ETHNO-NATIONALISM IN POST-SUHARTO

INDONESIA: THE CHINESE QUESTION

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by

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Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

List of Acronyms

ASEAN   Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Baperki   Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia

BKMC   Badan Koordinasi Masalah Cina

BMI   Banteng Muda Indonesia

BN   Barisan Nasional

DAP   Democratic Action Party

DPD   Dewan Perwakilan Daerah

DPR   Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat

DPRD   Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat - Daerah

GAM   Gerakan Aceh Merdeka

Gandi   Gerakan Anti-Diskriminasi

Golkar   Golongan Karya

HMTI   Himpunan Mahasiswa Tionghoa Indonesia

ID   Identity Card

IFES   International Foundation for Electoral Systems

INTI   Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa

IP-PSMTI   Ikatan Pemuda Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia

IPS	Institute Policies Study
KASI	Konferensi Agung Sangha Indonesia
LPKB	Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa
MA	Mahkamah Agung
MCA	Malaysian Chinese Association
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat
Nasakom	Nationalism, religion, and communism
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NS	National Service
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional
Parpindo	Partai Pembauran Indonesia
PARTI	Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia
PAS	Parti Islam SeMalaysia
PBI	Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan
PDTI	Partai Demokrasi Tionghoa Indonesia
PINTI	Perempuan Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia

PPP   Partai Persatuan Pembangunan

PR   Permanent Resident

PSMTI Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia

PT   Persatuan Tionghoa

PWBI Partai Warga Bangsa Indonesia

RT   Rukun Tetangga

SARA Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar golongan

SNB   Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa

SIMPATIK Solidaritas Pemuda-Pemudi Tionghoa Indonesia untuk Keadilan

TMII   Taman Mini Indonesia Indah

UMNO United Malays National Organization

VIP   Very Important Person

WALUBI Perwakilan Umat Buddha Indonesia

Nasionalisme Etnik Semasa Indonesia Pasca Suharto:

Persoalan Kaum Cina

Abstrak

Kajian ini bertujuan mengenal pasti perkembangan sentimen etno-nasionalisme, organisasi dan pergerakan yang dilakukan oleh golongan elit Cina di Indonesia semasa era pasca atau selepas Suharto dan pengaruh mereka terhadap politik Indonesia. Jika dibandingkan dengan kebanyakan kumpulan etno-nasionalis di Indonesia, nasionalis Cina dianggap unik kerana mereka merupakan pendatang atau imigran asal; komuniti Cina tidak mempunyai kesetiaan yang kuat terhadap Indonesia sebagai tanah air mereka. Justeru, penulis ingin memastikan motivasi golongan elit Cina dalam menyatakan sentimen mereka terutamanya sentimen yang tidak wujud semasa regim Suharto.

Kajian ini menggunakan kaedah penyelidikan kualitatif, khususnya pendekatan penyelidikan perpustakaan. Penyelidikan perpustakaan merupakan pilihan terbaik bagi kajian ini berdasarkan fakta bahawa ramai ahli komuniti Cina masih bimbang untuk membincangkan secara terbuka isu-isu yang berkaitan dengan politik. Justeru, soal selidik dan temu bual bukannya pilihan yang sesuai. Di samping itu, penulis juga memperoleh maklumat daripada beberapa golongan elit etno-nasionalis melalui temu bual secara peribadi.

Dapatan kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa agenda nasionalis Cina bukannya menuntut sesebuah wilayah. Motif disebalik tindakan nasionalis Cina boleh diterima sebagai sebahagian daripada masyarakat Indonesia. Penulis mendapati bahawa

nasionalis Cina semasa era pra-Suharto amat mempengaruhi nasionalis Cina dalam era pasca-Suharto. Semasa era Suharto, aktiviti berkaitan etno-nasionalisme dianggap sebagai aktiviti haram atau tidak sah. Oleh yang demikian, nasionalis Cina dalam era pasca-Suharto begitu diagung-agungkan oleh golongan elit Cina dalam era pra-Suharto. Di samping itu, nasionalis Cina tidak bersatu, mereka terbahagi kepada dua kumpulan yang berbeza. Kumpulan pertama, integrasionis Cina yang mengekalkan identiti mereka sebagai peranakan Cina tetapi menganggap Indonesia sebagai tanah air mereka. Kumpulan kedua, asimilasionis Cina yang menyatukan keseluruhan komuniti Cina dengan masyarakat Indonesia. Namun demikian, kemunculan generasi baru akan memberi kesan terhadap atitud peranakan Cina buat selama-lamanya. Tambahan pula, terdapat peningkatan bilangan golongan Cina Indonesia yang terlibat dalam politik, sama ada melalui parti politik atau organisasi sosiobudaya. Malahan, mereka lebih selesa menyertai parti politik nasionalis yang dimiliki oleh Pribumi daripada parti politik berasaskan Cina. Hal ni kerana kaum Cina Indonesia tidak yakin dengan parti politik yang tidak berpengalaman dan tidak dikenali. Yang mengejutkan, kebanyakan pengundi peranakan Cina dan Pribumi tidak mempedulikan bangsa dan agama seseorang calon bagi pilihanraya umum dan lokal, asalkan calon berkenaan berkarisma dan berpersonaliti yang baik. Akhir sekali, sentimen tidak puas hati yang terpendam terhadap kaum Cina Indonesia lebih terarah kepada isu sosioekonomi dan bukannya perasaan benci yang wujud di antara kaum Cina Indonesia dan Pribumi.

