI (Yunanto, 2003:6-8).

1.2 Problem Statement and Research Questions

The majority of the Indonesian population are moderate Muslims who have established organizations to promote peace, tolerance, interfaith dialogue, freedom of worship, and civic activism in the areas of education, economic development, and conflict resolution. Politically, Indonesian Muslims are not a single entity. They support Islamic political parties which struggle for the implementation of *Shariah* law and nationalistic political parties with no formal Islamic agenda in their political platform (Hardi, 2003:580). The pluralistic political reality of Indonesian Islam serves as the legacy of the syncretic terrain of indigenous beliefs eclectically made up of Hinduism, Buddhism, animism, and Islamic Sufism. Indonesian Islam is open

to the ideas of pluralism, moderation, and accommodation better than the version adhered to by Muslims in the Middle East. With this inclusive nature, the Western democratic society believes that Indonesian Muslims have the potential to accept the idea of democracy better than other Muslims in the world (Yunanto, 2003:1). Indonesian Islam is not monolithic in the sense that there is no single group which claims or exercises domination of Islamic teachings. Therefore, there is a great opportunity for Islam in Indonesia to become more progressive, more forward looking, and more responsive to this development (Azra, 2005:29).

However, at the outset of *reformasi*, Indonesia was beset with the rise of vibrant militant Islamist groups which were involved in terror attacks in Jakarta, Bali, and other places and in various religious conflicts intertwined with terror attacks in Maluku and Poso. Some of these groups abhor the democratic system and challenge the unitary state of Indonesia. Using Islamic pretexts and symbols, terror attacks have killed hundreds of innocent civilians, ruined hotels, churches, mosques, government buildings, and foreign embassy offices. Religious conflicts in Maluku and Poso have taken thousands of people‟s lives, wounded hundreds of thousands of others, and ruined both Muslim and Christian infrastructure. They have challenged the moderate Islamic groups, harmed religious tolerance and plurality, notably between Muslims and Christians, and damaged the good image of the moderate Indonesian Muslims. They threaten the nationalist political leadership which received support from the majority of moderate Indonesian Muslim communities, especially NU whose members are around 35-60 million and Muhammadiyah with around 30 million members (Azra, 2006:60; Hefner, 2002:757).

The demise of the New Order marked the democratic transition in Indonesia. The early years of *reformasi* brought about a few changes in the political and security sectors. Political reform promised Indonesia a democratic future characterized by freedom of the press, the release of political prisoners, and a fair election system. *Reformasi* has successfully amended the 1945 constitution which strengthens the parliament‟s legislative power. It has also implemented a multi-party system which offers the people more opportunities to participate in politics. This is a different experience from that of the New Order era which limited people‟s political participation to certain groups (Maruto and Anwari, 2002: 127–132).

The mushrooming of political parties, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom to establish organizations have stimulated people to be aware of their political rights which had, for so many years, been limited and subjected to humiliation. In some instances, these cumulative demands have turned into political upheavals, demonstrations, and protest movements (Romli, 2003:132–33). In the security sector, *reformasi* has transformed the socio-political role of TNI (The Indonesian Army) and the intelligence agencies, generated omnibus multi-sectoral defence legislations, broadened the authority of the POLRI (The Indonesian Police), and improved defence budget and defence technology policies (Laksmana, 2010:3).

However, the progress made by *reformasi* only brings about a superficial transformation from an authoritarian to a democratic government system. It has not yet resulted in a more effective political system which should have produced responsive public policies that meet the people‟s expectations. Law enforcement is stagnant, the bureaucratic reform is slow, and the coordination between the central

and the local governments does not work efficiently (Maruto and Anwari, 2002: 127–132).

During this turmoil, political and security institutions from the central to local levels have been found too weak to assume their responsibility in protecting the people. They have failed to prevent the conflict and terror attacks. Political institutions such as the civil society, political parties, parliament, and bureaucracy at both national and local levels suffered from multi-layered problems. Therefore, they have been unable to exercise control over the transformation of security institutions such as TNI, POLRI, and intelligence services from their authoritarian legacies to the modern ones which should be subject to democratic control.

