

Impact of Terrorism on Trade: A Case of North-East Nigeria

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Abstract

This explanatory study investigates the impact of terrorism on trade in North-East Nigeria. It further shows the empirical investigation of the scenario in which continuous mayhem posed by the 'Boko Haram' insurgent group has caused Nigeria loss in revenue over the past six years. Government has so far failed in its strive to provide the citizens with adequate security for life and properties, as well as an enabling environment for trade and investments which can also positively stimulate its revenue as a nation. As, there are numerous impacts of terrorism in Nigeria, trade is one of the key to the North-East region as their major source of income as well as revenue to the government. The study will use secondary data and will be guided by frustration-aggression theory to connect facts and give a meaningful context. Hence, the findings are expected to indicate possible relationship between terrorism and trade in the North-Eastern region. To this end, while applying the frustration-aggression theory, the researcher will propose some possible policy recommendations to the government on how to halt the menace threatening its revenue base, traders and investors.

Keywords: 'Boko Haram', Terrorism, Frustration-Aggression Theory, North-Eastern Region, Trade

1. Introduction

As rightly maintained by Ted Gurr, a world renowned Criminologist, "when expectations go up and realities go down, men rebel". Terrorism and terrorist activities have become a global phenomenon; this has prompted the attention of researchers all over the world to dive in and contribute to the menace and also to the body of knowledge. Since the September 11 attack on the world trade center in the United State of America, terrorism has been on the rise in several countries of world.

Boko Haram emerged as a militant Islamic fundamentalist sect in Nigeria (Onwuamaeze, 2011). The official name of the group is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, which is Arabic for 'People committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad'. The literal translation is 'Association of Sunnas for the Propagation of Islam and for Holy War'.

Nigeria now has the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world according to the United Nations which believes that as many as 1.5m people have been driven from their homes by Boko Haram. Over the last six years, Boko Haram has been waging a war of terror in Nigeria's northeast forcing villagers to abandon their homes in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States mostly.

According to Odeyemi J, (2015) Over 57,000 Nigerian refugees are in neighboring countries; Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger seeking shelter as confirmed by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA).

Therefore, the study will limit its scope to North-East Nigeria by focusing on Boko Haram terrorist activities and its impact on trade within the region under review. The limitation of the work is from 2009-2015 as this is the period in which the Boko Haram terrorist activities started making its impact felt on trade and other business related activities in the North East region of Nigeria.

1.1 Problem Statement

Boko Haram terrorist activities continuously affect production, whole sale, retail businesses and investments as well as import and export trade (with the neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger) in the North-East region of Nigeria. This is seen in the continuous decline in the government revenue generated through payment of business tax in trade and investment activities in the North East region since the inception of the insurgency in 2009 to date.

Coleman (2015), Borno state is affected most by the so-called “Boko Haram” terrorist group. It is however the first state that the group emerged, also the state that has suffered most from the whole crisis in Nigeria. The state has witnessed series of terrorist activities, ranging from the abduction of more than 200 school girls, suicide bombing of innocent citizens, forceful recruitment of children and adults into the terror group, random assassinations of prominent members of the state, capture and control of more than 2/3 of the state territories by the insurgent group among other ill activities. As such, it brought about a ripple effect of flow of internally displaced people moving into some of the neighboring states in the North-East region.

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This however, brought about closure of businesses and investments in most of the states in the region. People are afraid to use some of the major roads linking the states and other communities due to series of attacks by the insurgents. BBC on 7th September, 2015 confirmed that Nigerian Military announced the closure of all local weekly markets in Borno State.

1.2 Research Objectives

In order to complete this research study, there are some key objectives that need to be addressed;

- a) To explore the nature of attacks and threats faced by investors in the North East region by the “Boko Haram” terrorist.
- b) To analyze how the terrorist activities affect local trade, as well as import and export trade in the North East region.
- c) To evaluate how the Nigeria government can overcome the “Boko Haram” Terrorist activities.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Terrorism Concepts

The term terrorism is not entirely new in politics and international relations vocabulary. Therefore, what is terrorism? Why is it there? Who are terrorists? What are the ways to deal with it? These are the major questions that concern researchers who studied this social phenomenon.