Ethno-Nationalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia: The Chinese Question

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to identify the development of ethno-nationalists' sentiments, organizations and movements performed by the Chinese elites in Indonesia during post-Suharto era and their influence on Indonesian politics. If compared to most ethno-nationalist groups in Indonesia, Chinese nationalists are considered unique due to their origin as immigrants; Chinese community do not have strong ancestry attachment to Indonesia as their homeland. Therefore, the author wants to find out what motivates the Chinese elites to express their ethnic sentiment especially when such sentiments were not present during the Suharto regime.

This study utilized qualitative research, specifically library research approach. Library research was the best option for this study due to the fact that many members of Chinese community were still anxious to discuss issues related to politics openly, and thus questionnaires and interviews were not viable options. In addition, the author has also obtained information from several ethno-nationalists elites through personal interviews.

The result of this study revealed that Chinese nationalists' agenda is not independence or claiming a region. The motive behind Chinese nationalists' action is to be accepted as an integral part of the Indonesian society. The author discovered that the Chinese nationalists in pre-Suharto era heavily influenced the Chinese nationalists in the post-Suharto era. In Suharto era, activities related to ethno-nationalism were considered as illegal. Therefore, Chinese nationalists in post-

Suharto era have the tendency to glorify the accomplishment by the Chinese elites in the pre-Suharto era. Additionally, Chinese nationalists are not united, they are divided into two different groups; the Chinese integrationists who desire to maintain their identity as Chinese descents but still consider Indonesia as their homeland and Chinese assimilationists who desire to fully assimilate the entire Chinese community with the Indonesian society. Nevertheless, the emergence of reform generation (a newer generation which is more resilient with psychological trauma) will affect the Chinese descents' attitude forever. Moreover, there are increasing numbers of Chinese Indonesians who participate in politics, either through political parties or socio-cultural organizations. Chinese descents prefer to join with nationalist political parties belong to Pribumi instead of Chinese-based political parties. This is because Chinese Indonesians are unsure with the capability of inexperience and unknown political parties. Surprisingly, most Chinese descents and Pribumi voters are not really concerned about ethnicity and the religion of the candidates for general and local elections as long as the candidate is charismatic and possess good personality. Lastly, latent discontent sentiment toward Chinese Indonesians is more to socioeconomic issues instead of deep-rooted hatred between Chinese Indonesians and Pribumi.

<center>**Chapter 1**</center>

<center>**Introduction**</center>

1.1. Background of Study

The emergence of ethno-nationalist movements has been linked to state disintegrations, authoritarian regimes ending, pseudo-democracy, and ethnic purges due to regime change (Wu, 2007). Wu's (2007) study on Taiwan revealed that the struggle for power by political elites actually provided the impetus for the use of ethno-nationalist movements. Moreover, Wu argued that political elites try to segregate, form, and harden ethnic-based communities in order to facilitate power access. Purewal's (1998) study on Sikh ethno-nationalist indicated that although the conflict between Sikh capitalist farmer and majorly Hindu bourgeoisie of India in Punjab boiled down to economic hegemony, it later on developed into an ethno-nationalist struggle leading to violence by the military political elites, thus solidifying ethnic boundaries.

Furthermore, Lecours' (2001) study on ethno-nationalists' movements in Belgium, Spain and Canada showed that ethnic movements in these countries were orchestrated by elites although with different reasons. It started when the Flemish elites demanded for bilingualism in Belgium and it ended with many regions divided based on the dominant language. Additionally, during elections, the elites from both sides expose social injustice done by the other group to gain sympathy from voters. While in Spain, since 19th century, Spanish elites attempted to establish centralized, liberal and modern state but they received heavy resistances from the elites of Basque and Galicia provinces who are more traditional and conservative. In addition, Castilian elites of Catalonia were afraid of this situation might threaten

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their bourgeoisie power base joined Basque and Galicia. Therefore, these three regions established an alternate community for maintaining their supremacy. While in Canada, the conflict between French-speaking bourgeoisies with dominant English-speaking elites in Quebec region has made the establishment of identity based on language; identity formation in Canada was created based on competition between federal and provincial elites.

1.1.1. The Evolution of Ethno-Nationalism Studies

The ethno-nationalism term was introduced by Connor (1994); he defined ethno-nationalism as the action made by a group that declares some degrees of autonomy on the fields that are unified by a unique sense of solidarity formed by one or more collective traits and then forms a nation, where the appearance of ethno-nationalism is a nationalist movement (nationalist parties and organizations). The definition of ethno-nationalism for the Chinese Indonesian in this study based on the author's standpoint is an action performed by the Chinese nationalists who demand some degrees of autonomy on practicing their cultural identity and demand equality with other Indonesians. It is unified by a distinctive sense of solidarity that is shaped by one or more collective traits and fate, thus creates a community that is not only accepted by the Indonesians but also has equal status, whereas the materialization of the ethno-nationalism is a nationalist movement in a form of ethnic-based organizations.

Ethno-nationalism is perceived in a very broad manner and might be substituted with nationalism due to the "loyalty to a nation deprived of its own state and the loyalty to an ethnic group embodied in a specific state" (Conversi, 2004, p.2). Moreover, political studies defines ethno-nationalism as the first and leading

2

form of politics as a product of particular interactions between political actors where symbolic and subjective dimension of ethno-nationalism make a unique political activity (Breuilly, 1982; Brass, 1991).

