

# INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION TO BUILD A RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OF ISLAM BY HIZBUTH TAHRIR INDONESIA (HTI) IN INDONESIA

**Sovia Sitta Sari**  
**Communication Department**  
**Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta**  
soviasittasari@yahoo.com

## Abstract

After the downfall of President Soeharto and New Order regime in 1998, an Islamist groups or known as new religious movement –*Hizbuth Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI) – sprung up, calling for Islamization of society. Although, approximately 88 per cent of Indonesia's 255 million people are Muslims, according to Islamist new movement's perception, this country has been ruled under secular values. Moreover, mostly Indonesian Muslims practicing Islam have been influenced to secular values also tradition. Muslims' way of life should be restored to the authentic Islam which return to the the first age of Islam represented by Prophet Muhammad and The Companion (*Khulafaur Rasyidin*). In attempting to build an original identity of Islam for Indonesian Muslims, HTI employed both media and oral communication.

This study aimed to describe the process of building Islam identity and the use of communication has been done by the *Hizbuth Tahrir Indonesia*. To examine the research, the theoretical framework of identity and religious communication was applied. Methodologically, a single case was used in this research to describe the implementation of religious communication and the building identity process. Data will be collected through in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions. Multiple sources of data are used to construct triangulation strategies to ascertain the validity of the data.

**Keywords:** new religious movement, religious communication, Islam identity

## Introduction

Discussions of the awakening of Islam confronted to West have been very frequent since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in New York, which destroyed the World Trade Center in Manhattan (Baidhawiy, 2011, p.41). Furthermore, the rising of Islam's new religious movements in modern times can be perceived as rejection to Western domination (Bamualim, 2008 p.11). Westernisation is another momentum to bring about religious actions, because Western civilization is often associated to Christian civilization (Kato, 2011). Islam identity is revived as an alternative civilization as resistance power to Westernisation (Lehman, 1998; al-Makassary,2008). This phenomenon has influenced some Indonesian Muslims to establish movement inspired by movements in Middle East. One of the well-known of religious movement in Indonesia is *HTI (Hizbuth Tahrir Indonesia)* (Ahnaf, 2009).

In accordance to *HTI's* dissemination in amplifying their influence, it has been underpinned by religious communication circumstances in Indonesia. The tradition of Islamic transmission was developed since the 14th, with printed teaching in pre independence blooms into the Internet era. Two models of Islamic spreading in Indonesia present both in oral and written forms (Muzzaki, 2009). Then, according to Patrick McCurdy (2013, p. 59), the rise of information and communication technologies (ICT) and social media has unquestionably increased the opportunities for Islam's new movements to challenge the monopoly of

Western power. It has provided movements with alternate means for mobilization, communication and representation.

However, *HTI* as an Islam's new religious movement's facing a phenomenon which shows that Islam in Indonesia is not monolithic teaching or -ism. Kuntowijoyo (1987) argued that Islam in Indonesia has been influenced by traditional habits. Furthermore, it transformed into divergent identities, such as traditional Islam (*Kejawen*), modernis Islam, and *sufism* Islam (mysticism)(Qodir,2011, p.164). Dealing with such divergence , Islam's new religious movement focuses on the conversion of Indonesian Muslims to adopt their belief which what they believe as "authentic" Islam (Hamid, 2009). This issue of differentiation in practicing Islam become main challenge for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia to unity a meaning that authentic Islam's identity should be based on *Syari'a* (Islamic Law).

This study will focus on the extent to which religious communication within *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)* constructs religious identity and to convert Indonesian Muslims' beliefs to *Salafi* that calls for the Muslim community to return to Islam as it was in its first stage (the period of Prophet Muhammad and the Companion/*Sahabat*) and accepting a *Caliphat* (a form of Islamic government ruled by a caliph—a political and religious successor to Muhammed), instead of employing Western system. To investigate this, first, a case study research design will be used to analyse how religious identity has been established among Indonesian Muslims, both the member of *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)* in Jogjakarta and non-members during the introduction of a *Caliphat* by *HTI*. Second, theoretical perspective of identity and religious communication will be employed to examine this study.