To solve religious conflicts and combat terrorism, Indonesia has to strengthen its political and security institutions. Failing to do so will stimulate people‟s distrust toward the democratic system and invite anti-democratic interests to bring Indonesia back to its authoritarian yet stable and orderly system. Having this problem in mind, this thesis seeks to answer two research questions:

1. How were the militant Islamist groups involved in the conflicts and terror attacks during Indonesia‟s transition into a more democratic country?
2. What political and security challenges weakened Indonesia in preventing terrorism and religious conflicts?

1.3 Theoretical Framework

1.3.1 Weak State and Religious Militancy

This thesis uses the “weak state” theory to explain the incapability of a state to protect people during terror attacks and religious conflicts. A weak state is characterized by indicators of economic, social, political, and security problems, of

which politics and security serve as the dominant factors (Patrick, 2006:5–6). Being consistent with the focus of this research, this thesis analyzes Indonesia as a weak state from political and security dimensions.

From the political dimension, a weak state faces three main challenges. First, it is either unable to create social and political consensus amongst political powers or unable to solve communal and political conflicts amongst factions in the state. Since the government is unable to control the conflicting groups, the conflicts will then cripple the state and sometimes even destroy the central government (Buzan, 1983:66–67; Buzan, Weaver, and De Wilde, 1998:146; Laitin and Brubaker, 1998:437; Rotberg, 2003:4). Such conflicts are rooted in the ethnicity, religions, and languages which the militants capitalize on to legitimize the conflicts, to rally support, and to strengthen their own class, identity, and language. Religion provides them with militant caders and rituals important for the rise of militancy (Rotberg, 2003:4; Panggabean, 2004:53; Perwita, 2005:2; Appebly, 2000:109).

Second, due to the crippling conflicts, the state finally loses its political will, capacity, legitimacy, and capability to mobilize its own economic and political resources, to penetrate its people, to make social regulations, to mobilize resources, to enforce law, public order, and sanctions, and to control its citizens (Newman, 2007:3; Buzan, 1983: 66–67; Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: 146; Migdal, 1988:xiii–xiv; Rotberg, 2003:4). Third, a weak state is typically beset with rampant corruption (Rotberg, 2003:4)[2]. In other words, weak states are those whose

[2] In addition to the presence of domestic ethnic and religious conflict, rampant practices of corruption, and poor law enforcement, Rotberg also lists problems of poor state management, the presence of external attacks, despotism, low per-capita income, poor infrastructure, and the undermining of the role of civil society as the important indicators of a weak state (Rotberg, 2003:4).

institutions are ineffective and not autonomous in assuming their responsibility (Tadjoeddin, 2002:11).

From the security dimension, a weak state is characterized by two main challenges. First, the formulation of its national security policies is primarily devoted to dealing with domestic conflicting groups, organizations, or individuals that challenge the government‟s legitimacy. The design of the national security policy is to meet the government‟s interest instead of the state‟s interest. This is different from that of the strong state which is primarily focused on protecting their people from external threats. Such design meets both the government‟s and state‟s interests (Buzan, 1983:66–67; Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998:146). Second, a weak state also faces problems with enforcing border control, thus making it a convenient source, transit, and destination country for illegal arms business. Terrorists and militias then use the state as their safe haven to set training programs, conduct indoctrination, and access weapons, equipment, and finance (Patrick, 2006:8–9-10; Newman, 2007:3).