The term ‘terrorism’ suggests political violence or insurgency primarily. Terrorists kill people or destroy property for political purposes. But using the concept of terrorism as a synonym for political violence, which is done in political science literature, is a reductionist approach. According to Wilkinson and Stewart (1987), there is a general recognition that terrorism is a specific method of struggle rather than a synonym for political violence or insurgency. According to Brian Jenkins (in Wilkinson and Stewart 1987), terrorism can be described as a kind of weapons system. This is a useful definition to some extent because it provides a context to the researcher in which this weapon can be used by various actors. It is not the weapon of one group, organization or ideology but it is the weapon of various actors in the international system. It is indeed insightful to describe terrorism as the weapon of the poor. Terrorism is more likely to be used by ‘poorer’ groups who need to bring an expensive political change because terrorist activities induce lower costs but may bring significant political changes (Özdamar, 2008).

The U.S. Department of State has commended Nigeria for “forging an anti-terrorism consensus” in sub-Saharan Africa following al Qaeda’s attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. In fact, Nigeria has coordinated the U.S.-led Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, which conducts counterterrorism exercises in the region to prevent extremist groups from taking root (Coleman, 2015).

2.2 Implications of Boko Haram to Trade in Nigeria

Boko Haram terrorist has a bad signal to foreign investors with interest in Nigeria. Economic experts have described former President Goodluck Jonathan’s economic reform as an effort that may yield no results due to the insurgency situation in Nigeria. They also said the only problems with the nation’s economy were Boko Haram terrorist activities and mismanagement of government resources. A professor in the Department of Economics of the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Dr. Usman Muttaka, who spoke to *SUNDAY PUNCH* recently on the telephone, said even if Jonathan had gone to Switzerland for the World Economic Forum, it would have yielded no result. He said, the president was in Australia for a similar summit with about 500 delegates and he has done nothing. He also went to France with about 300 delegates but there was no tangible result. The issue of investment is also about the issue of security. No investor will come to invest in Nigeria with the current security challenge (Baiyewu, 2012:9).

Figure 1: Global terrorist casualties 2013 – 2014



Source: Posted by; Awala V. (2015)

Figure 2 above portrays the Global terrorist casualties between 2013 – 2014. The number of people killed in terrorist attacks around the world rose sharply in 2014, according to the US State Department. Compared to 2013, attacks were up 35 percent while fatalities increased 81 percent, reaching 32,700. This trend is primarily due to activity in Iraq, Afghanistan and Nigeria, as well as the exceptionally lethal manner of many attacks (Awala V. 2015).

Out of the attacks where perpetrator information was available, Boko Haram came first for lethality. The Nigerian jihadist group was responsible for 6,644 deaths in 2014, slightly ahead of ISIL who inflicted 6,286 fatalities during the same year. The Taliban had the third highest death toll of any terrorist group worldwide last year according to the US State Department (Awala V. 2015).

2.3 Economic Consequences of Boko Haram Terrorist on Trade in Nigeria

Here, a question needed to be asked ‘Can incentives to attack trade and other businesses increase the activities of Terrorist’. It could be observed that Terrorists are rational actors because they want to achieve their stated goal and objectives as efficiently as possible. The specific goals of a terrorist group may appear outlandish and difficult to appreciate by outside observers, but terrorists, nevertheless, will endeavor to reach these goals as efficiently as they can. They strive to achieve a maximum effect through the actions chosen. Empirical research has convincingly established that terrorists indeed opt for those kinds of actions from which they expect the highest benefit–cost ratio. If, for instance, the police and other security apparatus (Immigration, custom, state security services etc.) make some kind of terrorist act more difficult to accomplish, terrorists quickly shift to a different attack mode. Terrorists being rational actors, it is necessary to consider the benefit–cost relationships of various strategies from the point of view of the terrorists (Oladimeji & Oresanwo, 2014).