### **Definition of New Religious Movement**

Before discussing the topic further, some parameters for the key terms are used in this paper; that is, new religious movement. In his book, *Understanding New Religious Movements*, John A. Saliba (1996) characterizes three different ways in which different groups have sought to define new religions. The first way is with theology, which focuses on whether a religious group's claims to offer salvation are true or false (Wilkins & Chryssides, 2006, p. 5).

The second way is with psychology. Cults, for example, are often formed and joined by deprived young adults who are seeking satisfaction for their various needs (Saliba, 1996, p. 68). The psychological perspective's main point depends on whether a new religion uses mind control or brainwashing (Wilkins & Chryssides, 2006, p. 4). Brainwashing was a concept originally developed during the Cold War in order to explain why apparently normal people could convert to communism. Brainwashing theories offered a crude, popularized version of previous research on why so many working-class Germans joined Nazism that was carried out in the 1920s by the Marxist Frankfurt Institute for Social Research (Introvigne, 2014 p. 304).

The third way is with sociology. For instance, Saliba (1996) mentions that religious movements are related to a milieu's mainstream religion and/or dominant culture. Unlike the second, psychological, way that perceives new religious movement negatively, sociologists views new religious movements a response to social phenomenon (Wilkins & Chryssides, 2006, p.5). In attempt to define new religious movements, researchers in the sociology field use the term "cult" and "sect" to analyse new religions(Stark, 2003; Wilkins & Chryssides, 2006). However, researchers largely agree on how to appropriately apply the terms (Wilkins & Chryssides , 2006, p.5). First, a sect is a religious movement in a state of relatively high tension with its socio-cultural environment. A sect can be classified as a way to reaffirm the conventional religious culture(s) of society in which they appear.

Meanwhile, Barker (in Bromley, 2007) claims that new religions represent innovation rather than a continuation of previous traditions—that they set old traditions in a new context. While Bromley (2007) concludes that new religious movements exist socially and culturally on the fringe, they differ significantly in belief and practice from the dominant religious institution of the culture in which they are located and have minimum ties to and allies in that society's dominant government and religious and intellectual structures.

Another issue of new religious movements is the notion of new. Word "new" refers to new religious movements arise question on the meaning of new. Poewe & Hexham (1989) argue that what one perceives to be new is the actually a reaction to one's and others' current ways of life, to specific tension in their life, and to their specific notion of what constitutes salvation (p. 7). Wilkins & Chryssides (2006) define a religious group as new if it came into existence in recent times.

However, some new religious movements also contest with the power relation among state and politics. Religion's increasing political influence coupled with increasing religious repression has become a dominant pattern (Robbins, 2004). Studies on new religious movements of State's suppression to China's Falun Gong group and Al Qaeda in Central Asia (2004) shows the linkage to political issue. There are often three sources of tension between religious movements and the state. Robbins notes that Rosalind Hackett (2004, p. 5) wrote that, first, movements may pose a direct challenge to political authority, sometimes in tangible military terms. Second, new movements are often viewed as representing a threat to public interest; that is, the behavior of group or its devotees or the beliefs being espoused are seen as inimical to basic cultural values. Third, new movements may mount challenges to previous religions' power and authority.

### **The New Religious Movements in the World**

In nineteenth-century, Western countries such as, United State and Europa witnessed the surface of religious movements on several forms dramatically (Melton 1978; Barker 1989; Saliba 1996 ; Wilkins & Chryssides 2006). There are three points that indicate its presence. First, numerous Christian revival movements increased and were amplified their evangelical message. Second, the influence of Eastern philosophical and religious thought in the movements (Melton 1987; Saliba 1996). Third, was the appearance of religious or churches indigenous to the New World. *Mormonism* (The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) is the one of example of the successful new religious movement in this century in the West (Saliba, 1996, p.52). Furthermore, more new religious movements has emerged. Among the numerous new religious that share similar mission to *Mormons* as to restore modern Christianity known as *Jehovah's Witnesses*. Its root comes from the Adventist tradition (Wilkins & Chryssides 2006). Unlike Jehovah, in Britain (Baker 1989), the United Reformed Church has formed as a union between the Presbyterian Church of England and the Congregational Union of England and Wales in 1972. Those movements offer some kind of answer of a religious, spiritual and philosophical question.