1.3.2 A Weak State and Democratization in Indonesia

Democratization is like two sides of coins. On one face, it promises the hope for changes and progress toward a better life that stimulate people‟s eagerness for democratization. On the other face, it‟s initial stage is usually marked with the weakening state institutions which bring about instability, revolution, widespread violent conflicts, and give rise to conservative leaders who propagate anti-democratic nationalist movements. Liberating authoritarianism risks the unstable equilibrium

and the vulnerable compromise amongst conflicting parties (Huntington, 1991:121-124; Snyder, 2003:4; O"Donnel & Schmitter, 1986:3-11). Nationalist conflict is the side product of the elite"s effort to persuade people to join their nationalist agenda, which contains elements of conflict. The elite manipulates nationalism to legitimize the partial democracy, where they can use the voice of the people without being responsible to them (Snyder, 2003:18, 23). Such conflicts and other revolutionary changes may go beyond the political dynamics, along with other manifestations of mass mobilization like protests, strikes, and demonstrations, coinciding with the declining hope for democratization (O"Donnel & Schmitter, 1986:3-11).

Since its democratic transition in 1998, Indonesia has suffered from a number of terror attacks and religious conflicts in a number of locations. Indonesia has become one of the main destinations of Al-Qaeda"s operations, has suffered from spreading sectarian conflicts such as those taking place in Ambon and Poso and threats of self-determination and regional autonomy such as those taking place in Aceh and Papua. Democratization in Indonesia requires a strong state which is able to deliver its basic function and to protect its people. Post-*reformasi* Indonesia is weak in providing protection to its citizens (Rabasa, 2001:9; Azra, 2005:28).

Indonesia is ranked in the fourth quintile of the weakest countries in terms of security (Patrick, 2006:6). It experiences multi layered political conflicts which make it incapable to make sound security policy and take necessary security measures needed to prevent religious conflicts and terrorism. Counter-terrorism in Indonesia and other southeast asian countries should emphasize the effective role of the police and justice systems in enforcing law and order and ensuring political accountability,

in addition to dealing with terrorist grievances and reducing the factors that motivate them (Hamilton-Hart, 2008:10-11).

1. 4 Defining Islamic militancy, religious violence, religious conflict and terrorism

The term Islamic militancy can be understood from two perspectives: the substance and the approach. From the perspective of the substance, Islamic militancy is defined in similar terms with Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic radicalism (Fadl, 2005:18). With regard to the former, it refers to the belief that Islam serves as the fundamental value in politics, economy and social relations. The manifestation of militancy takes the form of the struggle to insert Islamic teaching, or *Shari'ah* law in the state. The militants view this as the fundamental and non-negotiable ideology, similar to capitalism or socialism, by which they view the state as a means to promote their programs (Jansen, 1979:188; Pipes, 2002:8). Jansen classifies Islamic militancy into four groups; the rude or the evil, such as Imam Khomeini‟s militancy in Iran; the flexible or the open, such as Indonesian Muhammad Natsir‟s militancy; the flexible but impatient, such as Sadeq Al Mahdi‟s militancy in Sudan; and the inspiring but threatening, such as the Muslim Brotherhood‟s militancy in Egypt (Jansen, 1979:188).

Similar to the meaning of "radicalization", the term "militancy" refers to the strong belief and desire to make such a belief happen in the social and the political change (Cobuild, 2000:977), the struggle to oppose the state on behalf of Islam (Ibrahim, 2001) and the rejection of Western values which they perceive as incompatible with Islam (Pipes, 2002:8). In doing so, militants adopt a literal interpretation of the

Kuranic verses as the basis for misusing and manipulating Islamic teaching to legitimize their militant and radical action (Azra, 2004:122).