However, Oladimeji and Oresanwo, (2014) it could be seen vividly that in recent years, Boko Haram terrorist has shown new patterns, shifting increasingly from police and military targets to civilian targets (i.e. hostage taking, kidnapping and other forms of recruitments), including Trade and business activities. Recent terrorist attacks in Nigeria affected both the national and the international economy. The economic consequences can be largely broken down into short term direct effects; medium-term confidence effects and longer term productivity effects.

The direct economic effects of terrorism includes; the destruction of life and properties, responses to the emergency, restoration of the systems and the infrastructure affected and the provision of temporary living assistance, are most pronounced in the immediate aftermath of the attacks and thus matter more in the short run. Direct economic costs are likely to be proportionate to the intensity of the attacks and the size and the characteristics of the economy affected. Major attacks in Abuja, Adamawa, Borno, Bauchi, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, and Yobe states of Nigeria by Boko Haram sect has caused major activity disruption especially the Abuja bomb blast that happened in April, 2014 and the abduction of over Two Hundred (200) secondary school girls in Chibok (local community) of Borno State although, the direct economic damage was relatively small in relation to the size of the economy. But the cost of terrorist attacks and insecurity in Nigeria has slow down trade activities particularly in the North East region and even the import/export trade activities between Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states that are sharing boundary with the neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic. This has caused the states and the country decline in revenue and other forms of tax which is gotten as a result of the trade and other business activities in that region (Oladimeji & Oresanwo, 2014).

The indirect negative implications of the Boko Haram terrorist have the potential to affect the economy in the medium term by undermining consumer and investor confidence. The activities of terror attacks can reduce the incentive to spend as opposed to save, this may lead to reduction in the investment in an economy and this will have a multiplier effect on the economic development of the entire country through normal business cycle and trade channels. Falling investor confidence may trigger a generalized drop in asset prices and a flight to quality that increases the borrowing costs for riskier borrowers (IMF, 2001b).

Table 1: Total Tax Revenue collections from 2009 – 2015 (For Nigeria)

	Tax Type	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
		(=N='b)	(=N='b)	(=N='b)	(=N='b)	(=N='b)	(=N='b)	(Jan-Apr) (=N='b)
	FEDERATION ACCT:							
a	Oil Tax							
	Petroleum Profit Tax	939.4122	1,480.3639	3,070.5913	3,201.3195	2,666.3669	2,453.9474	441.7075
b	Non-Oil Taxes							
	Company Income Tax	595.1822	658.5026	654.4482	820.5655	963.4508	1,173.4907	225.8592
	Gas Income			45.2271	9.7270	7.7269	17.7498	6.4437
	Capital Gains Tax	0.4935	1.0367	9.3045	8.9166	19.6559	2.6498	0.2534