Ethno-nationalism studies shows how ethno-cultural nationalism emerges and develops. However, a question arises: what is nationalism? Nationalism studies are a mushrooming subject that can dishearten scholars who study it due to its vague explanations of the key concepts. "To understand nationalism, we have to understand the practical uses of the category 'nation', the way it can come to structure perception, to inform thought and experience, to organize discourse and political action" (Brubaker, 1996, p.10). If the scholars want to understand what is nation then they should see "nationhood as *apolitical* and cultural form institutionalized within and among states" (Brubaker, 1996, p.16). Renan (as cited in Eley & Suny, 1996) defined a nation as a big scale solidarity formed by the determination of the self-sacrifice desires that had been made in the past and by those who are willing to do it in the future. Renan's definition shares similarity with Anderson's (1991) concept. He defined nation as an "imagined community", even in the smallest nation, its members will never know or even meet most of their fellow members, however, in their mind the communion image lives on and no matter how severe the inequality among them, a nation is always considered as a horizontal comradeship.

Nationalism study, in its development, is divided into two parts, civic nationalism and ethnic-cultural nationalism (also known as ethno-nationalism). An orthodox concept of nationalism assumed civic/territorial form as a good nationalism and ethnic/cultural form as a bad nationalism. Kohn (as cited in McCrone, 1998) argued superiority of western (civic) political form of nationalism

over eastern (ethnic) form can be seen from countries who adopt civic nationalism like England, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and America. These nations basically are modern states where its people are defined as citizens and the concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitan thrive. Contrary to the Eastern principle (suggestively Germany followed by Eastern Europe and Asia) which is completely the opposite of the civic countries, a nationalism is defined as a menace toward state borders and it can also easily change/shift due to ethnic demand, where its people are entitled as "folks" instead of citizens which is considered as primitive, traditional, lack of self-assurance, and inferior which was rewarded for "by over-emphasis and over-confidence.". (ibid., 7-8)

However, Herzfeld (1992) challenged Kohn's testimony by arguing that modern administratively regulated society is no more logical or less symbolic than traditional society. In practice, a bureaucracy relies severely on symbols and moral boundaries in a form of language. Additionally, Smith (1988) argued myths, symbols and cultural practices are the keys for making a modern nation. Moreover, Smith claimed that modern nation superiority was extravagant; modernist failed to locate nation in a cultural shaping historical structure and forget if a nation has ethnic as its core. Brown (2000) stated that ethnic minorities decide to resort their trust in ethnicity because they assume civic nationalism impotence that led to them being marginalized and exploited; for those who are unwilling to resort to the ethno-nationalism principle often choose multiculturalism as an alternative answer.

1.1.2. *Defining Ethnic Group and Ethnicity*

Ethnic groups can be defined in three different ways, in terms of objective attributes, with reference to subjective feelings, and in relation to behavior. The

objective attribute assumes that no particular attribute is regularly associated with all ethnic groups but there is always (a) unique cultural feature(s) that clearly differentiates one group with another. The cultural feature(s) might be in (a) form(s) of language, territory, religion, color, diet, dress, or combination of these. However, the main issue with the objective definition is very difficult to determine boundaries of the ethnic classifications. Although it is possible to do so, Barth (1969 as cited from Brass, 1991, pp.36) argued "the use of cultural attributes to identify ethnic boundaries may be superficial, confusing form with content."

In contrast, the subjective feeling definition faces difficulty when it has to explain a fundamental question, how a group of people attains subjective self-consciousness in the beginning. Meanwhile, behavioral definition assumes that there are particular and concrete ways in which ethnic groups should or should not behave, especially when this group interacts with other groups. Subsequently, behavioral definition simply proposes that among ethnic groups there are cultural distinctions, however, the significant differences can only be seen when the interaction among ethnic groups occurs (Brass, 1991).

Among the three approaches, Brass (1991) believed the most suitable definition for ethnic groups is the objective cultural markers. Every ethnic group is different from other ethnic groups in terms of objective cultural standards and contains within membership, either in principle or in practice, the component for complete allocation of work and for propagation forms an ethnic classification. Cultural markers are designed to highlight the cultural foundation of the ethnicity and to differentiate the ethnic classification from other kinds of social classifications. The genuine cultural markers might be language or dialect, unique outfit, food, customs, belief or race.

Ethnicity is a substitute shape of social organization and identification to class, but it is a flexible status that can change and is not rigid. Ethnic groups utilize ethnicity in order to compose demands in political sphere for revision of their status (whether in economic welfare, civil rights, or in educational opportunities) which manifest in a form of interest group's politics. However, some ethnic groups desire and demand communal rights to be granted to the group as a whole, what they desire for instance, not only have similar educational opportunities with other ethnic groups but also the demand to be given control over public education system in the areas that have significant numbers of their group members. Thus, they have the control and the ability to teach the history, language, customs, and culture of their group to their offspring (Brass, 1991).

However, it must be noted that sometimes misperception happens when scholars try to utilize terms of "ethnicity" and "ethnic identity". Wu (2007) explained, "Ethnicity is a set of characteristics commonly shared by individual constituents of a group" (ibid, p.9) also known as authentic racial-biological. However, although they share ethnic traits, it does not necessarily make this group ethnically united especially in terms of their actions. This explains that ethnicity does not instantly make the individuals associate themselves with their ethnic group. In contrast, ethnic identity immediately defines group solidarity with a chance followed by ethnic collective action. Consequently, while ethnicity contains cultural-historical traits, ethnic identity consists of moral awareness that permits ethnically distinct individuals to regard themselves as a united group (Wu, 2007).