To achieve the objective, many scholars agree that militancy refers to the use of extremism and unacceptable ways (Cobuild, 2000:977), collective violence (Ibrahim , 2001) excessive force (Fadl, 2005:18), violence (Deep, 1992:.55), aggression and violence (Pipes, 2002:8), violence and terrorism (Azra, 2004:102)**.** From this perspective, Islamic militancy has a similar meaning with extremism and terrorism in that they share the use of violence, coercion or an unlawful way to promote the mission. The involvement of Muslims in religious conflicts and terrorism serves as the manifestation of militancy, as both employ the use of violence in different forms. In its violent nature, conflict becomes a typical competition to win over value, power or status by injuring, attacking their rivals by using violence or armed force as the means to achieve the incompatible goals of the two parties. Using this definition, conflict prevention means preventing the use of violence and armed force, not preventing the competition (Panggabean, 2004:56-57). In theory, the distinction between communal, ethnic, religious, civil war and internal conflicts is not clear. In Indonesia, these types of conflicts are defined in broad terms as ethnic, racial and religious conflicts (Sukma, 2005: 41). Religious conflict is analyzed within the broad scope of ethnic conflict, as Horowitz argues, all ethnic conflicts are rooted in "the ascribed group‟s identity such as race, language, religion, tribes, nationality and caste" (Trijono, 2004:4).

Other scholars classify religious violence, such as the conflict in Poso and Ambon, as communal violence; that is, the violence which erupts between two social groups who attack each other. Such attacks are motivated by one or more of the following

reasons; religion, social class, political affiliation and even simple village-level differences (Tadjoeddin, 2002:24). Within the context of militancy, conflict is defined from the perspective of violence, while religious conflict is a typical form of violence motivated by religious interpretation aimed at achieving the incompatible goals of the two conflicting parties.

In its simple, albeit problematic conception, terrorism may be defined as (1) the manifestation of militancy as it employs the use of typical forms of violence to randomly spread fear targeted at civilians with political motives (Sihbudi, 2006: 42, Anggoro, 2003:231), (2) a typical intimidation or coercion against the government or people, using unlawful force or violence targeting humans or property with the aim of furthering political and social objectives (Salam, 2004: 30), or (3) targeting combatants with psychological motives beyond the direct victims (Cooper, 2004:30). Its tactic consists of bombing vital places, hijacking, killing, kidnapping and hostage taking (Manulang, 2005:101).

Militant Islamists manipulate the Islamic doctrine to legitimize their violent conduct in conflict and terrorism. According to Schoenfeld, in conflict situations, such manipulation is understandable, given the fact that any religion has two „faces", similar to the two sides of a coin: a peaceful „face" and a violent „face". In its peaceful „face", religion creates social harmony and order, social integration, meaning and morality. In its violent „face", religion stimulates war and revolution by monopolizing truth which then strengthens a collective consciousness. Extremism and violence are by-products of ethnocentrism and submissions to power (Schoenfeld, 1993:37-38).

All religions have a typical interpretation of doctrines to legitimize violence or force. Islamic Jihad has often been interpreted as the teaching which legitimizes war or physical attack, albeit in its multiple interpretative meanings. Christian leaders have promoted hard line actions and violence as the manifestation of liberation theology to uplift their underdeveloped followers. Hindus promote the Hindutva, the interpretation of Hindu‟s teaching within the framework of nationalistic spirit as the way to reject secularization and pluralistic state (Appebly, 2000:112-114). Regarding religious terrorism, Jurgensmeyer provides an analogy with religious rituals or practices aimed at extending the impact to the audience, not politically motivated violence. Religious terrorism is motivated by an imaginative "cosmic" stage, a typical imaginative motivation which is presently beyond reality (Cooper, 2004:57).

This research concerns Islamic militancy in terms of the use of unlawful or unacceptable ways, which take the form of violence, aggression and extremism to promote their missions. Militant Islamists materialize their spirit through their involvement in religious conflict and terrorism where Militant Islamists and their adversaries use violence to promote their missions. By the same token, this research does not discuss or analyze the substantive perspective of Islamic militancy which has similar meanings with fundamentalism, radicalism and Islamism, such as the reason behind their struggle to implement *shari'a* law and the interpretation of Islamic teaching that they offer as the alternative to the secular and Western systems. Instead, the research discusses how militants expose their violent, aggressive and extremist actions to promote their missions. The religious conflict discussed in the literature shares the same characteristics with religious militancy in that both use violent adversaries in the state territory. Brown categorizes this conflict into internal conflicts; that is, a conflict which takes the form of power wrestling, opposition from

the evil group against state sovereignty, ideological conflict, ethnic conflict and separatism (Brown, 2005).