Most of religion experience numerous new movements. Some will be formed by disgruntled members who withdrew from older religious bodies. Others will be born because someone created or discovered new religious culture and convinced others of its authenticity ( Stark, 1996). The novelty of this movement can be recognized from the way of religious movements deliberately seek innovation of their previous tradition. The Sokka Gakkai International (SGI) has different worship to the tradition of Buddhism and The Family Federation for the World Peace and Unification (FFWPU) which bases its teachings on new revelation afforded to its founder-leader (Wilkins&Chryssides, 2006, p.4).

However, the notion of “new” for these movements has been denied by some religious movements. In some cases, what the newness consists of is arguable. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) argues that it is the oldest and a religious tradition in the world (Barker 1989, p.147), returning to Krishna, whom it convinces to have lived in the third millennium BCE in Vrindaban in North India. In Buddhism, the Soka Gakkai International (SGI) claims to go back to the thirteenth-century Buddhist teacher Nichiren (1222-82). Some of the new religious movements believe to be old by being ‘restorationists’ (Wilkins & Chrystides, 2006). The Mormons (The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints), The Jehovah’s Witnesses claim to follow the form of the first-century Church that tries to restore mainstream Christianity (p.4).

Meanwhile, in Islamist movements, the core goal is to create a society governed and guided by *shari’a* or Islamic law (Wictorowicz, 2004, p. 203). Zeiden (2001) categorizes Islamist movements into several currents: that is, revivals that have recurred throughout Muslim history, religious reform movements with political agendas that emerge as a counterattack against secularism and the agenda of Islamic states based on the *Shari’a*. Still, methods differ between moderate gradualists and radical revolutionaries.

Saliba (1996) writes that new religious movements’ beliefs and practices have been reacted negatively. It has been condemned as a system that introduces heresy. Hostility to alternative religious reflected on some discrimination (Robbins & Lucas, 2004), such as being labelled as deviant, even radicalist for some new religious movements, especially for Islamic groups. Another way in which discrimination occurs is some kind of registration or licensing to be a legal organization. In China, unregistered *Protestant Evangelical*; the *Salvation Army* organization in Russia, have been under pressure by the State (p.21), also *Hizbth Tahr* was banned in Jordan (Qodir, 2006).

### **New Religious Movements in Indonesia**

New religious movements emerged because Muslim countries across the world, such as Indonesia, were becoming modernized and adopting democracy, leading to corruption and oppression of human rights, pluralism, and social justice (Hashemi, 2009, p. 134). In the Indonesian case, democracy and secularization have resulted in openness to freedom of expression but, conversely, a rise in poverty and corruption. Multidimensional crises such as weak enforcement of the law, increasing poverty, and more expensive fuel for transportation are causing despair among Indonesian people. A decline in the quality of life is causing the gap between the rich and the poor to widen (Tempo.co.bisnis, 2013). This situation provides a fertile ground for the growth of radical Islamic movements, which utilize this momentum to condemn the government for adopting a secular state system. New Islamic organisations argue that secularization has created a lot of problems, and therefore offer Islamic *Shari’a* as salvation. This is a phenomenon that Bourdieu called “symbolic violence” (Jenkins, 2002, p. 104) where the Islamists try to impose the purification of Islam on Indonesian Muslims. The imposition of this idea is essential to Islamist movements because, as Eliraz (2004) states, “the idea of the implementation of *Shari’a*, which is also essential to the world-view of radical Islamists in Indonesia, is tightly connected with fundamentalist perception of an Islamic state” (p.69).

The unsolved problems that Muslims face lead to wide opportunities for Islamic fundamentalists to challenge Westerners’ and Islamic modernists’ domination (Davidson, 2003, p. 12) because Western and Islamic modernist promises to bring prosperity, democracy, human rights, and resource distribution have proven illusory. Ironically, the Western program creates authoritative governments and a small prosperous group, with the worst result being the fading of the Islamic culture and tradition (Davidson, 2003, p. 11; Ahmad, 1993, pp. 460-462; Nash, 1993, pp. 691–739).