Furthermore, Wu stated that ethnic identity might originated "from racial-biological and/or cultural traits obtained at birth" (ibid, p.11) of ethnicity, however, ethnicity is not a prerequisite for ethnic identity. Wu made an example from a

Chinese born in America may identify himself as American not as Chinese, his racial inherent characteristics as a Chinese person that he inherits by birth does not automatically define his "subjective identification" with the Chinese community, let alone his solidarity with it. In contrast, ethnic group solidarity could emerge based on its members' self-awareness and self-imagination of their ethnicity also known as "imagined ethnic group." (Wu, 2007)

1.1.3. Understanding the Ethnic Nationalist Mobilization

The mainstream study of nationalist mobilization claims that the existence of ethnic-based institution which repeatedly creates ethnic cleavages over time is the reason for ongoing process of deeply divided societies. These are the reasons for the establishment of the ethnic-based political parties. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) found that political institutions are able to create cleavages which influence many political scholars. However, Mann (2004 as cited in, Kaufmann & Conversi, 2008) argued that it is too simplistic if we assumed the existence of elites from the ethnic-based institution or political parties automatically trigger mass mobilization. We need to understand the functions and implications of the ethnic-based association and patriotic societies' existence.

Kaufmann and Conversi (2008, p.26) found that patriotic societies were necessary for the nationalism process in the "revolutionary France (i.e. Republican clubs), Switzerland (i.e. the Helvetic society) and elsewhere in Europe." While, cultural associations aided "spread the ideas of romantic intellectuals and generate the impetus for the nationalist movements within the European empires in the nineteenth century."

However, the reasons why social movements' mobilizations succeed or fail are still rarely studied and identified. For example, why the Sinn Fein's efforts in 1914 to rally support for Irish nationalism failed so pathetically but then thrived two years later and why in 1974, The Orange Order in Northern Ireland succeed to help Protestant arrange protest toward Catholic supremacy but fail miserably during the early 1990s (Kaufmann, 2007). Githens-Mazer (2006) argued that the Sinn Fein's situation happened because of the importance of the "cultural trigger point", an incident which occurs in a symbolically-charged situation thus leads to a step-change in support for nationalist organizations. While, Kaufmann (2007) explained that the Orange Order movements succeeded due to the social magnetisms of the local Orange parades, lodge gatherings and family ties despite its members being severely divided over political and class issues but is still able to maintain its unity. Another example is in the Basque region where its people have ideological contrasts, cultural differences, and political pluralism but all these issues became null through the boundary-building effect of the violence and the existence of influential nationalist symbols in the street (Conversi, 1997).

As a conclusion, mobilization by ethnic nationalists can happen even in a fragmented ethnic community as long the elites are able to obtain or create a cultural trigger point which can draw ethnic sentiments from the community and maximize it to trigger social magnetisms which lead to social mobilization. However, when the elites fail to maximize the effect of cultural trigger point, misuse it, or even misinterpret particular situations as a cultural trigger point then social mobilization might fail to materialize or even harm the nationalists.

1.1.4. The Southeast Asian Nationalism Situations

In Thailand, the state is promoting assimilation and integration approaches to its minorities. There are two prominent minorities who are considered as not originated from Thailand; the Chinese and the Malays. In the earlier period, Thai state was still very rigid and undemocratic; the Government forcefully implemented assimilation and integration policies. The assimilation process of Chinese community in Thailand was not as intense as Malays from the southern Thailand (Noiwong, 2001).

Chinese community can easily assimilate into ingenuous community due to its education process and similarity in terms of religious belief (majority of both groups are Buddhists). Thai schools play an important role in the "re-socialization" of the Chinese students by disregarding Chinese culture and language, and introducing Thai cultures as role models for the Chinese. The government is promoting reward and punishment system based on Thai cultures to be implemented and practiced at home and also encourages the Chinese students to change their names into Thai-sounding name. Most importantly, completing Thai education is a prerequisite to obtain full citizenship rights (Guskin, 1966, as cited in Sachakul, 1984).

Chinese descents who have decided to become specialists, academicians and civil servants of their host country generally have to disintegrate from their primordial attachment in order to be accepted in the Thai society and to further integrate themselves into the Thai society. Therefore, large numbers of Chinese Thais gradually integrate into Thailand society. Although it does not mean Chinese

Thais were willing to assimilate completely (Coughlin, 1953; Skinner 1957, as cited in Sachakul, 1984).

However, the Malays were not as docile as the Chinese. Malay Thais consider the Thai government as an authoritarian state who continuously disregard Malays Thais' religion, culture and social life. Any attempt by the Malay Thais to secure their religious belief and language was alleged by the Thai authority as an act of separatism (Noiwong, 2001). The Thai state attempted to exclude Malay Thais from Thailand's political process which led to violence by Malay extremists in order to become an independent society. In addition, there are two types of movement performed by the Malays: the one who resorts to violent approaches such as kidnapping, extorting, terrorizing, and assassinating the opposition of their cause (Pitsuawan, 1985) and the other who resorts to peaceful approach such as giving seminar to Thai civil servants, through their writings and public comments about relationship between Indigenous Thais and Malay Thais (Parekh, 1999).

The Malay Thais who resort to violence usually are the Malay Muslim extremists, which is in its development their movements are gradually declining especially since Malaysia helps Thailand to capture these extremists. In addition, many Malay Thais do not sympathize with the extremists cause because most of them have become bandits attacking and pillaging villages (Wanchai, 1999 as cited in Noiwong, 2001). Malay Thais who resort to peaceful approach usually are the academicians and professionals who support liberal or moderate Islam (Bhikhu, 1999; Noiwong, 2001), for instance, Ismail (1996, as cited in Noiwong, 2001) proposed that Muslims and Buddhists should work together despite their differences. Noiwong (2001) argued that Malay Thais who choose peaceful approach are more successful in making Thailand's authority accept Malay Thais and give the Malays a

political share in the Southern Thailand province. Many Malay Thais gradually abandon their desire to create independent regions in Thailand.