	Stamp Duty	4.9143	6.5934	6.4623	7.3828	7.6025	10.9436	2.4024
	Sub-total	600.5900	666.1327	715.4421	846.5919	998.4361	1,204.8338	234.9587
	Total Federation Account (a+b)	1,540.0022	2,146.4966	3,786.0334	4,047.9114	3,664.8030	3,658.7812	676.6662
	OTHER NON-OIL TAXES							
c	VAT POOL							
	Non-Import VAT	363.5656	436.6102	492.0611	545.9196	629.6641	616.8852	214.7980
	NCS-Import VAT	117.8417	128.2814	167.0925	164.6355	173.0194	186.0795	53.7516
	Sub-total	481.4073	564.8916	659.1536	710.5551	802.6835	802.9647	268.5496
d	EDUCATION TAX	139.5350	89.1780	130.7419	188.4355	279.3587	189.6137	9.1967
e	CONSOLIDATED ACCT:							
	Personal Income Tax	28.4880	32.5639	43.4672	51.1734	48.4596	52.8456	22.3208
	Pre-Operational Levy	0.2212	0.3682	0.4045	0.4319	0.4766	0.4469	0.1304
	Stamp Duty	-	-	-	0.0076	0.0037	-	0.0002
	Sub-total	28.7092	32.9321	43.8717	51.6129	48.9399	53.2925	22.4514
f	NITDEF	6.8210	5.8861	8.6751	9.1379	9.8569	9.9082	1.2899
g	Total Non-oil (b+c+d+e+f)	1,257.0625	1,359.0205	1,557.8844	1,806.3333	2,139.2751	2,260.6129	536.4463
h	Grand Total (a+g)	2,196.4747	2,839.3844	4,628.4757	5,007.6528	4,805.6420	4,714.5603	978.1538

Source: FIRS: Planning, Reporting and Statistics Department.

KEY:

GBTOs: Government Business Tax Office

MTOs: Medium Tax Office

LTOs: Large Tax Office

However, the data above was collected from the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) of Nigeria. The agency is responsible for the collection of various taxes and revenues for the Nigerian government at the local, state and federal level. The tax and revenue collections ranges from; private, corporate and other government corporations. The table further portrays the overall breakdown of 2009 – 2015 government taxes and revenues on Trade, Businesses and other Economic activities (labeled non oil tax) at various levels in the country.

2.4 Why Trade, Businesses and investments become Boko Haram Target

Businesses are used as targets by terrorists for many different reasons:

1. Some firms are highly visible targets; an attack on them is certain to attract the attention of the media, wide sections of the population and of course, the government thus supplies terrorists with the publicity they seek.
2. Many firms are soft targets in the sense that it is impossible to prevent potential terrorists from coming near or even entering the premises.
3. When firms are attacked, the production and economic process is disrupted. The firms directly or indirectly affected may be induced to relocate to other areas or countries. International firms are less likely to undertake direct foreign investments in that area. The economic situation within the affected country may worsen, leading to dissatisfaction and possibly even revolts, making it more likely that the proclaimed goals of terrorists become more acceptable and reasonable.

4. Some companies may be part of the control and authority on which the power of the government that is opposed by the terrorists rests. The firms may be owned by the government or by members of the government.

The stronger the effects terrorists may expect their acts to have on businesses and or trade, the more likely it is that they will attack firms. Firms represent attractive targets as they can be situated almost anywhere, and therefore, are difficult to protect. Moreover, private firms have to provide and finance their own protection. They have to hire commercial security firms and have to install expensive equipment raising their costs of production (Oladimeji and Oresanwo, 2014).

2.5 Concept and theoretical assumptions on terrorism

Recent treatment of Homeland Security research concentrated on how to spend billions to protect sensitive installations from attack (Malakoff, 2002, p. 254). However, it has been argued that this last line of defense is probably easiest to breach because of the multitude of vulnerable and likely targets (including discotheques, restaurants, and malls), the abundance of would-be attackers, the relatively low costs of attack, the difficulty of detection (little use of electronics), and the unlikelihood that attackers would divulge sensitive information (being unaware of connections beyond their operational cells; Atran, 2003, pp. 1534 – 1539). Exhortations to put duct tape on windows may assuage (or incite) fear, but will not prevent massive loss of life, and public realization of such paltry defense can undermine trust. A first line of defense is to prevent people from becoming terrorists.

A rather Herculean task! Suicide terrorists are often labeled crazy cowards bent on senseless destruction who thrive in the midst of poverty and ignorance. The obvious course becomes to hunt down terrorists while simultaneously transforming their supporting cultural and economic environment from despair to hope. Research, however, indicates that suicide terrorists have no appreciable psychopathology and are at least as educated and economically well off as their surrounding populations. The significance of this section to the research is to expose the ignorance and the misperception of those who saddle themselves with the task of riddling the society of terrorists. Their ascription and assumption on the personae of terrorists and the prescriptions for remedy show a gross misunderstanding of the motives and consequently, the solution to this malaise.