In 1998, after the overthrow of Indonesian President Soeharto, fundamentalist groups became engaged in both cultural and political change through, respectively, Islamic social organisations and political parties. Rahmat (2005) wrote that the shift from oppression to freedom of expression has encouraged Islamic movements to increasingly express their Islamic culture. Meanwhile, there are at least two prominent accommodation patterns that exist in shaping Islamic culture. The first pattern is cultural accommodation, which consists of an adoption of Islamic cultural expressions, such as wearing a *koko* shirt or males wearing a headband (*sorban*). The second pattern is legislative accommodation, which incorporates aspects of Islamic law into state law for Muslims. For example, in marriage law, Muslims are prohibited from marrying people from other religions. Consequently, the face of Indonesian Islam changed at the end of the 1990s. In social life, Islamist new religious groups introduced different nuances in behaviour, purely following the way of life of the Prophet Muhammad and his *Sahabat* (companions). For example, fundamentalist groups have their own characteristic features such as physical appearance and the manner of dress. The typical male wardrobe is to keep a beard, wear *gamis* (trousers above the ankles and a blouse), and an Arabic headband (*sorban*). Conversely, the women wear clothing that covers their faces and whole bodies except for the palms of their hands. As for the relationship between men and women in daily life, fundamentalist groups prohibit the mingling of the sexes (Rahmat, 2005; Sattar, 2013).

When Abdurrahman Wahid, the successor of President Habib, was replaced by President Megawati in 2001, the tension among Indonesian Muslims escalated. Azra (2003) argued that the most visible challenges for President Megawati came from Muslim hard-liner groups, such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI), *Laskar Jihad*, *Hizbut-Tahrir*, and other smaller groups. These groups are known for their refusal to accept President Megawati because of her gender. According to them, a woman leading a country contradicts the teachings of Islam. Furthermore, these groups accused President Megawati of taking the side of the United States. Muslim hard-liners regarded her silence on the U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan as reflecting her unfriendly attitude towards Islam and Muslims. After Megawati resigned in 2004, President Soesilo Bambang Yoedhoyono (SBY) from the Democratic Party, took on the leadership with the conviction that a democratic system is the right path for governing Indonesia. During his leadership, the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalists who highlighted the purification of Islam was known as the “New Wave of Islam Movement”, which began to establish its cultural approach to Muslims (Rahmat, 2005).

## **Identity and Religious Communication**

It is important to recognise there are various definitions of identity which stemming from different sources. Identity is multidimensional; it continually exists, it is experienced, and it is negotiated within people’s lives. In term of opposing secular, Castells (2010, p.8) referred to identity as resistance from actors who are in position marginalized. The discussion of identity is linked to one of the predisposition of new religious movements as an ideological movement which seek for recognition. Recent approaches to identity have been grown from sociological perspectives, which argue that:

Identity is both “internal” and “external” to the individual. It is internal to the extent that it is seen to be subjectively “constructed” by the individual, but it is external to the extent that this construction is in reference to “objective” social circumstances provided by day-to-day interactions, social roles, cultural institutions, and social structures (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 49).

Although these statements may be appropriately recognised when applied to social identities, such as race, ethnicity, and nationality, they are no less true of personal identity, which “[denotes] the more concrete aspects of individual experience rooted in interactions” (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 8).

Du Gay and Hall (1996) explained that the definition of identity as the way people identify themselves within a cultural context. A broad consensus that the term *identity* associated to an individual’s subjective rather than objective react to the world in which they live, or the experiences they choose for themselves in their world. Bauman (2004) stated that identity has generally been analysed as a subjective response that includes a strong feeling of belonging at a group level, where individuals within the group have an identity that also identifies with others in the group.

In this study, religious communication was employed to analyse how identity has been constructed. Religious communication theories assume that the meaning and purpose of life derive a faith tradition grounded in scriptures (holy books), doctrines (collective teachings and beliefs) and communal religious experiences. This theories emphasizes on the persuasive purposes of influencing the minds and hearts of audience to belief in God, inspiring moral actions based on those beliefs, and cultivating a religious consciousness and identity. (Littlejohn, 2009)

## **Methodology**

In this research, a case study was used as a research strategy. A case study, as Yin argues, enables the researcher to capture real-life events in a holistic and meaningful way (2003, 9). The use of a case study in this research is based on three requirements proposed by Yin. The first requirement is that the type of question asked should be ‘how’ and ‘why’ a contemporary set of events takes place: why are certain decisions taken, how do they come about, and what consequences do they entail. Secondly, the researcher has little or no control over the events studied; and thirdly, a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context becomes the focus of the study (2003, 13). Some questions require explanatory answers that “deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than merely frequencies or incidence” (2003, 6). Moreover, this research will investigate the phenomenon (community access point projects) that is embedded in the full complexity of its real-world settings which is inseparable from human and social context. The focus of this study also deals with contemporary events (the launch of *Islam Nusantara* concept) which are taking place currently. For such reasons, my research fits Yin’s suggestions of suitability for choosing a case study as a research strategy. The case study that will be used in this research falls within the category of single-case design (Yin 2003, 46) .