In Singapore, the development of nationalism is rather unique. Chinese descents are the majority population in Singapore followed by Malay descents and the Indian descents.[1] Despite the fact Chinese Singaporeans are the majority, earlier in its independence, Chinese Singaporean leaders suggested multicultural policy instead of minorities' assimilation policy (Quah, 2000). This happens due to the number of Singapore's population is relatively small if compared to other countries in the Southeast Asia except for Brunei, thus its ability to regenerate talented citizens is relatively slow (Lee, 1989).

Moreover, different from other countries in the Southeast Asia, Singaporeans did not originate from the Singapore Island but immigrants who settled in this island (Lee, 1989). That is why Singaporeans' primordial sense are not as strong as its neighboring countries, and some Singaporeans even have stronger attachment with their home countries instead of Singapore (Quah, 2000). Furthermore, the standard of living in Singapore is relatively high since this country does not have any natural resources thus there is a trend by Singaporeans to migrate to other countries when they have the opportunity to do so. These are a sign of frail loyalty to the nation. Due to these circumstances, Singaporean elites decide to maintain multicultural instead of assimilate the minorities, not to mention several racial riots occurred during the early years of its independence (Quah, 1985, 2000).

In order to promote nation-building, Singaporean nationalists promote the usage of English language for communication with different races while at the same

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[1] The Information was taken from Singapore: Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1999, p.34-38.

time still maintaining their mother tongue to prevent discontent from minorities and preventing the Chinese-educated Chinese (opposition) from assuming the leadership role (Vasil, 1995). Later on, this condition creates a gap between the English-educated Chinese and the Chinese-educated Chinese. Despite its small population, Singapore's minorities are given a certain number of seats in parliament to prevent discontent which might lead to disintegration (Vasil, 1995).

The government also introduces NS (National Service), a conscription policy that is claimed able to promote nation-building. Singaporean nationalists argued that this training will create a bonding sentiment among Singaporeans since the male Singaporean youths experience it together. This situation implied that Singaporean elites are desperate to maintain the loyalty of minorities (Quah, 1990, The Strait Times, 1990).

However, the second generation of Singaporean nationalists starts to reveal their ethno-nationalist desire by promoting "speak Mandarin" campaign also known as "Asianizing Singapore" (Vasil, 1995). Although this campaign was meant for the Chinese but the non-Chinese Singaporeans (Malays, Indians, and Eurasian) begin to feel threatened and alienated by this campaign (Quah, 1990 & 2000). This campaign which lasted for more than two decades made the minorities felt insecure and established a sense of the racial consciousness (Quah, 1990). Chinese nationalists claimed the Singaporeans need to restore their cultures and heritages so they can function effectively in their communities and the western world. Chinese nationalists believed that the English-educated Chinese should speak Mandarin because if Chinese Singaporeans did not restore their Chinese-ness then the country will lose its highly educated and skilled citizens, thus it will affect its political stability (Goh, 1999). Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong claimed it as the overlapping

circles approach, where each ethnic group in Singapore is preserving their ethnic identity but at the same time still united as proud citizens of Singapore (Goh, 1999).

In its progress, many Singaporeans migrate to western countries (Quah, 2000). IPS (Institute Policies Study) found that many ex-Singaporeans were not satisfied with the quality of education for their children in Singapore because it is too pressurizing and lack in developing creative thinking; besides, the Singaporean government is regimented, imbalanced, and intolerant. Moreover, they believed the work in Singapore is too stressful compared to western countries they migrated to (Yap, 1991).

However, the biggest nationalism issue in Singapore is coming from PR (permanent resident) holders. The PR holder obtained similar benefits and privileges as the Singaporean, minus an ability to vote (Cunha, 1999). This condition makes Singaporeans question the value of their citizenships and reluctant to fulfill the NS obligation. The gap between Singaporeans and PR holders are widening when more number of occupations in Singapore were taken by the PR holders which lead to unemployment among Singaporeans. Moreover, Singaporeans sense that their government "cares" for the PR holders too much. However, at the same time, Singaporeans did not realize the Singapore's government predicament. The government needs foreigners' workforce to fill vacancy in its economy pillar or other vacant occupations that cannot be filled by Singaporeans. As a conclusion, Singaporeans' nationalism sentiments are eroded by state actions which might lead to exodus by the Singaporeans, due to their assumption that the Singaporean government does not value its citizens' rights (Quah, 2000).

While in Malaysia, the rise of Malaysian nationalism is complicated. It is not simply struggle between Malay nationalists and non-Malay nationalists, but also between conservatives and radical nationalists within one ethnic group (Salleh, 2000). On the surface, Malays dominance is being challenged by non-Malays such as Chinese Malaysian nationalists. However, in reality non-Malays have problems among themselves such as internal splits within one community, inter-ethnic elites' alliance, and economic growth have weakened the non-Malays position to place a strong demand towards the Malays. Due to these circumstances, Malay nationalists, through their prominent political party UMNO (United Malays National Organization) should be able to exert their power and authority to define "Malaysian Nationality" in terms of Malay culture, welfares and religion (Islam).