However, according to Ribadu N. (2015), because Boko Haram was a new phenomenon, it created a lot of confusion both in security and government circles, as well as among the citizenry. Understanding the motif and workings of the group became a problem. Many took advantage of it, including politicians, to throw blames at each other. In fact, the insurrection became a potent mirror of Nigeria's ethnic tensions as conspiracies were tailored along ethno-religious lines. Coincidentally, the Boko Haram's declaration of jihad came at the time when a Muslim northerner died in office and a Christian southerner became the president. At various points, Northern Nigeria was blamed for creating Boko Haram to make the country "ungovernable" for a president who was not from there. Some had a theory that says it was the government that was supporting the insurgents in order to diminish the numerical strength and, ultimately, political influence of the northern part. The Muslims contended that it was the work of the Christians. The Christians blamed the Muslims

for it. Even within the Muslim community there were accusations among sects. The buck has kept being passed.

However, the military operation is not spared from these disjointed criticisms, which confounded the problems of an institution already bedeviled by corruption and incompetent leadership. The mutual suspicion created by Boko Haram was extended to the military, with attention given to the tribes and religions of officers and men in ascribing motives to what the military had done, or failed to do. While Boko Haram would wipe out an entire village or stop commuter buses and execute all their occupants, the harshest criticism was spared for the military on any slight operational lapse or excess. International organizations, such as the Human Rights Watch and, more recently, Amnesty International also got entangled in the wave of the anti-military/government conspiracy theories, which substantially affected their reports. This demoralized the army and created international anathema for the military. However, this is not to discount the fact that the military's blunders and panic in facing a new challenge also played a role in alienating it from the civilian population and gave credence to most of the allegations (Ribadu, N. 2015).


As such, International response followed the pattern of the local reactions, largely in line with the narrative in the press and the undue, even unguarded, utterances by some otherwise respectable elders. The West, especially the United States, was looking for reason to escape engaging in military operations abroad. Thus, it was convenient for the international community to take the position not to help Nigeria, which has always been a hard sell for international support in the first place. The leadership then also failed to convince the world of its competence and seriousness in fighting the war. The West, particularly the United States, was looking for excuses and they got one in the lack of consensus among Nigerians. These distractions and lack of support make Nigeria lag behind while the terrorists became emboldened and began annexing territories, with alarming cruelty against defenceless victims (Ribadu, N. 2015).

2.6 Frustration-Aggression Theory

Frustration-aggression theory was first developed by John Dollard and his research associates in 1939. These research associates were: "Leonard Doob, Neal Milles, O.H Mowrer and Robert Sears" (Ibaba, 2011: 242). Later the frustration aggression theory was modified and expanded by other scholars, including Aubrey Tates "Frustration and Conflict" (1962); Leonard Berkowiz "Aggression: A Social Psychological Aggression" (1961) and Ted Robert Gur "why Men Rebel" (1970).

Frustration simply means the act of preventing someone from making advancement, progress or success in life, this blockage likely results to dissatisfaction in individual or groups who turn to react in a violent manner (aggression) as an indication of protest against hindrances to succeed. When this occurs, it can produce feelings of anger, which in turn can generate feelings of aggression and aggressive behavior (www.Alleydog.com).