## **Building the Identity by Religious Communication**

HTI’s messages predominantly analyze the problems of democratic secular societies. The HTI has concluded that Indonesia as a state is failing because it is unable to fulfill its function of providing prosperity, security, and solutions to disputes in society. The HTI’s criticism of the state are not limited to its policies but extends to its adherence to those secular functions. It proposes that the only way out is with *Shari’a* (Ward, 2009, p. 154; Ahnaf, 2009, p. 74).

In attempting to challenging Western domination, Islamic movements try to contest the hegemonic power of opponents by establishing religious identity (Meijer, 2009). The

goal of Islam's new religious movement (revivalist puritan organization) is to glory the name of Allah by developing an Islamic brotherhood (ukhuwah Islamiyah), including mobilizing solidarity against the persecution of Muslims around the world (Ahnaf, 2006; Yusanto, 2011 ; Qodir, 2013.). One of the member, EA (2015) argued that liberating Muslims from the thoughts, systems, and laws of unbelievers will be better for improving Indonesian Muslims' life. He argued that Islam has its own identity, including thoughts, systems and law:

Practicing Islam in our country is contaminated with local culture which isn't compatible to Islamic lesson.....Yes, I know that some of muslims have accused us adopting Arabic culture due to Islam worship. ..Indeed, we don't intend to immitate Arabic culture... but, in fact, for example, Al Qur'an stated that women should cover their body wearing veil or well known as to cover our *aurat*...the definition of *aurat* is clearly explained in Hadist.. Islam has regulated it and it's an obligation! So... why we still deny that hijab is an Islamic outfit?? And accused us adopting Arabic culture? (Source : EA, Indepth interview)

Recently, Muslims can easely accesses more information and knowledge of Islam. Many Islamic privat schools have been established and affordable to educate children for Islamic creed. Only few muslims family join with those kind of schools.....or.. Yeah..the others don't want to. So the awareness of the importance to introduce Islam lesson since childhood should be strenghtened. The urgency to return to Al Qur'an and Hadist as the only guidance in our life. (Source : AN, Indepth interview)

Most of HTI's member believe that building Islamic nation is urgent. In attempting to challenging Western domination, Islamic movements try to contest the hegemonic power of opponents by establishing religious identity (Meijer, 2009). The goal of Islam's new religious movement (revivalist puritan organization) is to glory the name of Allah by developing an Islamic brotherhood (ukhuwah Islamiyah), including mobilizing solidarity against the persecution of Muslims around the world (Ahnaf, 2006; Yusanto, 2011 ; Qodir, 2013,).

However, HTI is very careful not to engage in frontal attacks on the state, especially on the crucial aspects of nationalism such as Pancasila (the five pillars of the Indonesian constitution) and the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) (Ahnaf, 2009, p. 75). As ZA (2015) stated :

Of course, we realize many people disagree with our ideas, they provoke or discredite us, but we will not respond them aggresively.

Let the provocation dissapear...by the way, it is an advantage for HTI because everytime they attack verbally toward us so newspaper or television coverage will mention our organization and our struggle....it means free advertising, doesn't it...hehehe (laughing). (Source: EA, Indepth interview)

Ward (2009) describes the HTI as an Islamic revival movement that has chosen the path of non-violent action (*la maadiyah*). It is an unusual attitude to hold for a group with radical tendencies. In fact, HTI has declared to eschew violence to achieve its principal goal, although its strategy is to focus on a blend of radical ideology, sarcastic rhetoric, and non-violence. Like other groups, HTI also advocates implementing *Shari'a* in daily life.