However, Malay nationalists are not a homogenous group as most outsiders might think. In general, it contains conservatives English-educated elites and radical Malay-educated nationalists. This difference is manifested in UMNO and PAS (Parti Islam SeMalaysia). UMNO wants a more secular nation while PAS desires pure Islamic nation (Funston, 1980). Surprisingly, this situation cannot be used by Chinese Malaysian nationalists, due to the fact that the Chinese community are busy taking care of friction between "young Turks" (representing the younger generation who demand greater Chinese culture rights and questioning "old guard" accommodation of accepting Malays special position) and "old guard" (older generation who sided with UMNO) inside the MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association) and also to fend off radical Chinese from DAP (Democratic Action Party) waves (Loh, 1982; Salleh, 2000).

As a result, inter-ethnic alliance was not inevitable. In order to secure legitimation as an incumbent ruler of Malaysia, Malays (UMNO) made alliance with

non-Malays who share similar goals and forms a coalition known as BN (Barisan Nasional) (Loh, 2002; Salleh, 2000). On the other hand, the radical Malay nationalists (PAS) also make inter-ethnic alliance with the radical and/or the opposition non-Malays and create a coalition known as Pakatan Rakyat. When globalization enters Malaysia, it brings daunting tasks for incumbent elite leaders. UMNO elites try to realign their objectives to become economic orientated and cultivate the culture of aggressive wealth accumulation (Salleh, 2000).

Globalization gives implication on several Malay pillars. Liberalization of education system is encouraging the usage of English language as secondary language, which has made Malay nationalists felt betrayed by UMNO. UMNO is trying to introduce Malaysian consciousness (known as National Pride) as a substitute to Malay nationalism. However, it only gives superficial implication due to lack of support from fundamental elements such as religion, language, education and sharing similar traits. As a result, regardless of the Malaysianization effort done by government, ethnic gaps still thrive in everyday life. Currently, inter-ethnic alliance is considered as a viable option by elite nationalists to secure legitimacy in Malaysia (Salleh, 2000).

As a conclusion, based on these three Southeast Asian countries, the author drew several conclusions. State (government) and majority's behavior and action can determine how the minorities will react towards it. The stronger state/majorities put a pressure onto minorities, the weaker minorities' willingness to assimilate or integrate with the majorities. Moreover, when a state is unable to create a bond among ethnic groups within one nation, disintegration will most likely happen. However, when a state is unable to make its citizens acquire a sense of belonging to its nation then the loyalty of its citizens will deteriorate thus leading to ethnic

nationalist's movements. Furthermore, within-one-community dispute might take place which is why generalizing one ethnic group as a united group might lead to misconception or misinterpretation. There is a time when intra-ethnic relationship is worsening which encourages one fragment of group to ally themselves with other groups that share similar objective(s) in order to survive.

1.1.5. The Indonesia's Situation

Nationalism development in Indonesia after Suharto resignation is at a grim situation. The transition from civic into ethnic nationalism and inconsistency from political elites which created opposing groups (a faction who desires freedom of speech and identity revival in the name of democracy against a faction who desires to maintain status quo by preserving civic nationalism of the Suharto's version) have led Indonesia into political turmoil. These political elites wish to gain public support of Indonesians society while promoting contradicting objectives have torn Indonesia's legitimacy apart. Moreover, post-Suharto integration principle is different compared to Suharto's regime. Reformed regime proposes the theme of living in harmony within a plural society that can be achieved through the discourse of democracy and human right, which is completely the opposite of Suharto's force assimilation program.

On top of that, civic education (a government tool for proposing nationalism principle in form of integration) proposes that religious and ethnic clash should be solved through the practice of mutual respect among societal groups. It also explains that mutual respect requires positive acknowledgement of other religions or beliefs (Tim ICCE UIN, 2003 as cited in Song, 2008). The civic education has inspired the revival of the ethnic-based organizations and religious organizations.

However, during post-Suharto era there are two major issues that materialized. Firstly, the implementation of civic education and democratization during the post-Suharto backfire its original purpose. Instead of creating harmony among different ethnics and religious groups, it develops into ethnics and religious polarization focused on radical agendas by certain fanatic groups in ways to achieve identity exclusiveness. Secondly, the widening gap between the poor and the rich due to globalization (since this study only focused on ethno-nationalist study, the issue of social justice such as relationship between the poor and the rich will not be discussed). However, globalization has a role which influences the development of ethnic nationalists; it promotes "politics of identity" to achieve "purity" of ethnic or religion. Instead of established understanding from different ethnics or religions, the exclusiveness of each group has made Indonesia becomes further fragmented and it gives birth to a strong ethno-nationalist's sentiment that occur not only in the national level but also in the regional level (Song, 2008).

The fragmentation in Indonesia has started since Suharto regime but it is getting intense when Indonesia enters the post-Suharto era. Pudjiastuti (2002) stated that Suharto regime which promoted homogeneity culture instead of pluralism contributed to latent discontent among ethnic groups in Indonesia but they are too afraid to react, especially the relationship between the Javanese and non-Javanese. However, since Suharto regime fell and in the event of the lack of strong political leaders have made ethnic and religion frictions easier to materialize. For instance, in Kupang, hostility happens in response to events of church burnings in Java. Therefore, Christian mobs attacked Muslims properties, although this condition did not last long. However, in a few days after Kupang's incident, religious outbreaks

occur in Ambon and the Central Moluccas and it spread to other areas including Poso in Sulawesi (Lundry, 2009).