The Frustration - Aggression Theory Model



Source: *Adopted from; John Dollard and his research associates in 1939*

2.7 Theory and Application of Frustration-Aggression Theory: Theoretical Explanation to the impact of Boko Haram and Terrorism on Trade in North East Nigeria

Assumption I:

The first assumption of frustration-aggression theory postulates that, violent behavior is as a result of frustration. When an individual or groups of people are prevented from realizing certain desire of theirs, they get frustrated and their reaction will be aggressive. The major desires and demands of the Boko Haram insurgents and terror group have varied, but they often focus on two main areas: the release of Boko Haram prisoners and the creation of an Islamic state. The Islamic sect believes politics in northern Nigeria has been seized by a group of corrupt and false Muslims. It wants to wage a war against them, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a “pure” Islamic state ruled by sharia law (Walker, 2012). Even though their leader Shekau has pledged solidarity with jihadists globally, Boko Haram’s demands have largely remained local and the insurgency has fed on poverty, hopelessness and unemployment in northern Nigeria. These are some of the weaknesses the group took advantage in recruiting idle teeming youths in the North East region to cause mayhem in trading and other market places through bombings, kidnapping/hostage for ransom and among other ill menace. All these frustrations let to the aggressive behaviors.

Assumption II:

The second assumption holds that, aggression in behavior is due to the difference between what one has physically got and what he actually expects to get. It implies that, if what has been given or provided for an individual or group of people is not commensurate to what they expect, they will become aggressive much more. In this context, as discussed in the previous chapter that elements like; corruption unemployment, poverty and among other ill menace has contributed a lot in the group’s success story so far. The Boko Haram terrorist feels they have not been given freedom to practice their relation so that they can do away with all the elements of bad governance in their

societies to bring about justice and equity through the implementation of the Islamic law (Sharia). They strongly believe only through this struggle can they achieve their goal, and that whoever dies in the course of their struggle will enter the kingdom of God (paradise). Despite the fact that Nigeria as a secular state has enshrined in its constitution that citizens have freedom to practice any religion.

Assumption III:

The third assumption holds that, aggression is caused by persistence rise in human expectation. These expectations are not constant, when they are met others surface. Therefore, the more the expectations come up and are not met, it is likely to generate aggressive behavior. The nature of demands and desires of the Boko Haram has been rising over the years. Initially, they demanded that they should be left to preach and observe their religion (Islam) with aim of propagating holy war (Jihad), western education and democracy as not permissible (Haram). Even though their method of preaching and ideology is not acceptable by the entire Islamic clerics in Nigeria. Other demands later on were that the government should release the members of their group whom were imprisoned for various crimes ranging from killings and other violent activities. Also that, Islamic law (Sharia) be implemented in all the northern states of Nigeria. However, all these demands by the Terrorist have not been made yet by the government, which is why the group has stepped up its attacks. Several attempts by the government to negotiate with the group have failed.

Assumption IV:

The fourth assumption states that when people are frustrated they would usually direct their aggression towards the cause of the frustration and if this is not possible it will be displaced onto another person or object. Frustration does not automatically result in aggression, but it produces a readiness for aggression if triggered (Akuva, 2012). According to the Boko Haram Terrorist, the Nigerian state is not ready to give in their demands so they have embarked on several attacks on both the government (all security agents)-198 and the civilian population. In effect, the terrorist have targeted government buildings, security personnel's, places of worships, markets places, local villages and all other activities to cause mayhem and cripple the economy and government. These attacks were channeled to be presumed cause of the frustration or plight of the region which Borno State use to be known as home of peace. Boko Haram has influenced the short-falls in government revenues since the terrorist could not attack the federal government directly it attacks its source of revenue which often comes from trade and other business related activities in that region.

Assumption V:

The last assumption of the frustration aggression theory is that frustration sometimes does not lead to the perceived threats and sanctions from the source of frustration. During the most notable of these kinds of terrorist groups was the Maitatsine uprising, which began in Kano in 1980-1985 by Muhammadu Marwa (leader) and spread to Bulumkutu in Maiduguri (Borno State), Jimeta in Yola (Adamawa State) and Kaduna (Kaduna State) of Nigeria. Their ideology was a complete rejection of affluence, western materialism and western technology (Watts, 2005). It was during the military era in which constitution was suspended and Military decrees were installed. The Maitatsine were

crushed through using military force, the group was gun down, some even fled to neighboring Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger but the government still followed them and made sure they were entirely killed or apprehended. As such, the series of similar notion of some of these Islamic fundamental sect's could be viewed as been self motivated to achieve selfish goal and not for religious purpose as they often claim. As such, Boko Haram should be treated with more severe majors than the Maitatsine as they killed and displace more people than the later in terms of the terrorist acts.