According to the members, Islam is not just a religion but also a political system (*al-din wa al-dawlah*). Therefore, the group's most important objective is to establish an Islamic khilafah (*caliphate*). The group idealizes one government for all Muslims across the world that mirrors the one that formed during the era of the Prophet and his companions (Ahnaf, 2009). This implies that Muslims should not be divided by numerous state boundaries and that they should be ruled by one khilafah. Unsurprisingly, this group rejects the idea of nationalism or the nation-state. To illustrate the idea in which member understand to Islamic identity, a comment by a member, initially as ZA (2015) :

Majority of Indonesian population is muslims...almost 90% from 250 million people... but why their way of life don't adopt Islamic guideline? We have already had a guidance from Allah SWT, ...Muslims should follow AlQur'an and Hadist to lightening their way..why still mingle with tradition rituals? ...hmm...I believe they also have been infiltrated by secularisme values, could be from media

In accordance to building the pure Islam identity, th HTI also believe to restore the nation back to the *Caliph* era. To gain the goal, there are three stages (*marhalah*) of struggle that the HTI applies (Ahnaf, 2009, p. 80). The first stage is the forming of cadres (*marhalah tas'qif*). The second is the socialising stage, in which the idea of an Islamic state is presented to the Muslim community (*marhalah tafa'ul ma'a al-ummah*). During this stage, the cadres interact, educate, and answer numerous social questions from the community, based on the AlQur'an and the Hadith, to lead Muslims to believe that their only salvation is Islam. As EA (2015) explained :

...through our news online, eramuslim.com, we can disseminate our opinion, ideas. Yes, everybody can visit our website...

It is important for us to keep discussing about actual issu related to Islam practicing... oh yeah.. for routine religious meeting (*pengajian*), we focus on our internal group. Well,...people don't want to joint our pengajian.

Then, Islamist movement, like the HTI use the media especially Internet or new media to build up effective communication network and to spread information and propaganda (Brauchler 2004; Lym 2005; Khondker 2011). However, Azakki (2010) in his articles, in the book *Televangelista & Zealous in Media*, argues that the practices of public preaching and sermons still played role in propagating teaching, although he emphasize only on the Islamic transmission in television. Despite the use of media for transmitting fundamentalists belief and idea, it is usuall in Indonesia to mobilised people to conduct religious events. As ZA (2015) mentioned:

We avoid using mainstream mass media, namely television or commercial film...secularist government won't allow us employed those channel. Another communication form, such as liqo (class), pengajian (routine religious meeting), political discourse discussions will be used to communicate our ideas...every week we have such kind of activities. We can keep maintaining our solidarity, sharing our experiences and even supporting our friends dealing with their problems.

Or...for example, when an important issue emerged, such as pornography...we approach housewives or women mobilizing them to engaged with our action against pornography... It is important to have a non violent mobilization.... we didn't force



them lho...hehehe  
(Source : EA, Indepth interview)

Osman (2010) writes that, unlike other fundamentalist groups, the HTI believes that women have a role to play in an Islamic state. The HTI claims that males and females have equal rights to create the caliphate. The organization abandons representing women of the fundamentalist gender ideology, which places women in the domestic sphere. When women are used to personify tradition, they are disempowered from engaging in activities outside the home and family (Hardacre, 1993). In the contrary, the Hizbt Tahr in Indonesia accommodates women's participation. As EA (2015) explained:

women members have opportunity to publish their own booklets and websites, and they attend international Khilafah conferences. Clearly, the HTI believes that the women have the right to participate in supporting their struggle.

Finally, the third stage consists of replacing the government (*marhalah istilam al-hukm*).

### **Conclusion**

Identity of mainstream Indonesian muslim has no longer following "the authentic" Islam, which what *Hizbth Tahr* Indonesia (HTI) believes should be practice as to Prophet Muhammad and *Sahabat / Khulafaur Rasyidin* (the Companion) era. For HTI, the pure of Islam only based on AlQur'an and Hadist without adding some innovations influenced by cultural aspects or tradition. Religious communication are applied to educate Indonesian muslims and focuses on the redifine religious beliefs and religious practices. The HTI constructs Islam identity by restoring the meaning and religious beliefs refers to first stage of Islam.

In building Islamic identity among Indonesian Muslims, *Hizbuth Tahr* using both oral communication and media. The HTI has highlighted and maintained oral communication for restoring identity, although social media, such as news online (eramuslim.com), facebook are frequently employed. The ultimate goal of the HTI is to establish Islamic State. However, the Hizbt Tahr Indonesia (HTI) avoids confrontating to goverment in persuading Indonesian Muslims of the importance of *a Caliphate* (Khalifah). Ironically, in this information age, now, the HTI also take advantage from the democratic system adopted by Indonesia goverment. The system that guarantee of freedom of speech and expression. The political system is produced of Western that they have contested.