Minorities' discontent, frustration and the government inability to solve these issues play important role in encouraging disintegration which occurs across the Indonesian archipelago. The separatist's movements are getting intense. Regions such Aceh, Ambon and West Papua demand for separation and independence from Indonesia. Similar case happens to East Timor region; however, unlike Aceh, Ambon and West Papua cases, the East Timor separation and independence was granted (Lundry, 2009). Discontent from minorities towards the government due to the lack of equality in terms of the economy, political representation and culture (sometimes also including religion issues) would lead to separatism. Separatist movements are the indication of malfunction state in the process of establishment of nationalism and state building in plural societies (Tow, 2001).

Ultimately, this fragmentation in the form of ethno-nationalism not only affected indigenous ethnic groups but also the naturalization of ethnic groups such as the Chinese community. It is widely known during Suharto regime if not all, most Chinese communities were apolitical. However, when Suharto regime fell many Chinese suddenly became interested in political issues, courtesy to democratization and civic education policy, some of them established political parties and NGOs such as PARTI (Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia), PBI (Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika), Parpindo (Partai Pembauran Indonesia, later transformed into an ordinary association), SNB (Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa), Formasi, Gandi (Gerakan Anti-Diskriminasi), PSMTI (Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia), INTI (Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa), SIMPATIK (Solidaritas Pemuda-Pemudi Tionghoa Indonesia untuk Keadilan), HMTI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Tionghoa

Indonesia), PWBI (Partai Warga Bangsa Indonesia), and many more (Suryadinata, 2004; Hoon, 2006; Setiono, 2007; Thung; 2009). Many founding fathers of these NGOs and political parties claimed the main reason behind the establishment of their organizations is due to their responsibility as members of the Indonesian society and their role in trying to eradicate discriminatory policies against the Chinese community (Suryadinata, 2004). However, many NGOs still claimed to be apolitical organizations. Lembong (2004) argued that this does not discourage political desire either by those NGOs or its members. There is a tendency of Chinese elites who enter the political sphere who promise to eradicate discriminatory policies as if when they are in charge, the discrimination in Indonesia will suddenly vanish.

1.2. Problem Statement

The traditional ideal concept of modern political unit is a state that integrates under a single national community known as nation-state; however, nowadays this situation is very difficult to achieve (Horowitz, 1985). Heterogeneous states are considered as unstable and unnatural to achieve harmony. Therefore, social cleavages must be eradicated and assimilation of minority group was the only sine qua non of political stability (Coleman & Rosberg, 1966, as cited in Noiwong, 2001). On contrary, Lijphart (1971, p.11) stated, "Political stability can be maintained in culturally fragmented systems, if the leaders of subcultures engage in cooperative efforts to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of cultural fragmentation". This means all elites from major social groups are delighted to maintain ethnic groups' stability if they were given chance to do so.

Theoretically this concept gives legitimacy to parochial loyalties but it also needs an overlaying ideological national consensus. A national political culture, or

known as "moderate nationalism", is created when a nation gives each major social group a portion of nation's legitimacy to maintain social and political stabilities (Lijphart, 1971 as cited in Noiwong, 2001). Therefore, political stability can be achieved in multiethnic nation as long as its minorities are given opportunities to participate in decision making process. In the era of globalization, it is virtually impossible to have a homogenous ethnic group in one country.

In Indonesia's framework, after Suharto's authoritarian regime finally ended in 1998, the government has a daunting task to maintain political stability while at the same time needs to prevent disintegration orchestrated by discontent regions and minority groups. It triggers social and political turmoil which had shaken the very foundation of Indonesian society. Monetary crisis has made Indonesian economy at its lowest state but 1998's outbreak was a serious blow to Indonesia's integrity and ability to handle problem. However, Indonesian leaders attempt to save Indonesia from its deathbed by reforming Indonesia's bureaucracy and political system which is known as the Reform era. In addition, transition from authoritarian state into democratic state does not necessarily save Indonesia from breakdown but it does give a glimpse of hope to Indonesia's future; the Reform government decides to replace Suharto's monoculturalism project with multiculturalism concept.

The inability to adapt with immediate transition and failure to define democracy properly would prevent Indonesia from recovery especially when Indonesians defined free speech as unconditional liberty or plural society as exclusive groups. Moreover, regime transition does not directly wipe away Indonesia's disintegration issues. In fact, post-Suharto regime faces grave disintegration issues that lean toward radical movements such as Timor Leste departures from Indonesia and become independent nation, uprising in Aceh by

GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka), Papua's uprising, "religious" violence in eastern Maluku islands and Poso (Central Sulawesi). (Pudjiastuti, 2002)

Additionally, the fact that Indonesia has more than 300 different ethnic groups in which most of them were being suppressed by Suharto has made the implementation of multiculturalism model an impractical goal (Suryadinata, 2003). On top of that, realizing that there is an opportunity to resurrect their cultural heritage makes Indonesians' primordial spirit burn even stronger than before. Moreover, civic education as a symbol of government support toward unity in diversity concept has backfired against them. Civic education concepts allow ethnic groups especially minorities to promote their cultures without the fear of being blamed for cause of disintegration.