1.5 The Objective of the Study

At a theoretical level, this research, firstly, aims to find out the nature and the emergence of the Islamist militant groups who were involved in terror attacks in Jakarta and Bali and those who were involved the religious conflicts in Maluku and Poso. It also seeks to understand linkages amongst them and with local militant groups and other similar groups in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. Secondly, it aims to understand the intensity of their involvement with terrorism in the religious conflict in the four selected regions. Thirdly, it aims to find out the political and security challenges at the national and local levels which contributed to their rise. This research hypothesizes that such challenges have provided favorable conditions for their militancy.

The study will hopefully fill the gaps in the existing literature on the causal factors of the rise of militant Islamist groups, which have been dominated by other perspectives, including relative deprivation, ideological and historical perspectives. By taking a political and security dimension, it is expected that this thesis will enrich the theoretical debate concerning the politics of identity and political Islam in its relationship with democratization and the politics of security. In the post-Cold War era, the academic debate on these issues is timely at the national, regional and international levels. Fourthly, at a practical level, this research will provide policy inputs in conflict prevention, combating terrorism and security sector reform which have become pivotal components in the success of the on-going democratic transition in Indonesia.

1.6 The Significance of the Study

In the context of Indonesia, neighboring regional countries and the international community, these issues will be highly relevant in the years to come. The President of the Republic of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, has stated that terrorism, along with corruption and drugs, have become the major enemies of the Indonesian people. Solving these problems has become a priority for the Indonesian government and its citizens (www.presidensby.info, 2005). The Indonesian National Police (POLRI: *Polisi Republik Indonesia*) has been successful in arresting and convicting the perpetrators of the Bali Bombings, as well as killing Dr. Azahari, the most wanted intellectual actor who was allegedly the mastermind behind a number of terror attacks in Indonesia. The POLRI continues to hunt others who have evaded arrest (www.presidensby.info, 2006). In recent years, terror threats have haunted people across the world, including in Thailand and Mumbai, India, experiences from which Indonesia can learn (www.presidensby.info, 2008).

In a speech to launch the Operation Candlelight to ensure the security of Christmas celebrations in 2008, the Chief of the Indonesian National Police (Kapolri: *Kepala Polisi Republik Indonesia*) warned that terror bombings remained a serious threat following street demonstrations and other social vulnerabilities. POLRI has put terror threats as the priority target in the security operation (Silalahi, 2008). In the coming years, the threat of religious terrorists is predicted to increase, while the threat posed by nationalist terrorists is projected to decrease. Religious terrorists have gained confidence from their success in attracting public attention, destroying government and business activities; taking people‟s lives; collecting and storing weapons, explosive materials and money; conducting secret communication and attracting

international support which facilitates their action (Chaerudin, 2003:15-21). Despite the successful arrest and imprisonment of Jemaah Islamiyah members by the Indonesian police, the Australian Government and other governments still consider this terrorist group as a serious threat (Setiawan, 2008).

For Southeast Asian countries, terrorism has also become one of the most important items on the security agenda and one of the main topics discussed at the Regional Chief Police Conference (www.asean.org, 2008) held in Brunei Darusssalam on 25-29 May 2008, with delegates from Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. This regional meeting addressed the importance of the exchange of accurate information concerning terrorists and terrorist organizations, the need to strengthen commitment in tracing, freezing and confiscating terrorist assets, dealing with the terror victims, and coherent coordination with the regional Interpol (aseansec.org, 2008). The Indonesian Government cooperates with other countries to fight against terrorism and actively participates in forums such as the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT), a forum which serves as the legal umbrella used to fight against terrorism, followed by the ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action (ACPOA), ASEAN Minister Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) and Senior Official Meeting On Transnational Crime (SOMTC), held once a year, as the follow-up to AMMTC.