3. Methodology

This study will employ the use of qualitative research technique and content analysis to further build upon the secondary data gathered through; empirical study/materials, Books, Journals, Statistical bulletins, Newspapers/Magazines and other online data bases and sources done by other related researchers with emphasis on trade that were exposed to terrorism and violence in the region under review. Thus, relevant literatures related to the researcher's subject area will be employed to enable for clear and more articulated (scholarly) work. However, the study is part of my Masters Degree Research proposal paper being conducted in North-Eastern, Nigeria. As there are numerous impacts of terrorism in Nigeria, trade is one of the key to the North-East region as their major source of income as well as revenue to the government.

3.1 Data Collection

The study will employ the secondary and Tertiary data for analysis. The secondary data are those collected by the government or organizations but not yet processed. While, tertiary data are those already collected and analyzed for another study (Blaikie, 2003), which most certainly is useful for this study.

3.2 Secondary data

The secondary data shall include documents from the Nigerian government such as; Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) of Nigeria. The agency is responsible for the collection of various taxes and revenues for the Nigerian government at the various levels. Also relevant documents from; National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and among other relevant government agencies will be used for this study.

3.3 Tertiary Data

The tertiary data shall be data from renowned peer-reviewed academic journals, textbooks, collaborative research reports on Boko Haram and Terrorism, and also documents from civil society groups in Nigeria. The opportunity derived from the tertiary data will enhance the researchers' ability to understand other peoples' views, comments and opinions on the impacts caused by the Boko Haram and terrorism to the Nigerian State. As such, these ideas and opinions will form the basis for empirical analysis.

3.4 Data Analysis

Data Analysis is the process which involves processing data collected in such a manner that it answers the research questions (Blaikie, 2003).

3.5 Literature Gap

Several literatures have tried to address the issue of terrorism in different approach. The rise of Boko Haram terrorist group in the North East Nigeria is also not left out by several researchers. Most researchers laid emphasis on the security challenges posed by the group. Osumah, O. (2013) looked at the terrorist group as posing threat to the internal security of the state, while others were looking at its similarities with other terrorist links outside Nigeria; like the Al-Shabaab militant group in Somalia and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Other researchers looked at the Al-Qaeda ties to Boko Haram and Ansaru, while Ozdamar, O. (2008) was looking at it from the angle of terrorist behavior.

However, due to the rise in the Boko Haram terrorist activities and the displacement of several thousands of inhabitants of the North-East region coupled with ripple effects on trade and other investments related activities of both private and government in that region, the writer found it imperative to dive in to bridge the gap which exists. As there are no much relevant literatures which discoursed extensively on the impact of Boko Haram terrorist in the North East region of Nigeria on trade and other business related activities like the investment into manufacturing and production of goods and services which could be imported or exported to neighboring Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger whom are sharing boundaries with some of the North Eastern states (i.e. Adamawa, Borno, Taraba and Yobe).

As such, the study tends to align and bridge the existing gap in literature and the body of knowledge, also sought to come up with plausible solutions to the menace posed by the Boko Haram terror group in the North East of Nigeria.

Also, provide recommendations will help the various stakeholders involved in; Government decision making bodies, Policy makers, captains of industries, political figures, Chief executives i.e. Chairmen of Local Government Areas, Governors and the President and even trade unions etc. This will not just address the issues of strengthening trade activities as well as government revenue alone, but also the generality of restoration of the past glory of peace, security and the co-existence throughout the North East and Nigeria at large.

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