### **References**

- Ahnaf, M. I., (2006), *Image of the other as enemy : The radical discourse in Indonesia*, Thailand, Silkworm Books.
- Ahnaf, M. I., (2009). Between revolution and reform : The future of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict : Pathway toward terrorism and genocide* ,2(2), 69. doi:10.1080/17467580902822163
- Al-Makassary, R. (2008). The clash of religion and politics : An Indonesian perspective on the issue of terrorism. In C.Scott & I.Abubakar (Ed.), *Contemporary Issues in The Islamic World The Indonesian Perspective*, CSSR (Center for Study of religion and

- Culture, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, Indonesia
- Azra, A., (2004). Recent development of Indonesian Islam, *The Indonesian quarterly*, 32(1) (pp.13- 26).
- Azra, A., (2003). The Megawati presidency : Challenge of political Islam. In Soesastro (Ed.), *Governance in Indonesian: Challenges facing the Megawati presidency*, (pp. 45-67). Retrieved from [http://books.google.com.au/books?id=neScuzgMGPMC&pg=PA68&dq=Islamic+fundamentalisme+in+Indonesia&hl=en&sa=X&ei=hxReUtr8HoeLkwXlyoD4Bw&redir\\_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Islamic%20fundamentalisme%20in%20Indonesia&f=false](http://books.google.com.au/books?id=neScuzgMGPMC&pg=PA68&dq=Islamic+fundamentalisme+in+Indonesia&hl=en&sa=X&ei=hxReUtr8HoeLkwXlyoD4Bw&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Islamic%20fundamentalisme%20in%20Indonesia&f=false)
- Baidhawiy, Z. (2011). The concept of *Jihad* and *Mujahid* of peace. In H. Kato(Ed.), *The Clash of Ijtihad Fundamentalist versus Liberal Muslims*(118-143). New Delhi : ISPCCK (the Indian Society for the Promoting Christian Knowledge).
- Barker, E. (1996). *New Religious Movements*. London: SAGE Publication.
- Bamualim, C.S. (2008). What's wrong with the notion of *Jihad*? . In C.Scott & I.Abubakar (Ed.), *Contemporary Issues in The Islamic World The Indonesian Perspective*, CSSR (Center for Study of religion and Culture, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, Indonesia
- Bauman, Z. (2004). *Identity*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Brauchler, B., (2004). Islam radicalism Online ; The Moluccan Mission of the Laskar Jihad in Cyberspace. *The Australian Journal of Anthropology*, 15(3), 267-285  
doi : 10.1111/j.1835-9310.2004.tb.00098.x
- Bromley, (2004). *Teaching of New Religious Movements*. London: SAGE Publication.
- Castells, M. (1996). *The Power of Identity*. Sussex, UK : Wilew-Blackwell.
- Côté, J. E., & Levine, C. G. (2002). *Identity formation, agency, and culture: A social psychological synthesis*. Mahwah, NJ: L. Erlbaum.
- Davidson, L. (2003), *Islamic Fundamentalism, An introduction*, rev.ed, London: Greenwood Press.
- Du Gay, P., & Hall, S. (1996). *Questions of cultural identity*. London: Sage.
- Eliraz, G., (2004). Islamic radicalism in Indonesia: The global and historical contexts, *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, 38, 1, pp. 125-127
- Hamid, S. (2009). The attraction of “authentic “Islam. In R. Meijer (Ed.), *Global Salafism, Islam's New Religious Movement* , New York : Colombia University Press.
- Hardacre, H. (1993). The Impact of fundamentalism on women, the family and interpersonal relations. In R.S. Appleby (Ed.), *Fundamentalisms and Society*, (pp.139-147). Chicago : The University of Chicago Press.
- Hashemi, N. (2009). *Islam, secularism, and liberal democracy : Toward a democratic theory*

for Muslim societies, [SpringerLink version]. Doi :  
10.1093/acpro:oso/9780195321241.001.0001