The implementation of autonomy regions policy has weakened Indonesians' solidarity thus the term Indonesian citizens just becomes rhetoric. Many regions instead of promoting unity in diversity concept, ethnic clashes between majorities and minorities are getting intense; region becomes a small kingdom of ethnic majority of that particular area. Indonesia's ideology (Pancasila) is nothing more than a symbol whereas ethno-nationalism principle has gradually taken people's heart and mind. Zakaria (1997) argued usually a nation that undergoes transition into democratic nation tends to give vent to hyper-nationalism which leads to ethnic clashes. Instead of delivering freedom, prosperity, and liberty, premature democracy has tendency to reverse. Brown (2000) stated the discrepancy between performance and promise by elites tends to create disappointment and uncover the tension between two visions of the nationalism (civic and ethno-cultural) that leads to open conflict, whereas ethnic minorities deem they are cheated and marginalized by civic nationalism and decided to turn to ethno-nationalism instead.

The waves of ethno-nationalist's movements do not only influence local/indigenous ethnic groups but also the naturalization of ethnic groups in Indonesia such as the Chinese community. Several members' of Chinese community have the initiative for constructing ethnic-based organizations and ethnic-based political parties whereby their objectives are to resurrect Chinese cultures and political might to its former glory. However, there is no evident study that defines the ultimate reasons why the Chinese nationalist emerges, thus this issue needs to be investigated in order to understand their motives and objectives. Although some of these NGOs and political parties claimed the establishment of their organizations did not symbolize the exclusiveness of Chinese community but their support towards the struggle of Chinese community equality in Indonesia is questionable.

Moreover, Suryadinata (2004) argued that although the Chinese community appears cohesive, disagreement is still clearly evident due to different agenda and political alignments by different groups of people. These Chinese elites utilized Chinese Indonesians' traumatic experience as an instrument to achieve their goals. For instance, Chinese nationalists promise if they get elected or secured a position then in return they will give benefits towards their members (eradicating discriminatory policies, ensuring better life, promoting equality, etc.). Although, these attempts do not necessarily make Chinese community supports Chinese nationalists' endeavor especially many of them are still anxious to participate directly in politics but this attempt shows that Chinese are not as apolitical as people think. Through time, the number of Chinese-based organizations has increased steadily (Suryadinata, 2008). Since not all Chinese-based organizations can be defined as part of ethno-nationalist revival, thus the investigations of which

organizations can be defined as part of Chinese ethno-nationalist's movements are really important.

In conclusion, the rise of ethno-nationalism in Indonesia has influenced the Chinese community perspective (at least some of them). Their desire to carry out their ethnic interests in a form of organizations, NGOs, and political parties at national level (or regional level) has proven that the Chinese community does not isolate themselves only in economy sector. Chinese elites and nationalists' attempt to eradicate discriminatory policies and participate directly in politics are other faces of the Chinese community that were never seen during the Suharto era. This puzzling situation raises the following questions: what makes the Chinese community suddenly embraces ethno-nationalism principle and follows its trend? Are Chinese Indonesians already fed up with their condition and plan to participate directly in politics instead of delegating their aspirations to someone else? Most importantly, how strong is the implication of Chinese nationalist sentiment toward the Indonesian politics?

1.3. Research Questions

This study will focus on four research questions.

1. In what way does Chinese community in Indonesia during post-Suharto define ethno-nationalism in its movements?
2. What are the reasons for Chinese community to follow ethno-nationalist trend?
3. How does Chinese ethno-nationalist develop within the Chinese community?
4. What are the Chinese ethno-nationalist sentiments effects towards Indonesia's politics?

1.4. Research Objectives

In general, this study aims at understanding the development of ethno-nationalism by Chinese community in Indonesia during the post-Suharto regime. In specific, this study focuses on four main objectives.

1. To comprehend Chinese community's perspectives regarding ethno-nationalism concept.

2. To understand the reasons Chinese community follows ethno-nationalist trend.

3. To study the progress of Chinese ethno-nationalist movements inside Chinese community.

4. To determine the effect Chinese ethno-nationalist sentiments have influenced the fabric of Indonesia's politics.

1.5. Scope of Study

This study focuses on post-Suharto era, however, the nationalism study has the tendency of biasness if the author's data source solely from Post-Suharto and thus to certain degree the author also utilizes the data from Suharto and pre-Suharto era. Post-Suharto era starts from year 1998 and until present time is still considered as post-Suharto era (also known as Reform era). Moreover, this study also focuses on Chinese Indonesians who support the revival of ethno-nationalism notion regardless of their individual unique background. In addition, the author also includes studies of Pribumi (Indonesians indigenous) to explain the relationship and interaction between the Pribumi and the Chinese Indonesians to give better insight on Chinese Indonesians' motives.

Furthermore, Chinese Indonesians are heterogeneous community and many of them have integrated (to a certain degree) to their respective area which makes Chinese Indonesians who settled in every region become unique. Consequently, to overcome the heterogeneity of Chinese Indonesians issues, the author decides to focus on Chinese-based organizations instead. Chinese-based organizations with national coverage have the tendency to be centralized despite having branches in many regions; usually these branches are interconnected to each other and dependent on their headquarters. Therefore, Chinese-based organizations are suitable and reasonable for this study.

1.6. Significance of Study

The study of nationalism is not considered as a contemporary study, yet it keeps evolving from time to time following dynamic changes of societies and states. Moreover, previous studies concerning the Chinese community in Indonesia either by foreign or local researchers were mainly concentrated on economic study, marginalization, or discriminatory issues. Consequently, studies concerning Chinese ethno-nationalists in Indonesia are limited especially in the political outlook. That is why this study is important due to following reasons:

- This study will help to provide different perspectives of the Chinese Indonesians' political and social awareness from what mostly other scholars had done.

- This study will help to give a better picture of the development and implication of Chinese ethno-nationalist's movements in Indonesia by using the Chinese-based organizations' standpoints.