1.7 Methodology

1.7.1 Case selection

This research uses the comparative method. As Harold Lasswell argues, it is an important analytical tool to meet the sound academic standard by drawing inferences or generalizations from the logical relationship across sets of concepts represented by the observed variables. Such inferences and generalizations are built up from similarities and differences of the observed cases and variables and how they are explained. In other words, the comparative method is a procedure used to draw inferences or generalizations by looking at similar results and similar causes or different results and different causes in some social units or across the time within a social unit (Lasswell, 1968:3-18).

The thesis will use the comparative method to understand the similarity and differences of the nature and linkages of the militant Islamist groups which were embroiled in religious conflicts in Maluku and Poso and terror attacks in Jakarta, Bali, Maluku, and Poso. This method will also be used to understand the likely similarities and differences of the political and security challenges which contributed to the terror attacks and conflicts in the four selected case-study locations**.** This thesis hypothesizes these four areas share similarities in being targets of Islamic militancy. Maluku and Poso were selected due to the presence of religiously motivated conflicts, intertwined with terror attacks such as bombings. This research seeks to understand the similarity and differences of vulnerable security measures and the presence of political problems in these two regions. Jakarta and Bali were also selected as case-study locations as these two cities have suffered from repeated terror bombings and terror threats. This research seeks to understand the vulnerable

security policies and political contention in the formulation, implementation and oversight of the Indonesian Government‟s counter-terrorism policies.

On the rise of militant Islamist groups as a dependent variable, this thesis first examines the brief profiles of the groups, their linkages, and their involvement in conflicts and terrorism. In terms of political challenges, this thesis looks at the presence of multi-layered conflicts and controversies among political powers consisting of political elites at both national and local levels. Such conflicts and controversies have weakened political will and law enforcement. In addition, the analysis of political challenges also touches on the problem of corruption. In terms of security challenges, the thesis examines three problems related to security institutions: (1) poor policy making processes which lead to the incapacity of the state to enforce public order, (2) conflicts among the institutions which may develop partisanship towards their respective co-religionists, and (3) lax border controls which lead to the smuggling and diffusion of small arms and light weaponry used by terrorists and militias to support their attacks.

FIGURE 1:1 FLOW CHART OF ANALYSIS



1.7.2 Method of Data Collection

This thesis employs qualitative methods comprising the following activities. Firstly, a review of the existing literature was undertaken to synthesize previous research which discusses the topics raised in this research. Secondly, an analysis of media sources was conducted to discuss and analyze the nature of the conflict and terrorism and government policies in dealing with the issue. Thirdly, Indonesian government documents which contain the nature of the conflict and terrorism, responsive policies such as laws, standard operation procedures, and problems of their implementation were analyzed. Finally, interviews were conducted with policy makers, leaders of the militant Islamists groups who were involved in terrorism and The Poso and Maluku conflicts, researchers and academician who had particular attention or did researcher on this subjects.

During the research, 22 informants were interviewed. To understand the implementation and challenges of the government policy on countering terrorism and conflict prevention, I interviewed Ansyaad Mbai, the Head of National Counter-terrorism Agency (BNPT: Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme) and Basri Tuahuns, a retired army colonel who was a former field army commander during Maluku conflict. To get a more balanced opinion, I also interviewed Dr. Wawan Purwanto, a leading observer and analyst of security, communal conflicts, and terrorism; Syamsul Alam Agus, a human right activist who did humanitarian work during the Poso Conflict; Anis, S.H., a Muslim lawyer who provided legal defence to terrorist suspects; K.H. Hasyim Muzadi, the vocal NU leader with moderate views in combating terrorism and resolving religious conflicts; and Brig. Gen. (retired)

Rustam Kastor, an former army strongman in Maluku who provided strong support to Muslim militia, especially Laskar Jihad.