- Jenkins, R. (2002). *Pierre Bourdieu*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Kato, H. (2011). *The clash of ijihad fundamentalists versus liberal Muslims*, New Delhi : ISPCK.
- Khondker, H.H., (2004). The role of the new media in the Arab Spring . *Globalization*, 8(5), 675-679 . doi : 10.1080/14747731.2011.621287
- Lehmann, D., (1998). Fundamentalism and globalism, *Third World Quarterly*, 19(4) , p. 607-634 .
- Lim, M., (2005). Islamic radicalism and anti-Americanism in Indonesia : The role of the internet, *Policy Studies 18*. Washington: East –West Center. Retrieved from <http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/3520/PS018.pdf?sequence=1>
- Littlejohn, S.W.& Foss, K.A., (2009). Religious Communication Theories ., *Encyclopedia of Communication Theories*, Thousand Oaks : SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Maltby, S., (2012). The mediatization of the military, *Media, War & Conflict*, 5(3) , p. 255-268 . doi: 10.1177/1750635212447908
- McCurdy, P. (2013). Mediation, practice and lay theories of news media. In B. Cammaerts, Mattoni, A & McCurdy, P (Ed.), *Mediation and Protest Movements* (pp.59-74). Bristol: UK.
- Meijer, R. (2009). *Global Salafism, Islam's New Religious Movement* , New York : Colombia University Press.
- Muzakki, A. (2009). *The Islamic Publication Industry in Modern Indonesia : Intellectual Transmission, Ideology and The Profit Motive*, (a thesis for degree of Doctor of Philosophy at The University of Queensland, Australia) Retrieved from <http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:196965>
- Muzakki, A. (2012). Islamic televangelism in changing Indonesia : Transmission, authority and the politics of ideas. In P.N. Thomas (Ed.), *Televangelista & Zealous Media* (45-63). New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nash, M. (1993). Islamic resurgence in Malaysia and Indonesia. In R.S. Appleby (Ed.), *Fundamentalisms Observed* (691-757). Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press .
- Osman, Mohamed N. M., (2010). Reviving the caliphate in the nusantara: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's mobilization strategy and its impact in Indonesia', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22(4) , p. 610-612 . doi: 10.1080/09546553.2010.496317
- Powe, K & Hexham, I., (1986) *Understanding Cults and new religions*, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.

- Qodir, Z., (2011), *Sosiologi Agama (The Sociology of Religion)*, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.
- Qodir, Z., (2013), *HTI dan PKS menuai kritik : Perilaku gerakan Islam politik Indonesia, ( the HTI and PKS reaped criticism: The attitude of Islamic political movement in Indonesia)*, Yogyakarta: JKSG, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta.
- Rahmat, M. I., (2005), *Arus baru Islam radikal: Transmisi revivalisme Timur Tengah ke Indonesia (The new wave of radical Islam: Revivalism transmission of the Middle East to Indonesia)*. Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga.
- Robbins, T. (2004). Alternative religions, the State, and the Globe. In T. Robbins (Ed.), *New religious movements in the 21st century* (1-23). New York and London : Routledge.
- Saliba, J.A. (1996), *Understanding New Religious Movements*, London : Routledge Publication.
- Sattar, A. (2013). Fenomena Sosial Fundamentalisme Islam (Islamic Fundamentalism as a social phenomenon), *Jurnal Sosiologi Islam*, 3(1) , p. 1 - 15  
retrieved from <http://jsi.uinsby.ac.id/index.php/jsi/article/view/30>
- Ward, K. (2009). Non-violent extremists? Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 63(2), pp. 149-164. doi: 10.1080/10357710902895103
- Wilkins & Chrissydale. (2006). *Cult*. London: Sage.
- Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004), *Islamic Activism : A social movement theory approach*, Indianapolis : Indiana University Press.
- Yin, R K. (2003), *Case study research: Design and methods*. London: Sage Publications
- Yusanto, M.I. (2011), Caliphate, *Shari'a* and the Future of *Umat*. In H. Kato(Ed.), *The Clash of Ijtihad Fundamentalist versus Liberal Muslims*(118-143). New Delhi : ISPCCK (the Indian Society for the Promoting Christian Knowledge.
- Zeidan David. (2001), The Islamic Fundamentalist View of Life as A Perennial Battle', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 5:4, pp. 26-53.