To get a clearer insight into terrorist organizations, their involvement in terror attacks and conflicts, and their response to government policy and security measure to combat terrorism and to solve religious conflicts, I interviewed five figures: Abu Bakar Baashir, the leading Amir of JI, the former Amir of MMI, and now also the Amir of Jemaah Ansharuttauhid (JAT); Abdul Wahab Lumaela and Husein Toisuta, two militant Islamist leaders who played pivotal roles in the Maluku conflict; Abu Jibril, the leader of JI and Laskar Mujahidin; and Zarkasyih or Nuaim or Mbah, one of the JI leaders now in jail. To get more detailed information on the intensity of the Maluku and Poso conflicts, I interviewed Ateng, a former Muslim militia leader in Poso; Sahrul, a former combatant of the Tanah Runtuh militia group in Kanyamana, Poso; a former combatant leader of a Muslim militia in Ambon who prefers to remain unanonymous; and Nashir Abbas, a former leader of Mantiqi III of JI who was actively involved in the Poso conflict.

To get a more balanced opinion, I also interviewed Jimmy, a former field leader of a Christian militia in Poso and Father Damanik, a Christian priest and religious leader in Poso. More detailed information on the involvement of JI linkages in terror attacks were collected from interviews with a former DI activist and a former Afghan fighter. Both prefer to remain unanonymous.

1.8 Organization of the thesis

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter discusses the background, problem statement and the research question, theoretical frameworks and definitions of the major concepts used in the research which form the body of the research. It posits the political and security perspectives as the theoretical framework used in the research. It also presents the methodology of collecting and analyzing the data and selecting the cases of observation. The data collection employs qualitative methods such as existing research, government documents, media, and interviews.

Chapter 2: Perspectives in explaining Islamic militancy in Indonesia and their critiques: A literature review

This chapter discusses and analyzes the alternative answers to the research question which this thesis theorizes into relative deprivation, ideology, history, politics and security perspectives. Following an analysis and critique, this thesis chooses the political and security perspectives as a framework to discuss and analyze the collected data.

Chapter 3: The Strong Militants: The Rise of Militant Islamist Groups in Terrorism and Religious Conflicts in Indonesia

This chapter discusses and analyzes the rise of vibrant local, national, regional and international militant Islamist groups in terror attacks in Jakarta, Bali, and other locations, and the Maluku and Poso conflicts. Before analyzing their involvement in terror attacks and in the Maluku and Poso conflicts, this chapter first highlights brief

profiles of the militant groups such as Laskar Jihad (LJ), Laskar Mujahidin (LM), Laskar Jundullah (LJU), and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). It also briefly explores their history, fragmentation, and linkages with other militant Islamist groups in their respective regions.

Chapter 4: The Weak State: Political Challenges in Explaining Terrorism and the Maluku and Poso Conflicts

This chapter analyzes the political dimension of a weak state in terms of the presence of political conflicts, controversy, and practices of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN). It also analyzes the nexus between multi-layered political conflicts, corruption practices at the central government level during the early years of *reformasi,* and corrupt practices taking place in Maluku and Poso before and during the conflicts. Taken together, they contributed to the weakening of the government apparatus in dealing with conflicts and terrorism.

Chapter 5: The Weak Security Institutions: Politicization, Corruption,Lax Border Controls and Poor Law Enforcement

While chapter 4 analyzes the political dimension of a weak state and explains the incapacity of the government to tackle conflicts and terrorism, chapter 5 looks at the security dimension as an important indicator of a weak state. It categorizes such weaknesses into problems of the security institution and problems of security performance. Problems of security institutions include the politicization of security institutions leading to internal conflicts and partisanship towards their co-religionists. Problems of security performance take the form of commercialization of security services and border control management, which eventually leads to illegal migration of militias, smuggling of arms and explosive material, and diffusion of illegal arms.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This chapter draws a line from chapter one to five and tests the feasibility and deviation of the political and security perspective, which, it is hypothesized, is a sufficient explanation on the rise of militant Islamists groups in Indonesia. It summarizes how theories discussed in chapter one are proven in the other four chapters. In addition, this chapter provides the distinctive theoretical and practical contribution to the study of political Islam, democratization and the politics of security.